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The articles in this special issue of Court Review provide the reader with abroad introduction to the emerging field of Law and Neuroscience. Manyof these articles are specifically adapted and updated from previous pub-
lications for Court Review readers; others were written specifically for this issue.
The special issue begins with an overview article by professors Owen Jones,
Joshua Buckholtz, Jeffrey Schall, and René Marois—whose collective expertise
spans law, biology, psychology, and neuroscience—surveying the ways in which
brain science has been, and continues to be, integrated into law. The next article,
by law professor David Faigman, places attention
on one of the most difficult challenges inherent in
neurolaw: what can the legal system reasonably
infer about individuals before the court from
group-based neuroscience data?
The next article, by lawyer and psychiatrist
Susan Rushing, explores questions of admissibil-
ity in the illustrative context of Positron Emission
Tomography (PET), which courts have encoun-
tered for some years. The issue then shifts to con-
sider two special topics where neuroscience research may have great import for
law: adolescent brain development and pain. Psychologist Laurence Steinberg, a
leading authority on adolescent development, discusses how the science should
(and should not) be applied. Law professor Amanda Pustilnik then explores both
the promise and limitations of using pain neuroimaging research to resolve legal
disputes.
Law professor and psychologist Stephen Morse looks to the future of neuro-
law in the next article, cautioning against over-enthusiasm but pointing out areas
where neuroscience contributions may be most salient.
The issue concludes with law professor Francis Shen’s essay summarizing a
compendium of resources, for background information or for more extensive
consultation, related to neuroscience in the courtroom.
The preparation of this special issue was aided, in part, by support 
from the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience
(www.lawneuro.org).—Francis X. Shen and Owen D. Jones
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I write this message energized by the exciting AJAmidyear meeting and Scottsdale, Arizona, the site ofthe meeting. Over the course of the two-and-a-half
days spent together networking with colleagues, getting
reacquainted with longtime AJA friends, and making new
ones,  we were able to spend time in structured sessions
celebrating our achievements and planning new strate-
gies to move AJA forward.   We learned new skills and
ways of thinking to make better judges.  Based on the
evaluations, all of the planning and education sessions
received “excellent” ratings both for content and fac-
ulty/facilitator skills.
AJA remains the largest and possibly the
most robust judicial organization representing
boots-on-the-ground judges in the United
States and Canada.  We are well branded as
the Voice of the Judiciary® and are preemi-
nent at Making Better Judges®. This was con-
firmed when we reviewed our achievements
over the last 10 years.  
We benefit from the considerable volunteer
efforts of individual members of our organiza-
tion. So, in case you ever wonder about the
truth of the adage “what goes around, comes around,”
consider this: Kevin Burke was not able to be in Scotts-
dale because he was pursuing AJA’s branding in the area
of procedural fairness by speaking to judges at a confer-
ence in my home state of Massachusetts. When he was
finished, he sent me the following text: 
I had [a] terrific experience [in Massachusetts].
Several years ago, a Massachusetts judge set bail on
a guy who went on a killing spree in Seattle. It was,
as you may recall, horrific. Mitt Romney attacked
her. Steve Leben and I wrote a commentary for the
Seattle Times defending her. Neither Steve nor I
knew her. We just thought she was a judge in need
of a defense. When the article was published, I
never heard from her. But when I came in the room
yesterday, she sought me out and was pretty pro-
fuse in her thanks. She said it was a hard time for
her. She had stopped reading newspapers and
watching the news. Her husband found the article
and said: “You should read this.” That exchange
with her made the trip to Boston worthwhile.
Thanks for getting me there.
This is just one example of the work our members do
to make AJA a voice for judges. 
But Scottsdale was more than just feeling good about
the past.  The enthusiasm expressed during the participa-
tory planning and education sessions car-
ried forward to the business portions of the
conference where AJA’s entire leadership
committed to working in a more focused
and robust way to achieve the following
four goals:
1. Be a stronger and clearer voice BOTH of
and for the judiciary. 
2. Make better judges.
3. Provide and promote more innovative
and high-quality educational opportu-
nities for judges and the public.  
4. Play a key role in fulfilling the promise of justice for all
by advocating for and promoting strategies that evi-
dence supports as being effective in improving the
administration of justice.  
To help achieve these goals, AJA’s leadership under-
stands that AJA must retain its membership, revitalize the
commitment of members to the goals of the organization,
and increase the number of members.  AJA is committed
to the principle that AJA does its best work at making bet-
ter judges when we work together in robust ways to make
each other better judges.  That is our recipe to make AJA
grow and prosper. So look at our website—
www.amjudges.org—to learn more specifics about our
good work.
I’m proud of our organization and proud to represent it.
President’s Column
A RECIPE TO MOVE AJA FORWARD
Elliott Zide
This article is reprinted and adapted with permission from: Owen D.
Jones, Joshua W. Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall & René Marois, Brain
Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 5, for the convenience of the reader who would benefit from
background information about neuroscience and the law prior to
reading the other articles in this issue. The full text of the article,
including an example of how to read a brain-imaging study, is avail-
able online at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563612. Additional back-
ground materials have been collected by the MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience: http://lawneuro.org/
resources.php, and in extensive coursebook materials, OWEN D.
JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
(2014) (www.vanderbilt.edu/lawbrain).   
Footnotes
1. For an overview of issues, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the
Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49; Stacey A. Tovino,
Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for
Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). A sampling of the
rapidly growing scholarship at the law/neuroscience intersection
appears infra note 31. Professor Shen’s article in this issue pro-
vides an updated compendium of useful resources. Francis X.
Shen, Keeping Up with Neurolaw: What to Know and Where to Look.
50 CT. REV. 64 (2014).
2. The article annotated is: Joshua W. Buckholtz, Christopher L.
Asplund, Paul E. Dux, David Zald, John C. Gore, Owen D. Jones
& René Marois, The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment,
60 NEURON 930 (2008). 
3. A very useful survey, on which we draw in part in the paragraphs
that follow, has been prepared by Professor Carter Snead. See
CARTER SNEAD, NEUROIMAGING AND THE COURTS: STANDARD AND
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE INDEX (2006), http://tinyurl.com/sneadlink. Our
research also benefitted from Gary Marchant, Brain Scanning and
the Courts: Criminal Cases, Presentation to the Research Network
on Legal Decision Making, MacArthur Foundation Law and Neu-
roscience Project (Oct. 11, 2008). 
4. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
5. No. 227592, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 884 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8
2003).
6. 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
7. No. 215512, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2369 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5,
2000).
8. United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89137 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008). See also McMurtey v. Ryan, 539
F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp.
140 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
9. 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
10. 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), overruled on other grounds,
6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389 (2005).
11. 56 P.3d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
12. 17 S.W.3d 193 (Tenn. 2000).
13. 918 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2005).
14. 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999).
It has become increasingly common for brain images to beproffered as evidence in civil and criminal litigation.1 Thisarticle offers some general guidelines to judges about how to
understand brain-imaging studies—or at least avoid misunder-
standing them. (An appendix annotating a published brain-
imaging study, in order to illustrate and explain, with step-by-
step commentary, is available in the full text online.2)
Brain images are offered in legal proceedings for a variety of
purposes, as Professors Carter Snead and Gary Marchant have
usefully surveyed.3 On the civil side, neuroimaging has been
offered in constitutional, personal injury, disability benefit, and
contract cases, among others. For example, in Entertainment
Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,4 the court considered whether a
brain-imaging study could be used to show that exposure to
violent video games increases aggressive thinking and behavior
in adolescents. In Fini v. General Motors Corp.,5 brain scans were
proffered to help determine the extent of head injuries from a
car accident. In Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retire-
ment Plan,6 a former professional football player proffered brain
scans in an effort to prove entitlement to neuro-degenerative
disability benefits. And in Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank &
Trust Co.,7 involving a dispute over the sale of land, the defen-
dant introduced brain images to prove mental incompetency,
resulting in a voidable contract.
In criminal cases, brain images are sometimes invoked to
support an argument that a defendant is incompetent to stand
trial. In United States v. Kasim, for example, Kasim was found to
be demented, and incompetent to stand trial for Medicaid
fraud, on the basis of medical testimony that included brain
images.8 Brain images are also increasingly proffered by the
defense at the guilt-determination phase, in an effort to negate
the mens rea element of a crime, and to thereby avoid convic-
tion. For example, in People v. Weinstein,9 a defendant accused
of strangling his wife and throwing her from a 12th floor win-
dow sought to introduce images of a brain defect, in support of
an argument that he was not responsible for his act. And in Peo-
ple v. Goldstein,10 a defendant sought to introduce a brain image
of an abnormality, in an effort to prove an insanity defense, after
he pushed a woman in front of a subway train, killing her.
Brain images have also been proffered at the sentencing
phase of criminal cases, in furtherance of mitigation. For exam-
ple, in Oregon v. Kinkel,11 a boy convicted of killing and injur-
ing fellow students in a high school cafeteria sought to intro-
duce brain images of abnormalities, in an effort to secure a more
lenient sentence. Brain images have been offered—in Coe v.
State,12 for example—to argue that a convicted murderer is not
competent to be executed. And accessibility to brain-imaging
technology has even been litigated—in Ferrell v. State13 and Peo-
ple v. Morgan14 for instance—in the context of a claim that a
defense counsel’s failure to procure a brain image for the defen-
dant amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
For better or worse, the full complement of cases at the
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15. One of the many efforts underway, within the MacArthur Founda-
tion Law and Neuroscience Project, is a study by Hank Greely and
Teneille Brown to find all actual and attempted uses of neuroimag-
ing in criminal cases in California after January 1, 2006, regardless
of whether such uses are mentioned in published opinions.
16. See, e.g., SCOTT A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESO-
NANCE IMAGING (2d ed. 2009); ALFRED L. HOROWITZ, MRI PHYSICS
FOR RADIOLOGISTS: A VISUAL APPROACH (3d ed. 1995); FUNCTIONAL
MRI: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS (Peter Jezzard et al., 2001).
Useful introductions to broader cognitive neuroscience, of which
brain imaging is but a part, appear in: MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET
AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (3d ed.
2008); JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEURO-
SCIENCE (2006); ESSENTIALS OF NEURAL SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR (Eric
R. Kandel et al. eds., 1995); MARIE T. BANICH, COGNITIVE NEURO-
SCIENCE AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 2004); MARK F. BEAR ET AL.,
NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN (3d ed. 2006); NEUROSCIENCE
(Dale Purves et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
17. The limits of brain-imaging techniques are widely known to
brain-imaging researchers, and many brain-imaging researchers
are broadly concerned about misunderstandings among laypeo-
ple. A non-exhaustive list of important cautionary and explana-
tory articles, which have influenced some of our approaches
below, include: John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You’re Imag-
ing the Brain Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop Using Your Head: A Primer
and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 650
(2003); Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5
PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007); Eric Racine et al., fMRI in the Public
Eye, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 159 (2005); J.D. Trout, Seduc-
tion Without Cause: Uncovering Explanatory Neurophilia, 12
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 281 (2008); Society of Nuclear Medicine
Brain Imaging Council, Ethical Clinical Practice of Functional
Brain Imaging, 37 J. NUCLEAR MED. 1256 (1996); Michael S. Gaz-
zaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412 (2008); Joseph
H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimag-
ing in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007); Russell A.
Poldrack et al., Guidelines for Reporting an fMRI Study, 40 NEU-
ROIMAGE 409 (2008); Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and
What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 869 (2008); WILLIAM
R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: WHAT EVERY LAWYER
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE MIND AND THE BRAIN (2008). One of the
works most critical of how brain-imaging results can be inter-
preted is WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF
LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN (2003).
intersection of neuroscience and law is now too large for com-
prehensive overview—in part because many of the cases do not
result in reported decisions.15 While there is no denying that
brain imaging is a powerful tool, whether used for medical or
legal purposes, it is also clear that, like any tool, brain imaging
can be used for good or for ill, skillfully or sloppily, and in ways
useful or irrelevant.
We are concerned that brain imaging can be misused by
lawyers (intentionally or unintentionally) and misunderstood
by judges and jurors. Consequently, our aim in this article is to
provide information about the operation and interpretation of
brain-imaging techniques, in hopes that it will increase the
extent to which imaging is properly interpreted, and conversely
decrease the extent to which it is misunderstood or misused. 
Part I of the article provides some very brief background on
modern brain imaging, with particular emphasis on one wide-
spread and powerful technique, known as functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). The physics of fMRI, and the statis-
tics accompanying the analyses that generate brain images, are
complicated. We will make no effort to provide a comprehen-
sive or detailed exploration of the subject. There are many
existing textbooks that cover this material to great depths, often
far greater than judges will need to master, for the specific con-
texts in which brain images are (potentially) legally relevant.16
Instead, we will aim here to focus on what a judge needs to
know in order to have a basic understanding of what works
how and why. Our goal is to present this in an accessible way,
recognizing (as we trust our readers to allow us) that simplify-
ing discussions are illustrative of general principles, but obvi-
ously ignore the richer detail that enables deeper appreciation
of important caveats and subtleties.
Part II of this article then turns to provide, in brief and acces-
sible overview, a variety of key concepts to understand about the
legal, biological, and brain-imaging contexts at this particular
law/neuroscience intersection, as well as a variety of guidelines
we (and in some cases others) recommend to help avoid the var-
ious factual errors, logical traps,
and analytic missteps that can all
too quickly lead away from sound
and sensible understandings of
what brain images can mean—and
equally what they cannot. Make no
mistake: we are not the only
researchers concerned about poten-
tial misunderstandings of brain
images.17 A great many cautions
have been swirling about in the lit-
erature, often offering multiple ver-
sions of key and basic points about
the limitations of the technologies, and we hope here to distill
some of those, add others, and explain the set in a way that we
hope provides a concise and useful introduction to judges
approaching this interdisciplinary nexus for the first time.
The online appendix to this article then provides a concrete
illustration of how to read an fMRI study. We will not over-
claim. Some of the details of fMRI defy short descriptions,
involve technical details unlikely to be relevant in legal con-
texts, or both. On the other hand, much of the technical jargon,
and many of the basic concepts one will encounter in an fMRI
study, are clear with just a little explanation, oriented toward
the audience we anticipate. We attempt to provide this in an
accessible, informative way—assuming no particular scientific
sophistication of the reader.
Specifically, the core of the online appendix is a 2008 fMRI
study (co-authored by three of us and others) that used fMRI
techniques to investigate how brains are activated during pun-
ishment decisions. Though we do not anticipate that the sub-
stantive findings will necessarily find immediate utility in liti-
gation, we believe that judges reading an fMRI study will learn
most from a study that inherently addressed matters relevant to
law—in this case, the decision whether or not to punish some-
one for criminal behavior and, if so, how much.
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“We are 
concerned that
brain imaging
can be 
misused by
lawyers. . . and 
misunderstood
by judges and
jurors.”
18. This signal is used in conjunction with measures like heart rate
and skin electrical conductance to constitute the polygraph pro-
cedure that is used commonly in a context of detecting deception.
Although used commonly by the U.S. government and police
departments, the fundamental limitations of these procedures
have been thoroughly described. See, e.g., COMM. TO REVIEW THE
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003).
19. STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL
TECHNIQUE (2005). Some have attempted to use ERP signals in
legal settings, but the limitations of this approach are well known
and can serve as lessons for the interpretation of brain-imaging
information.
20. The leading “f” remains lowercase, by convention.
21. See generally HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 16.
22. There are varying opinions in the neuroscience community about
how conclusive an understanding there is of the fMRI signal’s rela-
tionship to the activity of neurons, and about how much fMRI can
reveal—beyond where brain activation occurred—about behavior
and mental states. See, e.g., Logothetis, supra note 17; Poldrack et
al., supra note 17. 
23. Magnetic fields are described in Tesla units. A 3-Tesla machine
(which uses super-cooled electrical coils) generates a magnetic
field roughly 60,000 times the magnetic field of the Earth.
To facilitate that learning in
this concrete application, the
Stanford Technology Law Review
generously afforded us the
unique opportunity to annotate
the article in the margin with
explanations of various terms
and contexts, as they appear
throughout the study. 
I. BRAIN IMAGING: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW
There are many kinds of brain images. All readers are likely
familiar with the way x-rays, and the closely aligned technique
known as computed tomography (CT) scanning, can show vari-
ous structural anomalies in the body, including in the brain. In
these techniques, radiation aimed at and passing through the
body forms images on photographic film. The varying density of
different tissues in the body results in varying levels of radiation
reaching the film—creating, in turn, an image of internal struc-
tures. (For example, bone tissue appears as white, while soft tis-
sue appears gray.) CT scanning varies from conventional x-rays
by virtue of collecting images from multiple angles rotating
around the body, which images are then combined by computers
into cross-sectional representations. These techniques (like mag-
netic resonance imaging, which will be discussed in a moment)
are used for information about how various parts of the body are
structured. They can show whether structures are intact, and can
reveal damage, atrophy, intrusions, and developmental anom-
alies. They do not, however, collect or provide information about
how those body parts are actually functioning.
PET, which refers to positron emission tomography, is one of
the techniques that enable researchers to learn about how the
brain functions, as it is actually doing so. With PET, a researcher
injects a subject with radioactive tracers that move through the
bloodstream and accumulate in different locations and concen-
trations in the brain, over time, as different parts of the brain
increase and decrease activity (such as glucose metabolism) that
is associated with brain function. (A similar technique, known
as SPECT, uses single photon emission computed tomography.)
EEG and MEG, short for electroencephalography and mag-
netoencephalography respectively, record electromagnetic fluc-
tuations in various parts of the brain, as the brain is function-
ing, using non-invasive sensors applied to the scalp.18 In
research laboratories, the EEG signals can be analyzed in rela-
tion to stimuli or responses to obtain event-related potentials
(ERP), which were used before brain imaging was developed to
make inferences about the brain processes underlying percep-
tual, cognitive, and motor processes.19
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging20) uses the
technology of regular magnetic resonance imaging adapted to
detect changes in hemodynamic (literally “blood movement”)
properties of the brain occurring when the subject is engaged in
very specific mental tasks. In a nutshell (and with a reminder
that we are over-simplifying for heuristic purposes) here’s how
it works.
At its most basic, fMRI can be understood as a tool for learn-
ing which regions of the brain are working, how much, and for
how long, during particular tasks. In much the same way that
the body delivers more oxygen to muscles that are working
harder, the body delivers more oxygen to brain regions that
work harder. The fMRI technique measures blood oxygenation
levels—within small cubic volumes of brain tissue known as
“voxels”—as those levels change across time with the varying
metabolic demands of active neurons.21 Changes in demand for
oxygen are widely considered to be reliable proxies for inferring
the fluctuating activity of the underlying neural tissue.22
The physical principles underlying fMRI are quite complex.
But in general terms the technology works as follows: An fMRI
machine creates and manipulates a primary magnetic field,23 as
well as several smaller magnetic fields (one in each three-
dimensional plane) that can be quickly varied in orientation
and uniformity. Recall (from basic physics) that protons within
the nuclei of atoms spin on an axis and carry a positive charge.
As they spin, these electric charges form what can be thought
of as tiny magnets. When a person is inserted (typically hori-
zontally) into the open bore of an fMRI machine, the previ-
ously random axes of spin, for many protons, align, like iron
filings along a magnet. That is, the axes begin to point in the
same direction. Researchers then administer to the subject’s
head brief radio frequency pulses (which usually originate
from a device looking rather like a small birdcage that sur-
rounds the subject’s head). Those pulses deflect the protons’
axes of spin temporarily. When the pulses stop, the axes grad-
ually return to their original orientation, releasing energy dur-
ing that “relaxation” process. The machine can detect charac-
teristics of the released energy because it depends on a proton’s
“local” magnetic environment, and this environment is
affected by the relative concentrations of oxygenated and
deoxygenated blood in local brain tissue. Crucially, as these
concentrations are affected by regional changes in brain activ-
ity, they provide indirect markers of neural activity that form
the basis of the fMRI signal. The machine enables localization
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24. MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TES-
TIMONY (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2006). Chapter One pro-
vides an excellent overview of the “general acceptance” and valid-
ity tests. It examines the cases that established those tests and dis-
cusses subsequent cases that applied and further developed those
tests. 
25. Interested readers can find further information about these back-
ground principles in a variety of sources (as well as in the citations
that they, in turn, provide). See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Schall, On Building
a Bridge Between Brain and Behavior, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 23
(2004). 
of these signals in space—i.e. “spatial resolution”—by collect-
ing them from many different “slices” of the brain. And the
technique enables localization of these signals in time—i.e.,
“temporal resolution”—by recording the signals many times
over a period of several seconds for each mental event. A
“stack” of slices comprising the whole brain is acquired every
couple of seconds or so, enabling the rapid collection of many
of these three-dimensional “volumes” of brain activity over the
period of an experimental paradigm.
II. KEY CONCEPTS AND GUIDELINES
This part is divided into four sections. These address the legal
context, the biological context, the intersection of law and biol-
ogy, and finally, with that preparatory background, the brain-
imaging context. We proceed in this way because one cannot
gain a clear understanding of brain imaging, and its intersection
with the legal system, without first considering the underlying
legal and biological contexts, and their background interactions.
A. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
With terrific, new, whiz-bang technology—which can reveal
inner structures and workings of the brain—it is all too tempt-
ing to jump past the more mundane legal issues, and to race to
apply new techniques to solve new problems in new ways.
But hold the horses. Although our principal purpose here is
to discuss how to read (and not read) brain-imaging evidence,
we would be remiss not to first anchor the discussion in the
legal contexts in which those images might, arguably, be
admissible. The territory here is broad, and could occupy us
for some time. But to be brief, there are a variety of questions
to keep in mind at the outset in order to understand the spe-
cific legal context in which brain imaging might be considered
in the courtroom.
The threshold consideration, of course, is: Are the proffered
brain images relevant? Because behavior comes from the brain,
and the legal system often cares not only about how someone
acted but also why, it is tempting to assume that brain images
of people important to the litigation will provide legally rele-
vant information, of one sort or another. But this is, in fact, not
a decision to reach lightly.
What specific legal questions do the images purportedly
address? Contexts vary considerably, even within the civil and
criminal halves of the docket (each of which bears differing
underlying standards of proof). Within civil cases, for example,
there are a wide variety of different legal purposes into which
brain images might conceivably plug. Are brain images prof-
fered to help establish liability, such as in the case of a medical
malpractice action? To demonstrate a pre-existing condition,
such as in the case of a dispute over insurance coverage? To
help estimate damages, such as in the case of a car accident?
And within criminal cases, are brain images proffered during
the liability phase, in an effort to
defeat the prosecution’s claim that
the defendant had (and was there-
fore capable of having) the mental
state requisite for conviction? Are
they instead proffered during the
sentencing phase, in an effort to
mitigate penalty? Are they proffered
as evidence of lying or truthfulness?
It is important to remember that
the admissibility of brain images is
not simply a matter of whether they
are scientifically sound. The poten-
tial relevance and hence admissibility of brain images will vary,
according to the specific legal issue at hand within civil and crim-
inal contexts. Put another way, the admissibility of brain images
depends largely on their perceived potential relevance (if any)
to the issue to be determined, independent of (and often before)
considering the quality and interpretation of the specific images
themselves.
What, specifically, do the images allegedly demonstrate, and
how well does that connect to the legal issues at hand? Some of the
many variables that may come into play here include: Are these
structural or functional images? When were they taken? (For
example, before or after events in question?) How recently?
Under what circumstances were they procured? (For example,
what specific mental tasks was the subject executing during
functional imaging?) What is being compared to what? (For
example: Are these before and after images of the same brain?
Are these comparisons between a party’s brain and a group-
averaged composite, for contrast?)
What are the applicable standards for the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence? As is well known, the federal and state systems
can have (and often do have) different standards for the admis-
sion of scientific evidence. And the state standards vary among
the states. It is therefore necessary to note that the backdrop of
all that follows below is the specific legal regime under which
images are to be evaluated for potential relevance, within the
specific context of the specific matters in dispute. Although it is
not our purpose here to explore the applicability of scientific-
evidence law to brain images, we would be remiss not to flag
the centrality of evidentiary rules and contexts to all that fol-
lows. Interested readers will find comprehensive discussion of
scientific evidence generally in the treatise MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE.24
B. THE BIOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Understanding the potential relevance of brain images to law
also requires a few words of general background about the rela-
tionship between biology and behavior generally. Key things to
keep in mind (generally speaking) include:25
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26. Yes, the alert reader will point out that some behavior, such as
reflexes, leaps right out of the spinal cord. In the text, we are
speaking in generalities. 
27. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behav-
ioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). See also LAW & THE
BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2006); LAW, MIND,
AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2009);
THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW (Nita Fara-
hany ed., 2009); Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in
Context, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 81 (2006); bibliographic
sources compiled on the website of The Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law (www.sealsite.org). 
28. For more details, see sources cited supra note 16.
• All behavior results from the
interaction of genes, environ-
ments (including social con-
texts), developmental history,
and the evolutionary processes
that built the brain to function
in the ways it does.
• Behavior originates in the phys-
ical and chemical activities of
the brain.26
• All behavior is thus “biologi-
cal.”
• Understanding behavior as biological in nature does not
mean that behavior is “biologically determined” in a reduc-
tionist or reliably predictive way.
• The brain is an evolved information-processing organ that,
generally speaking, and through differing processes, associ-
ates various environmental inputs with various behavioral
outputs.
• Those environmental influences are (generally speaking)
unique for each individual.
• Each person’s brain, though highly flexible, is both anatom-
ically and functionally specialized. (That is, brains do not
consist of undifferentiated all-purpose tissue.)
• Humans share, across the species, a common brain plan of
anatomical and functional specialization.
• Each brain is slightly different in size, shape, and other
anatomical features.
• One area of the brain can affect multiple behaviors.
• A given behavior arises from multiple areas of the brain.
• Different individuals can use different parts of the brain, in
different ways, on the same cognitive tasks.
• Behavior is a complex phenomenon, neither attributable to
single causes, nor easily parsed among multiple causes.
• Cognitive phenomena rarely originate from a single region
in the brain.
C. THE INTERSECTIONS OF BIOLOGY AND LAW
The potential relevance of brain imaging to law must be
evaluated against the broader background of the intersections
of law and human biology (both structural and behavioral)
generally.27
• Like the rest of behavior, both criminal and law-abiding
behavior originates in the brain.
• There is no brain structure, or set of brain structures, that is
specifically “for” criminal or law-abiding behavior (since
those categorizations of behavior are socially determined).
• To say that brain features influence behavior relevant to
crime does not mean that brain features can necessarily
explain why certain individuals behaved criminally.
• No explanation of any kind, brain-based or otherwise, has
an automatic bearing on justification or exculpation or mit-
igation in law.
• Legal responsibility for behavior is a legal conclusion, not a
scientific finding.
• Establishing a “biological basis” for behavior carries no
automatic, normative relevance to anything (legal or other-
wise).
• Norms, though influenced by biology, can never be justified
by biology alone.
D. THE BRAIN-IMAGING CONTEXT (USING FMRI)
With that brief but foundational background, drawing atten-
tion to the legal and biological contexts, and to their interac-
tion, we can now turn to discuss key concepts about brain
imaging that judges should know:28
1. Anatomical imaging and functional imaging are impor-
tantly different.
Two anatomical images, taken one minute apart, will ordi-
narily look identical. Yet two functional images, from data col-
lected one minute apart, could look completely different. One
reason this is so is simply that, in the latter case, brain activity
changes rapidly. Another reason is because fMRI brain images
are built statistically, not recorded photographically. In the typ-
ical fMRI case, hundreds of recordings are made of each voxel
in the brain, at slightly different times (e.g., every two seconds).
Each recording of each voxel within a given trial is analogous
to a single frame in a movie. Learning what happens within
each voxel, over time, is akin to watching motion seem to
emerge from the successive snapshots that comprise a moving
picture. But that metaphor only captures part of the fMRI tech-
nique, because there are subsequently many repeat recordings
of that voxel, under similar conditions, on many consecutive
trials—the results of which are typically then averaged across
trials. Complicating matters further is that there are about
100,000 voxels within the brain, and what typically matters is
how neural activity within those voxels is varying over time, in
relation to some task a subject undertakes while being scanned.
Furthermore, within each voxel are millions of neurons of dif-
ferent types, interacting in ways that could be mechanistically
different but indistinguishable from the measure of fMRI. In the
end, fMRI brain images lay the result of any one of many possi-
ble statistical tests overtop of an anatomical image of a selected
slice of the brain. That is, an fMRI image is a composite of an
anatomical image, of the researcher’s choosing, and a statistical
representation of the brain activity in that image, also of the
researcher’s choosing.
2. Functional brain imaging is not mind reading.
There is more to a thought than blood flow and oxygen.
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29. There appear to be some exceptions. See, e.g., John-Dylan Haynes
et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURRENT
BIOLOGY 323 (2007) (determining through brain imaging, with up
to 71% accuracy, which of two tasks a person is covertly intend-
ing to perform); Y. Kamitani & F. Tong, Decoding the Visual and
Subjective Contents of the Human Brain, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
679 (2005) (determining through brain imaging, with near 80%
accuracy, which of two overlapping visual patterns a person is
paying attention to); S. A. Harrison & F. Tong, Decoding Reveals
the Contents of Visual Working Memory in Early Visual Areas, 458
NATURE 632–35 (2009) (determining through brain imaging, with
83-86% accuracy, which of two visual patterns a person is actively
maintaining in memory).
30. Consider this quote from a popular account: 
With PET, for example, a depressed brain will show up
in cold, brain-inactive deep blues, dark purples, and hunter
greens; the same brain when hypomanic however, is lit up
like a Christmas tree, with vivid patches of bright reds and
yellows and oranges. Never has the color and structure of
science so completely captured the cold inward deadness of
depression or the vibrant, active engagement of mania. 
KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND
MADNESS 196 (1995). Our point here is that the colors used are
arbitrary, and may have been represented in this way to create pre-
cisely this impression. 
fMRI is very good at discovering where brain tissue is active
(commonly by highlighting differences between brain activa-
tions during different cognitive tasks). But differences are not
thoughts. fMRI can show differences in brain activation across
locations, across time, and across tasks. But that often does not
enable any reliable conclusion about precisely what a person is
thinking.29
3. Scanners don’t create fMRI brain images; people create
fMRI brain images.
Images are only as good as the manner in which the
researcher designed the specific task or experiment, deployed
the machine, collected the data, analyzed the results, and gen-
erated the images. It is important to remember that fMRI
images are the result of a process about a process. Multiple
choices and multiple steps go into determining exactly what
data will be collected, how, and when—as well as into how the
data will be analyzed and how it will be presented.
4. Group-averaged and individual brain images are
importantly different.
Most brain-imaging research is directed toward understand-
ing how the average brain, within a subject population, is acti-
vated during different tasks. This is not at all the same thing as
saying either that all brains performing the same task activate in
the average way, or saying that the activation of a single brain
can tell us anything meaningful about the operation of the aver-
age brain. Consequently:
Do not assume that the scan of any individual is
necessarily representative of any group.
Do not assume that the averaged scan of any group
will necessarily be representative of any individual.
5. There is no inherent meaning to the color on an fMRI
brain image.
fMRI does not detect colors in the brain. fMRI images use
colors—of whatever segment of the rainbow the researcher
prefers—to signify the result of a statistical test. By convention,
the brighter the color (say, yellow compared to orange) the
greater the statistical significance of the differences in brain
activity between two conditions. Put another way, the brighter
the color, the less likely it is that the differences in brain activ-
ity in that voxel or region, between two different cognitive
tasks, was due to chance alone. As with any color-coded repre-
sentation, accurate interpretation requires knowing exactly
what each color represents in absolute terms. The researcher
specifies what each color will represent, and this matters. Yel-
low might mean that there is only one chance in 1,000 that the
difference between brain activa-
tions in this voxel, between con-
ditions, is due to random chance.
Or, yellow might mean that there
is one chance in 20 that the differ-
ence is due to random chance.30
6. fMRI brain images do
not speak for themselves.
No fMRI brain image has auto-
matic, self-evident significance.
Even well-designed, well-exe-
cuted, properly analyzed, properly generated images must have
their import, in context, interpreted.
7. Classification of an anatomical or behavioral feature of
the brain as normal or abnormal is not a simple thing.
Because we have learned a great deal about the brain, from
dissection, imaging, and the like, we have some confidence
about what a typical brain looks like, and how a typical brain
functions. But even without full anatomical scans of everyone
on the planet, we know there is considerable variation—both
anatomically and functionally—within some general parame-
ters. That means that it can be (with some exceptions, such as
a bullet lodged in the brain) difficult to say with precision how
uncommon a given feature or functional pattern may be, even
if it appears to be atypical. Base rates for anatomical or func-
tional conditions are often unknown. For example: suppose
brain images show that a defendant has an abnormal brain fea-
ture. We often do not have any idea how many people with
nearly identical abnormalities do not behave as the defendant
did. How, then, to make a reasonable conclusion about the
causal effect of the brain condition?
8. Even when an atypical feature of function is identified,
understanding the meaning of that is considerably
complex.
Brain images can show unique features and functions of a
person’s brain. But the meaning of them is rarely self-evident.
Determining which of those are important, and how, depends
not only on the legal context for which the images are offered,
but also on expert analysis of what the images do and do not
mean. For example, suppose that measurement of the fMRI-
detected signal during a given cognitive task indicates that a
person has less neural activity in a given region than the aver-
age person. Does that mean that the person is somehow cogni-
tively impaired in that region? Or might it alternatively indi-
cate that the person has more expertise or experience than
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31. See, e.g., LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough,
eds., 2006); LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver R.
Goodenough eds., 2009); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND,
AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent Garland ed., 2004); George J.
Annas, Foreword: Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neu-
roethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163 (2007); Bruce A.
Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: The Case of
Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 457 (2007); Abram
S. Barth, Note and Comment, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of
Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501
(2007); Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH.
U. L.R. 859 (2009); Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom
Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.
L. CONTEXT 233 (2006); Brent Garland & Paul W. Glimcher, Cog-
nitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBI-
OLOGY 130 (2006); Steven Goldberg, MRIs and the Perception of
Risk, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 229 (2007); Oliver R. Goodenough, Map-
ping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and Moral Intu-
ition, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 429 (2001); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience
and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1103 (2008); Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological
Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139 (2008); Henry T. Greely &
Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377 (2007); Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIO-
LOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004); Charles N. W. Keckler, Cross Examining
the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility
average, requiring less cognitive
effort? 
9. Correlation is (still) not cau-
sation.
The fact that two things vary in
parallel tells us little about whether
the two are necessarily causally
related and, if so, which causes
which. For example, suppose brain
imaging reveals that 70% of
inmates on death row for homicide
have atypical brain activation in a
given region, compared to normal,
unincarcerated subjects. That statistic does not mean that the
brain activation pattern causes homicidal behavior. It might
mean that having murdered affects brain activations, or that
being incarcerated for long periods of time affects brain activa-
tions, or something else entirely.
10. Today’s brain is not yesterday’s brain.
In all but the most fanciful of contexts, a brain scan likely
takes place long after the behavior (such as criminal activity)
that gives rise to the scan. Drawing causal inferences is there-
fore further complicated. People’s brains change with age and
experience. And some proportion of the population will
develop atypical anatomical or functional conditions over time.
If a defendant is scanned six months or six years after the act in
question, and the scan detects an abnormality, it is not a simple
matter to conclude with confidence that the same abnormality
was present at the time in question or—even if one assumes so,
arguendo—that it would have meaningfully affected behavior.
11. Scanners (in theory) detect what they are built, pro-
grammed, and instructed to detect, in the way they
are built, programmed, and instructed to detect it.
Scanners are highly complex and often unique pieces of
machinery. So (as in other areas of science) are the people who
calibrate, program, operate, and interpret collected data. It is
important to recognize that the product of these intersecting
complexities may or may not be reliable, generalizable, and
replicable.
12. fMRI brain imaging enables inferences about the
mind, built on inferences about neural activity, built
on the detection of physiological functions believed to
be reliably associated with brain activity.
It is important to remember that fMRI does not provide a
direct measure of neuronal activity—as do, for example, inva-
sive techniques that measure single neuron recordings. fMRI
detects fluctuations in oxygen concentrations thought to be
reliably associated with neuronal activity. But the precise rela-
tionship between metabolic demands and neuronal function
remains poorly understood.
Even if regional activations in brain images reflect true
neural activity, it should also be kept in mind that our ability to
confidently infer the cognitive process that must have led to
such regional activation is highly constrained. This is because
neuroscientists still understand so little about what the various
regions of the human brain contribute to a particular cognitive
function.
CONCLUSION
We have provided above a very brief introduction to the
intersection of brain imaging and law principally intended for
those judges relatively new to this interdisciplinary intersec-
tion. This article also provides some scientific context for the
other articles in this special issue of Court Review.
As reflected in the numerous citations and descriptions of
neuroscience matters in the other articles in the special issue,
courts are already frequently confronted with issues concerning
the admissibility and proper interpretation of brain images. And
all present indicators suggest that brain images will be proffered
by more lawyers in more cases in more contexts for more pur-
poses in the future.
On one hand, the issues for the legal system are simply the
same as they long have been: What might the proffered evi-
dence tell us that may help us to answer legally identified ques-
tions in fair, effective, and efficient ways? Brain imaging is sim-
ply the latest high-tech tool to be offered for its potential assis-
tance in this age-old enterprise.
On the other hand, brain imaging represents a perfect storm
of power, to be used or abused. It combines the authoritative
patina enjoyed by scientific evidence generally, and the allure of
all-modern brain science specifically, with the seductive power
of visual images.
How the legal system will ultimately deal with the exoge-
nous shock of such technologically, rhetorically, and visually
powerful information remains to be seen. To deal with it well,
however, the legal system will need the combined efforts and
advice of many legal and neuroscientific scholars,31 such as
those populating the MacArthur Foundation Research Network
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Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (2007); Richard E. Red-
ding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insan-
ity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006); Robert
Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359
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the Law, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: PERILS AND PROSPECTS 103 (Dai
Rees & Steven Rose eds., 2004); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging
and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265
(2007); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotech-
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32. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neu-
roscience, http://www.lawneuro.org.
33. Gruter Institute, http://www.gruterinstitute.org.
34. Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, http://www.sealsite.org.
on Law and Neuroscience,32 the Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research,33 and the Society for Evolutionary Analy-
sis in Law (SEAL).34 And, fortunately, many efforts are under-
way. In the meantime, judges likely to encounter brain images
in their work would be well-advised to lay carefully constructed
mental templates, on which to hang existing and future infor-
mation emerging from brain-imaging communities. We hope
that what we have discussed here will provide a useful means
for doing so.
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The Uneasy Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and
Introduction, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 847, 852–53 (2008).
4. Daniel B. Mark, Decision-Making in Clinical Medicine, in 1 HARRI-
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al. eds., 16th ed. 2005).
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6. For example, Dr. Jerome Groopman cautions against over-reliance
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each patient. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 5–6 (2007).
7. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 21:6-7, at 27–45
(2008–2009 ed.) (listing cases). Not all science is engaged in
describing cause-and-effect relationships, so “general causation”
and “specific causation” are subcategories of what might more
properly be labeled “general propositions” and “specific applica-
tion.” Sometimes general propositions in science will be stated in
causative terms, but very often they will be associational, techni-
cal, or descriptive. Specific application refers to the determination
whether a particular case is an instance, use, or example of gen-
eral propositions that are supported by research.
Scientists typically study variables at the population level,and most of their methodological and statistical tools aredesigned for this kind of work. The trial process, in con-
trast, ordinarily concerns whether a particular case is an
instance of the general phenomenon. As I have previously
observed, “[w]hile science attempts to discover the universals
hiding among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover
the particulars hiding among the universals.”1 This essential
difference in perspective between what scientists normally do
and what the trial process is ordinarily about has yet to be
studied with any degree of rigor—by scientists or lawyers.2 Yet
this phenomenon is endemic to virtually every context in
which law and science meet. Indeed, it might be said to be the
single greatest obstacle to the law’s rational use of science.3
The challenges associated with individualizing science,
however, are not unique to the law. In fact, in a wide variety of
social contexts, empirical research exploring general phenom-
ena are sought to be applied reliably to individual cases. In
medicine, for example, research on the effectiveness of various
cancer therapies will inform a particular patient’s decision
regarding which therapy to choose. In meteorology, research
on hurricanes will inform a governor’s decision regarding
whether to evacuate a particular city. Indeed, all applied sci-
ence, ranging from aerodynamics to zoology, potentially pre-
sents the problem of making decisions about discrete cases
based on group data. Different fields have adapted strategies to
respond to the evidentiary-incommensurability challenge with
differing degrees of success. In medical decision-making, for
example, evidence-based medicine is one way that doctors
have sought to bring data to bear on individual diagnostic and
therapeutic judgments.4 Meteorologists generate computer
models that describe the likelihoods associated with a storm’s
path and strength.5 At least from an outsider’s perspective,
these efforts have not been so successful that courts would
want to borrow them wholesale.6
How and whether general data can be usefully employed to
inform decisions about individual events is a problem that is
central to the law’s function. In fact, courts are generally
acquainted with the difficulties inherent in employing general
scientific data to reach conclusions about specific cases. The
primary area in which courts have considered this matter is in
medical causation cases where they distinguish routinely
between “general causation” and “specific causation.”7 Courts
and legal scholars have not, however, engaged in a careful
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study of the details and intricacies associated with this matter
across the wide spectrum of cases in which it presents itself. In
addition, although the courts are passingly familiar with the
problem of evidentiary incommensurability, they naturally
approach the subject from their own need for information,
with little appreciation for how and whether scientists can pro-
duce this information. Courts frequently demand empirical
answers despite scientists’ inability to provide them.8 At the
same time, scientists involved in the legal process naturally
approach the problem of incommensurability from the per-
spective of their own desire to produce information, with little
appreciation for how and whether the courts can effectively
use this information.9 It is hardly surprising that scientists
should study the questions that they are most curious about
and able to answer rather than those the law deems most rele-
vant. In short, therefore, the two sides, law and science, per-
ceive incommensurability from their separate vantage points,
which largely perpetuates the problem.
This essay jumps into the center of this conundrum. My
objective, however, is somewhat unusual. It is a call to arms.
I do not aim to resolve the incommensurability paradox but
rather to ring the fire bell. Indeed, given the scope and depth
of the obstacles presented by evidentiary incommensurability,
it is a subject well beyond resolution in the pages provided to
me here. My purpose, then, is to explore the paradox in the
hope that it will help lay a common framework through
which both lawyers and scientists might understand the chal-
lenges presented at the intersection of these two great profes-
sions. This essay, therefore, contemplates many of the sundry
issues that would have to be reckoned with in any subsequent
comprehensive effort to bring systematic rationality to the
problem of employing group data to decide individual cases.
It is divided into two parts. Part I, Hypothesis Testing in Sci-
ence, considers scientific hypothesis testing and the inherent
population focus of most of that work. While most scientific
research focuses on a general population-level analysis,
results of that work can have very different levels of probative
value in regard to informing decision-making at the individ-
ual level. Part II, Framing Empirical Questions in the Court-
room, examines evidentiary demands in the courtroom and
the inherent individualized focus of that process. This part
also considers some of the challenges inherent in any attempt
to close the evidentiary-incommensurability gap between
what most science says and what most legal proceedings need
to know.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN SCIENCE
Scientific research is most often conducted from a general
and population-based perspective. This is a defining charac-
teristic of the field. However, sci-
entific methods, and the phenom-
ena that scientists study, range
widely. Inevitably, the demands of
the empirical context dictate
which set of research designs are,
or might be, available. While
studying the effects of depleted
biodiversity in the Amazon rain-
forest and investigating the inter-
action between neuron and glial
cells in a rat’s brain are both scientific endeavors, the methods
involved are obviously disparate. Yet, from the law’s perspec-
tive, there may be certain insights that persist across scientific
domains in regard to individualizing group data. This section
provides a preliminary sketch of the scientific landscape and
examines whether certain common denominators might be
identified within the process of bringing group data to bear
on individual decisions.
The essential question posed in the context of reasoning
from the group to the individual is whether a particular case is
an instance of the general phenomenon. If smoking causes
lung cancer, the individualized query is whether a particular
person’s lung cancer was caused by smoking. The degree to
which scientific research might be relevant to resolving an
individualized question varies from completely to not-at-all
relevant. In some areas, science might provide a definitive
answer to the question of whether an individual case is an
instance of a general phenomenon. If tobacco smoke is the
only cause of lung cancer, we logically know that someone
with lung cancer got sick from tobacco smoke. In other areas,
science might help increase the accuracy of individual deci-
sion-making along a range of helpfulness, from nearly deter-
minative to just above random chance. If tobacco smoke
causes lung cancer, but many other things, known and
unknown, do so as well, we cannot say with certainty that the
person’s lung cancer was caused by tobacco smoke. The degree
of certainty that the science provides, of course, is the opera-
tive question. Indeed, sometimes even very good science will
not demonstrably improve the accuracy of individual decision-
making, though it might nonetheless be relevant and admissi-
ble in court because it provides the triers of fact with contex-
tual information that will help them understand other evi-
dence in the case.
WHEN GENERAL SCIENCE IS DETERMINATIVE IN 
PARTICULAR CASES
In practice, the law is interested not simply in whether a
particular variable causes a particular effect, but, ultimately, in
8. Among many possible examples that could be cited, possibly the
most obvious is that of predicting violence. Courts call upon
experts in myriad contexts to predict future behavior, from proba-
tion decisions to capital sentencing, though the best empirical
research indicates that such expert opinions remain highly falli-
ble. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Fore-
casting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L.
REV. 391, 405–07 (2006).
9. Scientists do not generally study how to “individualize” their find-
ings in ways that would make their findings more helpful for legal
usage. This is not meant as a criticism, only an observation. Espe-
cially in the social sciences, it is ordinarily sufficient to find a sta-
tistically significant effect among college sophomores. Little atten-
tion has been paid to how the variables studied might operate in
a particular case.
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whether a particular variable did
cause the effect.10 Scientific
research will sometimes identify
a single unidirectional relation-
ship between two variables. In
medicine, the term pathogno-
monic refers to a diagnostic ver-
sion of this insight. A symptom
is pathognomonic when it is
“decisively characteristic of a dis-
ease.”11 For example, “Koplik’s
spots are pathognomonic of
measles.”12 The strongest version
of a path-specific relationship would be the unusual situation
where a cause and an effect are uniquely associated, such that
the cause always produces the effect and the effect is always
attributable to the cause. Outside of basic physics and chem-
istry, however, the strongest version of path-specificity will be
quite rare. Nonetheless, such relationships are possible. This
strong version could be termed cause/effect path-specificity
because the cause and the effect are uniquely tied to one
another.
The law is also interested in weaker versions of path-speci-
ficity. For instance, a particular cause might always produce a
particular effect, but other causes might produce similar
effects. This could be termed causal path-specificity because
the cause always produces a single effect, but other causes
might produce the same effect. An example of this might be a
lesion in a specific part of the brain that produces auditory hal-
lucinations. Anyone with such a lesion would suffer from audi-
tory hallucinations, but not all people with auditory hallucina-
tions have a lesion in that region of the brain. Conversely, a
particular effect might always be produced by a particular
cause, but the cause does not invariably produce the effect.
This could be termed effect path-specificity because the effect
has a single cause, but the cause does not have a single effect.
An example of this is the relationship between asbestos expo-
sure and mesothelioma. The unique cause of mesothelioma is
exposure to asbestos, but not everyone exposed to asbestos
develops mesothelioma.13
In legal proceedings, the strength and nature of path-speci-
ficity is likely to be important. In general, cause/effect path-
specificity will be the most probative kind of scientific evi-
dence available. In contrast, the probative power of causal
path-specificity or effect path-specificity will depend on the
substantive law of the case. For example, in many criminal
cases, the issue will be whether the defendant suffered the rel-
evant effect, and it will not matter greatly that a variety of
causes can produce it. In such cases, scientific evidence of
causal path-specificity would strongly support the defendant’s
case. This would be so in an insanity case in which evidence
that the defendant has a brain lesion that invariably produces
auditory hallucinations would be highly probative, despite the
fact that other factors might cause the same symptoms. Con-
versely, in many civil cases, effect path-specificity will be the
more probative kind of evidence. In the example of mesothe-
lioma, a civil plaintiff who has this disease will be able to trace
it back to asbestos exposure. In many civil cases, a substantial
obstacle to a plaintiff ’s recovery is showing that the effect he
or she suffers from is attributable to a cause associated with
the defendant. Effect path-specificity solves this difficulty. If
the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff ’s asbestos expo-
sure, then the plaintiff ’s mesothelioma is attributable to the
defendant.
WHEN GENERAL SCIENCE IS PROBATIVE, BUT NOT
DETERMINATIVE, IN PARTICULAR CASES
In most applied-science contexts, path-specificity is not
possible, either because it does not exist in actuality or because
scientists’ methods are unable to identify it in those cases in
which it does exist. In most areas of interest to the law, scien-
tific research provides knowledge about cause-and-effect rela-
tionships generally, but will be only more or less determinate
on the question of whether a specific instance of an effect is
attributable to a specific cause, or that a specific cause con-
tributed to a particular effect. In this vast domain, applied sci-
entific research comes in myriad forms, and its value for decid-
ing individual cases varies greatly. In some situations, the sci-
ence will be nearly definitive regarding a specific cause-and-
effect relation, and in others it will do little more than increase
the likelihood slightly above chance that a relevant relation-
ship exists.
As is true with the concept of path-specificity discussed in
the previous section, indeterminate scientific research might
be relevant in legal proceedings in three separately identifiable
ways, regarding (1) effect only, because the cause is known (or
can be assumed); (2) cause only, because the effect is known
(or can be assumed); or (3) both cause and effect. As will
become clear in the discussion that follows, the intended pur-
pose for which the science is to be used is associated with the
demands that courts place on the science itself.
In many legal contexts, only the effect is relevant because
the causal variable is fairly known or is assumed. Indeed, one
of the best-known subjects in law and psychology fits this cat-
egory: eyewitness identification. In eyewitness-identification
research, researchers have found that certain factors interfere
with accuracy, such as presence of a weapon, cross-race identi-
fications, and use of leading questions by interviewers.14 In
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this example, the causal side of the equation is the indepen-
dent variable, which is more or less known or assumed to be
present in the case. The focus, therefore, is principally on what
effect this causal variable has had. Hence, if the witness is
white and the perpetrator is black, the empirical crux of the
matter concerns what effect this causal variable has on the
accuracy of the identification. Other examples in which the
effects are relevant and the cause is known or assumed include
the effects of hypnosis on memory,15 the impact of putatively
prejudicial photographs or images on fact-finders’ judg-
ments,16 and the effect of violent television on viewers.17
In effect-relevant cases—that is, where the cause is known
or assumed and the effects have been the subject of research—
the science is rarely employed to do more than provide gen-
eral insights about those who have experienced the causal
variable of interest. It may very well be, for instance, that
when a gun is present, eyewitness identifications are on aver-
age less accurate than when one is not; but this finding pro-
vides very little information regarding whether any particular
identification is accurate. In the law, general research findings
might very well be relevant and admissible to inform the jury
of factors that might interfere with a witness’s accurate recall,
which the jury could use or ignore as it deemed fit. The sci-
ence in this case, however, says very little about eyewitness
identification.
The second category, and one that arises often in court, is
when the effect is fairly known (or can be assumed), and the
science is offered to demonstrate the cause of that effect.
Whole areas of medical and psychological causation fit this
category, as do some areas of forensic science. In medical cau-
sation, a plaintiff might be known to have leukemia (i.e., the
effect) and the scientifically controverted issue will be whether
one variable (e.g., trichloroethylene) or another caused the ill-
ness. In psychological causation, the same analysis applies. For
example, a witness who suffers from post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) might claim that it was caused by a sexual
assault rather than other causes, such as a failed marriage and
a lost job. Finally, some areas of forensic science fit this cause-
relevant category. The best example is arson investigation. In
the ordinary arson case, the effect is known (i.e., a burned or
exploded structure), but the science is offered to demonstrate
the cause (e.g., purposely set using some incendiary device or
material).
When the proffered science is relevant to determining the
cause of some known effect, it is ultimately meant to operate
diagnostically in regard to the individual case at hand. This
category presents the most classic manifestation of the chal-
lenges associated with applying rea-
soning from group data to decisions
in individual cases. In many areas,
the research provides substantial
evidence of a general connection
between variables, but the science
does not pave a direct path for
extrapolating general data to apply
to the individual case. Ordinarily,
some additional method is used to
bring the general science to the individual case, usually labeled
vaguely as “differential diagnosis” or “differential etiology.”18
This issue is considered in Part II, infra.
The third and final category of scientific relevance is some-
thing of a catch-all and involves those cases in which the sci-
ence informs both the cause and the effect sides of the equa-
tion. In other words, in this category the situation or context
is argued to have legal significance, but the science is necessary
to show how or why this is so. Many psychological claims fall
into this category, as do most forensic identification technolo-
gies. A good example of the former is research on predictions
of violence. The matter of predicting violence has wide signif-
icance in the law, and scientists have sought to provide guid-
ance on this issue by relating one set of variables (i.e., predic-
tors) to another variable (i.e., future violence). Neither the
“cause” nor the “effect” is known outside of the applicable
research. Most forensic-identification technologies operate
similarly. Scientific research on DNA profiling, for instance,
describes both the existence of the phenomenon as well as the
significance of that phenomenon for legal decision-making.
Significantly, both actuarial predictions of violence and DNA
profiling are framed generally, and, to the extent that they are
applied to individual cases, the proffered opinions ordinarily
remain in their general population-based form.19
In the end, law and science are separate disciplines and,
though they often share goals or objectives, neither is nor
should be expected to be the other’s handmaiden. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the methods of science do not cor-
respond neatly to the needs of the law. Yet, at least in a prelim-
inary way, it is possible to identify general pathways of scien-
tific investigation and consider how they sometimes might, but
oftentimes do not, provide the answers to the questions the
law poses. Understanding the parameters of the scientific
enterprise, however, is only the first step in improving the
law’s use of research data. Much of the information the law
needs from science does not fit neatly into conventional modes
of empirical inquiry. Whereas scientists ordinarily study causes
“[T]he methods
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and effects in populations, courts
ordinarily need to determine
causes and effects in particular
individuals. The next section
examines the difficulties endemic
to developing a rigorous individ-
ual-based empiricism.
FRAMING EMPIRICAL QUES-
TIONS IN THE COURTROOM
The basic perspective of most
courtroom proceedings is individ-
ual and specific. Courts look to
answer such questions as whether the defendant killed the vic-
tim, the plaintiff’s leukemia was caused by a chemical pro-
duced by the defendant, the juvenile defendant is competent to
be tried as an adult, the capital defendant is likely to be violent
if not executed, and so forth. While the ultimate issue in most
legal proceedings involves the determination of a particular
fact (or facts), courts well understand that underlying these
specific questions is knowledge about the general world.
Hence, a defendant’s guilt might depend on the general match
probabilities of DNA evidence, and a plaintiff’s civil claim
against a chemical manufacturer might depend partly on epi-
demiological studies showing an association between the
alleged offending chemical and leukemia. Tackling the com-
plex challenge of integrating scientific research into legal deci-
sion-making would be helped considerably if there were a
vocabulary that permitted categorization of the different ways
science might be relevant to legal decision-making. There has
been no shortage of attempts at providing such a taxonomy.20
TAXONOMIES OF FACT-FINDING
The first, and still most influential, taxonomy of fact-find-
ing in law was offered by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis.21
Davis distinguished between what he termed legislative facts
and adjudicative facts. Legislative facts are those facts that
transcend the particular dispute and are relevant to legal rea-
soning and the fashioning of legal rules.22 Adjudicative facts, in
contrast, are those facts particular to the dispute.23
In a series of influential articles in the 1980s, Professors
John Monahan and Laurens Walker refined Davis’s dichotomy
in a manner that more fully captures the ways that science is
used in the courtroom.24 Their primary focus was on the law’s
use of social science. They identified three levels of conver-
gence between social science and law: social authority, social
facts, and social frameworks. Social authority refers to social
science research relevant to the determination of legislative
facts and thus the formulation of legal rules.25 According to
their proposal, social authority is analogous to legal authority
and should be consulted similarly. Hence, judges would con-
sider social science “precedent” (i.e., past research) as pre-
sented through briefs, arguments, and sua sponte.26 The infor-
mation found to be relevant and valid would then be incorpo-
rated into the judge’s conclusions of law. Alternatively, in the
Monahan-Walker model, social science research might be rele-
vant to adjudicative facts (what they call “social facts”), in
which case, after being deemed admissible, it would be pre-
sented to the trier of fact through expert testimony.27 Finally,
social science research might have relevance as a combination
of social authority and adjudicative fact. Professors Monahan
and Walker label this use “social frameworks,” where some
issue in the particular dispute is claimed to be an instance of a
social scientific finding or theory of general import.28
The Monahan-Walker model, though framed to deal exclu-
sively with social science, nicely captures the three basic divi-
sions of fact-finding that courts must process. Most impor-
tantly, their social framework category is a significant leap for-
ward in clarifying the challenges associated with integrating
empirical research into legal decision-making. Indeed,
arguably the social authority (i.e., legislative facts) and social
facts (i.e., adjudicative facts) are merely components of social
frameworks, with the latter two being defined as a function of
the legal use for evidence, not its scientific nature. In other
words, all empirical research is conceivable in terms of frame-
works, because it invariably has both a general component and
a specific component. Whether the general component is
legally relevant at all and, if so, what it is relevant to prove, dic-
tates in the Monahan-Walker model whether it is a “social
authority” or “social framework.” 
For example, consider the empirical question of the devel-
opmental competence of 16- and 17-year-olds. In the context
of capital punishment, this general fact was used in Roper v.
Simmons29 to support the conclusion that applying the death
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penalty to those who killed before reaching the age of majority
was unconstitutional. As such, this legislative fact was
informed by “social authority.” On the other hand, if the ques-
tion was whether a particular 16- or 17-year-old had compe-
tently waived his Miranda rights, the research used in Roper
would be employed to inform a “social framework.”30 In the
case involving the waiving of Miranda rights, the court would
have to apply the framework to the individual case, thus para-
digmatically using both components of Monahan and Walker’s
social-framework category.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORKS
For the purpose of examining evidentiary incommensura-
bility between law and science, the Monahan and Walker con-
cept of social frameworks is all that is specifically needed. It
fully captures the juxtaposition of the inordinate empirical dif-
ficulties surrounding the use of group data to make individual
decisions and the law’s frequent need to do just that. Since the
phenomenon of interest extends well beyond social science,
and includes all applied science with policy implications, the
term “empirical framework” is more accurate and will be used
here. The following sections, therefore, consider the legal
demands on empirical research, from both the more concilia-
tory use of general research data to answer general legal propo-
sitions, to the more demanding use of general data to reach
individualized judgments.
DEFINING THE “FRAME”
Because ordinary science operates at the general level of
descriptive and inferential statistics, it can be readily employed
to determine general propositions. Consider, for example, a
hypothesis that has been the subject of several legal cases: vio-
lent video games cause minors who play them to be violent
and asocial. This hypothesis has been studied in a multitude of
ways, including observational case studies, correlational stud-
ies, laboratory experiments, brain imaging, and so forth.31 If
these differing methods point in the same direction, then some
general conclusions might be made regarding the relationship
between violent video games and violence among children. If
they point in different directions, of course, the task is compli-
cated greatly, if not made impossible, until more research is
done. But even when the body of research is robust, conclu-
sions are likely to be tentative and, at best, described in prob-
abilistic terms.
The legal relevance of the science, however uncertainly
known, depends on the substantive law of the case. In regard
to the violent video game example, then, this hypothesis might
be relevant as a general proposition (e.g., do violent video
games lead to increased violence among children?) or as that
research might apply in a particu-
lar case (e.g., was the minor
defendant’s violent action attrib-
utable to having played violent
video games?).
In the law, most litigation
tends to involve the application
of general principles to a specific
case. Frequently, however, a gen-
eral proposition of science is
itself at issue. A good example of
this, coming from the violence-
in-media example, is the case
Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich.32 In Enter-
tainment Software, several video-game-industry trade associa-
tions sued the State to enjoin the enforcement of two statutes
that regulated the content of violent and sexually explicit
video games. The plaintiffs argued that the State’s laws vio-
lated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The
district court agreed that the laws implicated First Amend-
ment rights and held that the legislation could survive only if
the State had a compelling interest that would be substantially
achieved by the laws. The court found that “[t]he Illinois
General Assembly’s main justifications were three legislative
findings about the effect of playing video games on minors’
physiological and neurological development.”33 According to
the court, the legislature believed that playing violent video
games makes children (1) “exhibit violent, asocial, or aggres-
sive behavior”; (2) “[e]xperience feelings of aggression”; and
(3) “[e]xperience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes of
the brain which is responsible for controlling behavior.”34 In
concluding that Illinois had not met its considerable burden,
the court extensively reviewed psychological and neurological
research that had been advanced by the State. The court
explained that the State “failed to present substantial evidence
showing that playing violent video games causes minors to
have aggressive feelings or engage in aggressive behavior.”35
Moreover, the court stated that “there is barely any evidence
at all, let alone substantial evidence, showing that playing vio-
lent video games causes minors to ‘experience a reduction of
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain which is responsible
for controlling behavior.”’36 The court permanently enjoined
the Illinois law.
The second hypothesis, that a particular minor’s violent
action is attributable to having played violent video games, is
the more typical courtroom situation in regard to scientific evi-
dence. In these cases, both the general hypothesis and the spe-
cific hypothesis are at issue. Although the defense is unusual,
defendants have on occasion argued insanity on the basis of
“[There are]
inordinate
empirical 
difficulties 
surrounding the
use of group
data to make
individual 
decisions.”
Court Review - Volume 50 57
37. See generally Jonathan Chananie, Violent Videogames, Crime, and
the Law: Looking for Proof of a Causal Connection, 26 DEV. MENTAL
HEALTH L. 27, 43 (2007) (listing cases); Patricia J. Falk, Novel The-
ories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the Social Envi-
ronment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage,
74 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1996) (same).
38. 361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Victor Roggli, Asbestos: Scientific Status, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note
7, at § 26.
42. Faigman et al., Tobacco: Legal Issues, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 7.
43. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS §§ 300.12–.13 (4th ed., text revision 2000).
44. Id. at xxxvii.
video programming.37 In Zamora
v. State,38 for example, “Zamora’s
insanity defense was based upon
‘involuntary subliminal television
intoxication.”’ In particular,
defense counsel argued that vio-
lent television had a noxious
influence on sociopathic children
and that Zamora had killed as a
consequence of this effect.39 To
support this theory, the defense
offered two experts. The first, a
psychologist, offered to testify to
the effect of television on adoles-
cents generally.40 A second expert, a psychiatrist, testified that
the defendant “did not know right from wrong” when he “fired
the fatal shot,” thus applying the general theory of the case to
the particular defendant. The court excluded the psychologist
on the ground that she could not speak to Zamora’s individual
case. The psychiatrist testified at trial, but apparently to little
effect, since Zamora was convicted.
In the courtroom, research on general propositions, such as
whether violent media causes an increase in violence among
children, addresses a threshold question and one which scien-
tists are trained to address. In an insanity defense to murder,
however, the question is whether the particular person’s vio-
lence was caused by exposure to violent media. This issue of
specific application poses a complex and difficult cognitive
exercise. Moreover, it is an exercise that varies in different
empirical contexts. It is also a subject that has been substan-
tially ignored by scientists interested in the courtroom use of
their data.
REASONING TO THE SPECIFIC
Although the challenge of reasoning from general research
data to individual cases has been considered in a fairly cursory
manner by courts and legal scholars, the basic challenges are
fairly easily summarized. This is especially so in the conven-
tional toxic-tort-litigation context, the area in which courts
have most often considered it. In a nutshell, the first task is to
demonstrate that the substance could have caused the ailment
(i.e., the validity of the general proposition); the second task is
to show both that it probably did, and that other substances
probably did not, cause the plaintiff’s condition.
The simplest case of this reasoning process might involve
general research that indicates that some substance causes an
ailment that is uniquely associated with that substance. For
instance, as noted in Part I, asbestos has been shown to cause
mesothelioma, and it is the only substance known to cause it.41
Since mesothelioma is a “signature disease,” the only question
concerns the circumstances of the individual’s exposure to
asbestos (i.e., was the defendant responsible?), not whether
exposure caused the condition. The cause-and-effect path-
specificity operates in this example to permit straightforward
logical deductions from the general data to individual cases.
This is rare in toxic tort litigation. For example, in contrast to
asbestos, while second-hand smoke has been linked to lung
cancer, many other substances are known to cause lung cancer.
Hence, in regard to identifying the cause of a person’s lung can-
cer, an expert must not only rule in smoking as a possible
cause but also rule out other possible causes.42
The principal tool used to move from general research find-
ings to statements about individual cases is “differential etiol-
ogy,” sometimes misleadingly referred to as “differential diag-
nosis.” Properly understood, differential diagnosis refers to the
identification of the illness or behavioral condition that a per-
son is experiencing. Differential etiology refers to the cause or
causes of that condition. Hence, the determination that a per-
son suffers from “dissociative amnesia” and not “dissociative
fugue” is a diagnostic issue.43 The determination that a sexual
assault at age ten caused the diagnosed dissociative amnesia,
and that it did not result from a medical condition or physical
trauma, is an etiological matter. Very different skill sets are
usually involved in these two determinations. Indeed, the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM) explicitly eschews any
claim of the etiological verity of its diagnostic categories.44 It is
worth emphasizing, as well, that the validity of the diagnosis of
dissociative amnesia is a matter of general research. The entire
process of differential diagnosis and differential etiology
assumes that the designated category has adequate empirical
support in the first place as a general proposition. Hence,
although it is logically obvious, it should be stated plainly that
an expert should never be permitted to testify about a specific
application of a general proposition if research does not ade-
quately support the general proposition.
In the professional practice of both clinical medicine and
clinical psychology, the primary concern is diagnosis and not
etiology. An oncologist might be curious about what caused his
or her patient’s leukemia, but the doctor’s first task is to diag-
nose and treat the condition, not determine whether it was
caused by trichloroethylene, benzene, electromagnetic fields,
or something else. Similarly, a psychologist treating a person
thought to suffer from either PTSD or adjustment disorder is
primarily concerned with identifying and treating the condi-
tion, not determining the true causes of that condition. In the
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ordinary practice of clinical medicine and clinical psychology,
treatment and therapy are the principal objectives, not assess-
ing cause. A person presenting symptoms associated with
PTSD, therefore, may claim that the traumatic event was a sex-
ual assault committed by her uncle. From the therapeutic
standpoint, at least at the start, the important factor is that
there was a traumatic event. Whether the patient’s uncle was
the cause need not be specifically resolved for diagnostic pur-
poses. In the law, of course, who caused the traumatic event is
the crux of the matter. Hence, the core nature of much clinical
practice is at right angles to the crux of most legal inquiries.
In the courtroom, differential etiology is the operative issue.
Moreover, the same basic principle is implicated, whether the
expert opinion comes from research-based science or clinical
practice (i.e., “experience”). Indeed, at least superficially, the
former suffers a comparative disadvantage, since the research
tradition does not ordinarily purport to offer conclusive state-
ments about individual cases. Research, for example, might
identify factors highly associated with false confessions, but
these general propositions are some distance from what is
needed to allow experts to opine regarding the truth or falsity
of any particular confession. Clinicians at least have a history
of applying general knowledge to individual cases, though, as
noted, while this practice might be well accepted for therapeu-
tic purposes, its validity for forensic ends is somewhat doubt-
ful. Whether researchers or clinicians have the wherewithal to
help triers of fact in applying general research propositions to
specific cases is a threshold legal matter that should depend on
the reliability and validity of the differential etiology done in
the respective case. It may be, that is, that in vast areas of clin-
ical practice there is no general research foundation in the first
instance. And, as stated above, if research does not support a
general proposition—say, the phenomenon of repressed mem-
ories—then clinical expert testimony that a particular person
has repressed certain memories of early sexual abuse cannot be
sustained.
DIFFERENTIAL ETIOLOGY
Differential etiology is a reasoning process that involves a
multitude of factors, few of which are easily quantified. An
expert offering an opinion regarding a specific case must first
consider the strength of the evidence for the general proposi-
tion being applied in the case. If the claim is that substance X
caused plaintiff’s condition Y, the initial inquiry must concern
the strength of the relationship between X and Y as a general
proposition. For example, both second-hand smoke and first-
hand smoke are associated with lung cancer, but the strength
of the relationship generally is much stronger for the latter
than it is for the former. The inquiry regarding strength of rela-
tionship will depend on many factors, including, among other
things, the statistical strength of any claims and the quality of
the methods used in the research.
Additionally, the general model
must consider the strength of the
evidence for alternative possible
causes of Y and the strength of
their respective relationships (and
possibly interactions with other
factors). Again, the quality of the
research and the different method-
ologies employed will make com-
parisons difficult. Complicating
matters further regarding identification of potential causes of
condition Y are the myriad of possible causes that have not
been studied, or have been studied inadequately.45 Hence,
determining the contours of the general model is a dicey affair
in itself, since it requires combining disparate research results
and discounting those results by an unknown factor associated
with additional variables not yet studied. And this is just the
first part of the necessary analysis if the expert wants to give an
opinion about an individual case.
The second part of the analysis—specific application of gen-
eral propositions that are themselves supported by adequate
research—requires two abilities, neither of which are clearly
within most scientists’ skill sets. The first, and perhaps less
problematic, is that of forensic investigator. Almost no matter
what the empirical relationship, whether medical or psycho-
logical, exposure or dosage levels will be relevant to the diag-
nosis. The first principle of toxicology is that “the dose makes
the poison,” since any substance in sufficient quantities could
injure or kill someone.46 Similarly, in a wide variety of psycho-
logical contexts, the exposure or dose will be the poison. For
instance, degree of trauma affects diagnostic categorization
between PTSD and adjustment disorder, level of anxiety affects
eyewitness identifications, amount of lack of sleep affects false
confession rates, and so on. The expert testifying to specific
causation must determine exposure and dosage levels for the
suspected cause (i.e., the source suspected by the client) as
well as for all other known or possible causes. This task is dif-
ficult enough alone but is enormously complicated by the sig-
nificant potential for recall bias, given that the litigation will be
profoundly affected by what is recalled.
The second skill set that is needed has not yet been invented
or even described with precision. Somehow, the diagnostician
must combine the surfeit of information concerning the multi-
tude of factors that make up the general model, with the case
history information known or suspected about the individual,
and offer an opinion with some level of confidence that sub-
stance or experience X was the likely cause of condition Y. In
practice, this opinion is usually stated as follows: “Within a
reasonable degree of medical/psychological certainty, it is my
opinion that X caused [a particular case of] Y.” This expression
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has no empirical meaning and is simply a mantra repeated by
experts for purposes of legal decision makers who similarly
have no idea what it means. But even less extreme versions of
this statement—such as, “It is more likely than not true that
this case is an instance of some general phenomenon”—are
objectionable. Just how, for instance, would an eyewitness
researcher determine that a witness was more likely than not
inaccurate when the witness made a cross-racial identification
of the defendant after seeing the unarmed perpetrator for five
minutes under a streetlight from an unobstructed view 20 feet
away from the crime? There is no data that would support psy-
chologists’ ability to make such statements, however modest or
innocuous such statements may appear. Experts’ case-specific
conclusions appear to be based largely on an admixture of an
unknown combination of knowledge of the subject, experi-
ence over the years, commitment to the client or cause, intu-
ition, and blind faith. Science it is not.
Whether, and in what way, particular scientific findings are
relevant to legal decision-making depends on the substantive
law of the case. Frequently, the relevant factual issue under
applicable law involves general propositions, ones that popu-
lation-based research corresponds to directly. Much more
often, however, the empirical focus of the ultimate legal issue
is on the particular case. But conventional scientific methods
do not share this focus. Although research data might demon-
strate with high confidence that a particular variable has an
effect of interest, it typically cannot demonstrate with the same
confidence that the particular variable had the effect of interest
in a particular case. Reconciling this evidentiary incommensu-
rability between what science ordinarily does and what the law
ordinarily needs is, as yet, one of the great unmet challenges at
the intersection of science and the law.
CONCLUSION
Most evidentiary codes require that expert testimony “assist
the trier of fact” in order for it to be admissible.47 Scientific
expert testimony, however, must be legally relevant and have
evidentiary reliability (i.e., scientific validity).48 Moreover,
expert opinion must offer insights beyond what triers of fact
could do on their own. Put another way, scientist-experts are
limited to testifying about what their respective field’s research
can validly add to fact-finders’ deliberations—and nothing
more. This injunction, however, is not always followed. In par-
ticular, experts frequently seek to comment not simply on the
import of general research findings, but on whether a particu-
lar case fits those findings. Scientific research that permits a
valid description of a general phenomenon, however, does not
invariably give experts the capacity to validly determine
whether an individual case is an instance of that general phe-
nomenon.
A basic difference in perspective between science and the
law is that science studies individuals in order to make state-
ments about populations, while the law studies populations in
order to make statements about individuals. It does not neces-
sarily follow that a scientist who can validly describe a general
phenomenon also has the wherewithal to say whether an indi-
vidual case is an instance of that general phenomenon. In
many respects, the matter of translating scientific research
findings into helpful information for fact-finders in court
should be a subject of first concern for applied science. Yet this
issue has been largely ignored by scientists. This essay calls for
a broadly conceived collaborative effort to consider this basic
issue, one that is endemic to the intersection of law and sci-
ence.
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The People of the State of New York v. Herbert Weinstein(1992)1 is one of the earliest and most prominent exam-ples of an attorney offering a Positron Emission Tomog-
raphy (PET) scan as evidence in a criminal trial. Mr. Wein-
stein, a 68-year-old, married, Caucasian male worked in adver-
tising. Mr. Weinstein had no past criminal history and no his-
tory of violence, but he was accused of strangling his wife and
throwing her body from their 12th-story Manhattan apartment
to make her death appear to be a suicide. When confronted,
Mr. Weinstein admitted his guilt and even readily admitted his
attempts to cover up his crime.2 Mr. Weinstein’s lack of emo-
tion when discussing the crime and apparent lack of remorse
for his action caused his legal team to question whether the
older gentleman could be suffering from a neurological impair-
ment that caused an uncharacteristic act of aggression.3
Acts of aggression have been hypothesized to arise from
dysfunction within the prefrontal cortex and impaired connec-
tions between the frontal lobe and associated limbic brain
regions. Physicians consulting with Mr. Weinstein’s defense
attorneys suggested Mr. Weinstein undergo neuropsychologi-
cal testing and brain scanning that could demonstrate poten-
tial structural and/or functional deficits in his brain.4
An MRI of Mr. Weinstein’s brain revealed a large cyst in the
arachnoid mater, a protective lining that covers the brain tis-
sue. The arachnoid cyst was situated within the left sylvian fis-
sure and compressed the left frontal, temporal, and insular
regions of Weinstein’s brain. A functional scan of Mr. Wein-
stein’s brain demonstrated that the areas of brain tissue that
were compressed by the cyst were not metabolizing glucose at
the expected rate. Mr. Weinstein’s attorneys offered the PET
scan in support of a claim of not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI). Prosecutor Zachery Weiss moved for an order to pre-
clude Weinstein from offering any testimony or other evidence
concerning his PET scan. The prosecution argued that PET
scans were not accurate or reliable depictions of cerebral
metabolism.5 The prosecutor further argued that the idea that
hypometabolism in the frontal lobes causes frontal lobe dys-
function was not generally accepted in the psychiatric and
neurological community.6 Likewise, Weiss argued that it was
debatable whether a causal link could be established between
the presence of a congenital cyst and a single violent act. A
Frye hearing followed, and Judge Richard Carruthers consid-
ered whether the PET scan was generally accepted as a diag-
nostic instrument within the psychiatric and neurological
community.7
A PET scan measures brain function by determining the
brain’s use of glucose—the main energy source for the brain.
Brain cells, called neurons, need glucose to survive and to
function properly. In order to assess glucose metabolism, glu-
cose is radioactively labeled with a tracer. The most common
radiotracer in use today in PET scanning is 18F-fluo-
rodeoxyglucose (18F-FDG).8 FDG-PET is the only established
technique that allows analysis of brain glucose metabolism in
a live person. Before the PET scan, 18F-FDG is injected into
the vein of a patient who has previously been fasting. As the
radioactive glucose is metabolized by the brain, a pair of pho-
tons is emitted and captured by detectors within the PET
scanner through a process called co-incidental detection.9
The scanner records the number of times that photons are
captured. The resulting counts are used to calculate a meta-
bolic rate. The metabolic rates are displayed in color-coded
fashion in which metabolic increases are typically shown in
shades from yellow to red and metabolic decreases are shaded
from blue to purple. The 18F-FDG PET (FDG-PET) images
are used to determine sites of abnormal glucose metabolism
and can be used to characterize and localize brain abnormali-
ties.     
Edward Hoffman and Michael Phelps developed the PET
scanner in 1973, and techniques for diagnosing diseases in
humans soon followed. FDG-PET is an accepted clinical test
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used to diagnose and monitor cancer,10 epilepsy,11 and degen-
erative brain disease.12 FDG-PET is also used for pre-surgical
planning, in post-stroke evaluation,13 and for evaluation of
moderate to severe traumatic brain injury.14 PET is used by
forensic medicine practitioners to demonstrate diffuse axonal
injury, which is characteristic of mild traumatic brain injury.15
The similar single-photon emission computed tomography
(SPECT) is used to characterize neurodegenerative disorders
such as dementia, stroke, seizures, inflammation, and
trauma.16 SPECT uses the radioisotope technetium-99m
(99mTc), a compound with a much longer half-life than 18F-
FDG. The breakdown of 99mTc results in the emission of a sin-
gle photon. The imaging data is captured by a gamma camera,
which is rotated around the patient. The SPECT radioisotopes
are more accessible and less expensive than the PET radioiso-
topes, which must be produced in a specialized cyclotron and
used within hours of its production.  
Only since the early 1990s have courts been confronted
with admissibility questions regarding the use of nuclear med-
icine studies, including PET and SPECT technologies, in crim-
inal trials. The primary issue that judges consider is whether
the information provided by the scan will assist the jury in
determining an issue regarding the cognitive capacity of the
criminal defendant. This information is not given the same
level of relevance in every court phase. At sentencing in all
death-penalty cases, the jury must consider the defendant’s
cognitive and neuropsychological limitations. But during the
guilt phase of a criminal trial, brain imaging studies are gener-
ally offered to substantiate a diagnosis or to offer a causal link
between a brain-based abnormality and violent behavior. At no
point in a criminal trial can nuclear studies be used to deter-
mine whether the defendant committed the act in question.
And brain images cannot assist the jury in understanding the
emotional mindset of the defendant at the time of the crime.
However, nuclear medicine studies can demonstrate brain-
based abnormalities, which may suggest that a defendant had
a limited capacity for self-control.  
In Weinstein, the defendant
underwent a resting-state PET
protocol, and his brain’s meta-
bolic rate was compared to a
group of controls. The PET scan
demonstrated that Mr. Weinstein
had abnormally low levels of glu-
cose metabolism in the areas of
his brain that were compressed
by the cyst and in the brain
regions opposite to the cyst.
There was no doubt that the pres-
ence of the cyst altered Mr. Wein-
stein’s brain structure and func-
tion. However, the question
before the court was one of cau-
sation. Was there sufficient evidence to allow psychiatric and
neurological experts to testify that Mr. Weinstein’s brain abnor-
mality was related to his violent criminal behavior?  Further,
could a psychiatrist reasonably opine that Mr. Weinstein’s
abnormal brain function made him unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his action and therefore rendered him insane
as defined by the State of New York?  
Judge Carruthers found that the scientific community gen-
erally accepted that PET scans provide a reliable measure of
brain glucose metabolism. Judge Carruthers also noted that it
is generally accepted in the fields of psychiatry, psychology,
and neurology that the frontal lobes of the human brain con-
trol executive functions, including the abilities to reason and
to plan.17 The court accepted that damage to the frontal lobes
could cause cognitive impairment and that the impairment
could specifically be in the areas of judgment, insight, and
foresight. The defense planned to call a psychiatrist to testify
that, at the moment Weinstein allegedly killed his wife, his
cognitive impairment prevented him from understanding that
his conduct was wrong and that his impairment was in part
due to organic brain damage from the cyst. Judge Carruthers
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placed a limitation on the
defense witnesses’ testimony
and would not permit them to
opine either that the cyst or
reduced levels of glucose
metabolism in the frontal lobes
of the brain directly caused
Weinstein’s violence. 
Nevertheless, Judge Car-
ruthers noted that such asser-
tions would not be generally
accepted as valid in the fields of
psychiatry, psychology, and neu-
rology. He specifically noted that
the sensitivity and specificity of
frontotemporal hypometabolism
for impulsivity and violence is unknown. He noted that there
were no published controlled PET studies of either episodic vio-
lence or subarachnoid cysts, nor were there imaging studies of
cyst patients with and without incidents of violence. 
There is no legal record of how Weinstein’s insanity claim
fared before a jury because on the eve of trial he agreed to
plead guilty to manslaughter. Weinstein was sentenced to 7 to
21 years in prison. A surgeon can drain an arachnoid cyst;
however, there is a risk of reaccumulation of the cyst. Mr.
Weinstein did not undergo cyst drainage. He was incarcerated
for more than 12 years and did not engage in any violent acts
while in prison.18 He was granted a conditional release at age
79 and died 2 years after his release. More than 20 years later,
arachnoid cysts remain a common incidental finding in neuro-
radiologic studies. Arachnoid cysts can lead to epilepsy,
headache, and other neuropsychiatric impairment, but no
studies directly link this brain abnormality with violence.
PET IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: CURRENT TRENDS IN 
ADMISSIBILITY
Despite the acceptance of PET in the Weinstein case in 1992,
today there continues to be debate concerning the admissibil-
ity of FDG-PET and the appropriateness of expert witness tes-
timony discussing brain scans in the courtroom.19 This section
reviews the most prominent concerns about the introduction
of these brain scans into evidence and explains how the admis-
sibility calculus differs depending on the phase of the legal
proceeding. It will review the introduction of scans at pretrial
competency hearings and the guilt and sentencing phases of
criminal trials and conclude that courts are most willing to
admit brain-scan evidence at the sentencing phase.
Admission of PET at Pretrial Competency Hearings 
The standard for assessing competency to stand trial was set
out in Dusky v. United States20 and has since been adopted by
many state jurisdictions. Dusky requires that a defendant pos-
sess a reasonable capacity to understand the criminal process
and be able to function in that process. Mental illness, brain
injury, dementia, and mental retardation can significantly affect
these abilities. If a defendant is found incompetent to stand
trial, the trial is delayed until the defendant becomes competent
to respond to the charge. However, there are some conditions
that cannot be remedied, and therefore, neither the passage of
time nor treatment is likely to restore competence. In these
cases, the prosecutor may choose not to pursue certain charges
or may request that a defendant be committed to a mental facil-
ity to attempt to restore the defendant’s competence. 
The ultimate fate of incompetent defendants was addressed
in Jackson v. Indiana (1972).21 Jackson was a 27-year-old man
who suffered from an intellectual disability, deafness, and
muteness. He was unable to read, write, or otherwise commu-
nicate except through limited sign language. Jackson was
charged with theft of five dollars and a purse and its contents,
estimated to be worth four dollars. Mr. Jackson was not able to
communicate with his attorney, so his legal team sought assis-
tance from a teacher at the school for the deaf. The teacher
stated that Jackson did not possess adequate sign-language
skills for communication and that he would be unable to com-
prehend the proceedings or aid counsel due to his intellectual
disability. The State of Indiana had no facilities that could pro-
vide Jackson with rehabilitation for this form of incompetency,
and the Supreme Court found that indefinite commitment
would violate the defendant’s right to due process.22 The
Supreme Court stated that a defendant committed to a mental
facility solely on the basis of incompetency “cannot be held
more than the reasonable period of time necessary to deter-
mine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”23
Today forensic psychiatrists are routinely asked to evaluate
defendants’ competence to stand trial. If the physician deems a
defendant incompetent, the physician will be asked to predict
whether the defendant’s competence can be restored and what
sort of treatment may be necessary to accomplish restoration.
There will be cases in which it will be clear to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that competence to stand trial can-
not be restored. In some cases, functional imaging may be part
of the medical workup to determine the severity of a brain-
based cause for incompetence.   
Competency is likely to be a growing concern as the popu-
lation ages. More than 3 million people living in the United
States suffer from dementia, a degenerative brain condition.24
As the population of Americans over age 65 is predicted to
double by 2030, the number of people with dementia—a risk
factor for violence— is also likely to dramatically increase.25
Dementia, including Alzheimer’s-type dementia, frontotem-
poral dementia (Pick’s Disease), and Parkinson’s disease, are
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currently irreversible and incurable. While medications may
slow the progression of these diseases, people with cognitive
deficits caused by these illnesses are not expected to regain lost
cognition. In cases of severe cognitive impairment that pre-
vents defendants from working with their defense attorneys,
findings of incompetence to stand trial are possible. FDG-PET
can be used to diagnose dementia.26 And depending on the
severity of the crimes, the prosecuting attorneys may require
more evidence to support the alleged irreversible diagnoses.
The following case provides an example of a PET scan that
showed organic brain dysfunction but failed to persuade a
court that a defendant was not competent to stand trial.
In United States v. Vincent Gigante, the mafia boss known as
“the Chin” claimed he was incompetent to stand trial for con-
spiracy and racketeering.27 Mr. Gigante was court ordered to
undergo a competence examination after his legal team
claimed he suffered from Alzheimer’s-type dementia. A PET
study was offered in support of this finding. The court admit-
ted the PET evidence but declined to rely upon it. The court
noted that the scan was of “excellent technical quality but
[offered] a number of difficulties in interpretation.” Specifi-
cally the court was concerned that the controls in the study
were not treated with the same psychotropic drugs as Mr.
Gigante.  
Defense witness Dr. Monte Buchsbaum of Mount Sinai
School of Medicine interpreted the PET scans and concluded
that Mr. Gigante was suffering from organic brain dysfunction,
possibly due to Alzheimer’s disease or multi-infarct dementia.
He believed Mr. Gigante was incapable of being tried. Neu-
ropsychological testing by Dr. Wilfred Van Gorp of New York
Hospital’s Cornell Medical Center also supported a diagnosis of
severe cognitive impairment. However, the prosecution’s
expert, Dr. Jonathan Brodie, a psychiatrist at New York Uni-
versity Medical School, testified that the results of both the
neuropsychological tests and the PET scan could have been
corrupted by medications that Mr. Gigante was taking. 
Dr. Brodie criticized defense experts for not analyzing the
defendant’s blood to determine the amount of medication in
his system at the time the tests were administered. Mr. Gigante
had been taking potent psychotropic medications for a long
period prior to the PET scan and did not stop these medica-
tions prior to the scan. The medications could have altered
blood flow to the brain or crossed the blood-brain barrier and
potentially altered metabolism.28 The members of the control
group were not medicated at the time of their scans and were
not close in age to Mr. Gigante. As a result, the court did not
find the results of the PET persuasive. Ultimately, Mr. Gigante
was found competent for sentencing and was sentenced to 12
years in federal prison in 1997. 
But PET scans have been admitted to support a pretrial
motion of incompetence to
stand trial. For example,
Miguel Carrizalez was charged
with two counts of murder, six
counts of attempted murder,
and gang-related charges in
California.29 Mr. Carrizalez had
sustained a gunshot wound to
the head and had a bullet
lodged in his brain. He claimed
incompetence to stand trial due
to this severe traumatic brain
injury and offered a PET scan
in support. The prosecution
objected to the admission of the PET scan, and the court held
a Kelly-Frye hearing.30 During the competence hearing, the
judge stated that PET studies are “generally accepted in the sci-
entific community and . . . are certainly accepted as tools used
in clinical settings. And in forensic settings it seems . . . there
could be testimony as to the areas of the brain that are relevant
to the issue of [trial competency].”31 The court admitted the
PET study into evidence. Despite evidence of severe traumatic
brain injury, Mr. Carrizalez was found competent to stand trial,
and the PET scan was presented again during the sentencing
phase of the trial. The jury convicted Mr. Carrizalez of all
charges but did not return a unanimous vote in favor of the
death penalty, a requirement to impose a death sentence in Cal-
ifornia. The district attorney did not retry the penalty phase,
and Mr. Carrizalez was sentenced to life without the possibil-
ity of parole. The defense teams’ multiple reminders to the jury
of the severity of Mr. Carrizalez’s brain injury both in the form
of expert testimony and by pictorial demonstration may have
led at least one juror to vote for life in prison rather than death
in this double-homicide trial.  
Admission of PET During the Guilt Phase of 
Criminal Trials 
In a capital case, neuroimaging can be used in two ways:
first, during the guilt-or-innocence phase in which the State
must prove a defendant committed an alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, and second, in the penalty phase, where the
jury decides whether a guilty defendant will receive a capital
sentence. Admissibility challenges are far more likely to arise
when PET images are submitted for consideration in the guilt
phase of a criminal trial. During the guilt phase, PET may be
introduced to support a defendant’s claim that he has a brain-
based abnormality that affects his or her ability to form the req-
uisite mens rea for the charged crime. When a defense attorney
chooses to display a brain image in the guilt phase of a crimi-
nal trial, the image will almost certainly be presented by an
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expert, who will testify as to
whether the defendant was capa-
ble of forming the mens rea
needed to accomplish the crime.
To negate mens rea, the expert
must believe that a neurological
defect caused the defendant to be
unable to form the intent
required to constitute a crime. In
cases in which the expert plans to
testify that a neurological deficit
precludes mens rea, an eviden-
tiary challenge is likely. But when
the claim is diminished capacity
due to a neurological deficit, an
evidentiary challenge is less likely to arise. Evidentiary chal-
lenges are rarely raised when neuroimaging is presented in the
sentencing phase of trial. 
Legal and medical scholars alike have feared the effect that
images could have on a jury determining a defendant’s guilt.32
Critics fear a “Christmas tree effect,” whereby jurors may be
unduly influenced by the visual display of a colorful brain scan
and accept the scan as authoritative evidence without consid-
ering the merits of the expert’s accompanying testimony.33
Critics have also feared that the expert testimony interpreting
scans will prejudice or mislead the jury. Further, there is con-
cern that a jury will find a misshapen or malfunctioning brain
more persuasive than traditional forms of lay or expert testi-
mony.34 A study by Gurley and Marcus (2008) weighed the
effects of structural neuroimaging with MRI used in support of
an insanity defense in a simulated murder trial.35 In this study,
involving a sample of 400 mock jurors, jurors were more likely
to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) if
an MRI showing a brain lesion was presented than if no image
was presented. Mock jurors were even more likely to choose
NGRI when both expert testimony and neuroimaging was pre-
sented than when either type of evidence alone was presented.
This study suggested that the combination of expert testimony
and imaging can lead jurors to find that a defendant lacked the
mens rea needed to commit murder. 
However, in a mock study by Schweitzer, there were no
increases in successful mens-rea-specific defenses when brain
images were presented to the “jury.”36 In the research study,
brain images had no consistent impact on the verdicts or sen-
tences rendered by the mock jurors.37 Further, showing the
mock jurors neuroimages also had no impact on jurors’ per-
ceptions of the defendant’s criminal responsibility.38
Admissibility challenges are less likely to prevail if the
defense offers the incomplete defense of diminished capacity
or a variant thereof. When a defendant raises a diminished-
capacity defense, the defendant suggests that he or she was
deprived of a normal level of mental wherewithal at the time of
the crime. Not every state employs this partial defense. In
states that do, a successful plea of diminished capacity in a
murder trial would likely result in a charge of first- or second-
degree murder being reduced to manslaughter.
When introduced in the guilt phase of the trial, PET should
aid the physician in making a diagnosis. In some cases, the
court has required that PET demonstrate information that is
not otherwise available to the clinician. In People v. Goldstein,
the defendant, Andrew Goldstein, pushed Kendra Webdale in
front of an oncoming subway train, killing her.39 Both prose-
cution and defense experts agreed that defendant Goldstein
had schizophrenia. At issue in the trial was whether he was
insane at the time he pushed Kendra in front of the oncoming
train. PET was offered by a defense expert witness to show that
Goldstein’s brain imaging was consistent with schizophrenia.
Specifically, the defense witness planned to testify that Mr.
Goldstein had a massive reduction in metabolism in the frontal
lobe and the basal ganglia.40 A special master appointed by the
court stated that PET cannot conclusively prove schizophre-
nia. He continued that regardless of any brain abnormality that
PET could show, PET would not be probative of the key issue
of the insanity defense, namely, whether Mr. Goldstein com-
prehended either the nature and consequences of his actions or
that his actions were wrong. As PET was not offered to further
probe into the impact of schizophrenia on the defendant’s cog-
nition and behavior, it was excluded from evidence.41
In addition, an expert’s attempt to introduce PET to demon-
strate that a particular process or substance altered brain
metabolism can be risky if PET is not routinely used for such
a diagnosis. Michael Jackson (not the pop star), a man with a
history of phencyclidine (PCP) dependence, shot and killed
West Covina Police Officer Kenneth Wrede in 1983 when Jack-
son was intoxicated on PCP.42 Mr. Jackson admitted to shoot-
ing Officer Wrede but maintained that he had no recollection
of the encounter whatsoever.  Defense put forth a defense of
actual innocence under the theory that Mr. Jackson could not
form the requisite mens rea required to commit the crime of
first-degree murder. The defense expert offered a PET scan to
demonstrate brain damage secondary to chronic PCP abuse.
The prosecution expert testified that the use of PET scans to
diagnose chronic PCP abuse is not generally accepted by the
scientific community, and the defense expert did not dispute
this fact. No evidence was introduced to suggest that a PET
scan could prove that Jackson was unable to premeditate or
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form specific intent to kill at the time of the shooting. The PET
scan could not explain what effect PCP-induced brain damage
would have on Jackson’s capacity for higher thought. The
appeals court found that the trial court did not err in exclud-
ing the PET scan and found that Jackson failed to make the
required showing of probable innocence. 43
PET was also excluded from evidence in the case of U.S. v.
Montgomery.44 Lisa Montgomery had an online friendship with
her pregnant victim Bobbie Jo Stinnett. The two had engaged
in email exchanges about their respective “pregnancies.”
Montgomery arranged to meet Stinnett and buy a puppy from
her. Montgomery strangled the expectant mother, performed a
cesarean section, and kidnapped Stinnett’s premature baby.
Stinnett died, but her premature daughter survived. Mont-
gomery crossed state lines with the baby, making her crime a
federal offense. A PET scan was offered to support Mont-
gomery’s defense of pseudocyesis, or false pregnancy, a mental
disorder that could have led to a diminished-capacity finding.
The court found that a PET scan was not ever used as a diag-
nostic aid for pseudocyesis. Further, the abnormalities revealed
on PET did not predict behavior, nor did the abnormality cause
Montgomery to commit the crime. Accordingly, PET was
excluded from evidence in the guilt phase of the trial. In this
case PET was also excluded from evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase, but such exclusion at sentencing is exceedingly rare
in death-penalty cases. 
PET scans are also only admissible if unlikely to mislead the
jury. In United States v. Mezvinsky,45 Edward Mezvinsky, a for-
mer congressman, was charged with 69 violations of federal law
arising from fraudulent schemes and related financial crimes.
The crimes occurred over a 12-year period. In his defense, Mr.
Mezvinsky offered a PET scan to demonstrate that he was inca-
pable of deception, an element necessary to prove fraud. Dr.
Ruben Gur, the Government’s witness, and Dr. Jonathan Brodie,
Mr. Mezvinsky’s witness, agreed that no study exists that links
the diminished capacities in various parts of Mezvinsky’s brain
to any specific disorder. Both agreed that a PET scan is only a
snapshot of a patient’s brain at one particular time and that one
cannot make retrospective appraisals of that brain from such
snapshots. Thus, neither expert could make any inference
about the state of Mezvinsky’s brain at any point during the 12
years in question. Neither expert could identify anything in the
scan that would elucidate Mezvinsky’s capacity to deceive.46
Accordingly, the court found that the relevance of the evidence
was outweighed by its capacity to mislead the jury, and PET was
excluded from evidence in Mezvinsky’s trial. Such a result is
unlikely in the sentencing phase, however.
PET Admissions Rarely
Challenged at Sentencing
Phase 
The penalty phase arises
after the jury has found the
defendant guilty of the capi-
tal crime. To help the jury
determine whether a defen-
dant should be sentenced to
death, the State presents evi-
dence of aggravating factors
about the defendant and the
crime, and the defense presents evidence of mitigating fac-
tors. The penalty phase presents the jury with “the moral and
normative choice” of whether a capital defendant deserves
execution.47
PET scans are often admitted because criminal defendants
facing the death penalty have a constitutional right to present
any evidence at sentencing that could lead to a sentence less
than death. In Lockett v. Ohio (1978), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a capital defendant is entitled to present any aspect
of character or record and any circumstance of the offense that
might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death, regardless
of whether the evidence supports a statutorily authorized mit-
igating factor.48 And in Tennard v. Dretke (2004), the Supreme
Court stated that any cognitive or neuropsychological impair-
ment may be considered a mitigating factor even if the impair-
ment bears no direct link with the homicidal behavior.49 Evi-
dence of a structural or metabolic brain abnormality could be
included as evidence of a severe mental disturbance, a prong
that most states and the federal government include as a miti-
gating factor in the death-penalty statute.50 Further, most
states allow a defendant to present any “other factor” in the
defendant’s background, record, or character or any other cir-
cumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of a
death sentence.51 Evidence of brain damage or brain dysfunc-
tion can be offered under the “other factor” prong as well.
Functional images of the brain are commonly admitted in
death-penalty litigation to demonstrate brain abnormalities
that a jury could find mitigating.52
The admission of PET to demonstrate brain abnormalities
has become routine during the penalty phase of capital trials in
several states. The right to present a PET scan in the state of
Florida was determined in Hoskins v. State.53 Mr. Hoskins was
charged with multiple felonies, including first-degree murder,
and the State sought the death penalty.54 Mr. Hoskins’s exam-
ining physicians noted that he had an IQ of 71 and recom-
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mended that PET be obtained as
part of the workup for brain
damage. The trial court refused
to grant the defendant’s motion
seeking to transport Hoskins to
a hospital for PET scanning. Mr.
Hoskins was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to
death. The appellate court
remanded the case, ordering that
a brain scan be obtained and a
new penalty phase considered,
in effect overturning Hoskins’s
death sentence.55 The court’s
denial had limited the physi-
cian’s ability to evaluate the
degree of Hoskins’s mental impairment, which is a statutory
mitigating factor under Florida law.56
In most capital cases, the image of the defendant’s brain is
but one piece of evidence demonstrating the disadvantages
confronted by the defendant. A complete mitigation workup
will review the developmental, genetic, social, family, home
environment, educational, and vocational history of the defen-
dant. When evidence of brain damage or brain dysfunction has
not been explored during the original sentencing phase of a
capital trial, this oversight may be grounds for appeal.   
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL CLAIMS FOR
FAILURE TO EXPLORE BRAIN-BASED ABNORMALITIES  
As explained in the previous section, it appears that the use
of PET scans is growing, most rapidly in the sentencing phase
of criminal trials. Accordingly, some courts are now dealing
with the question whether an attorney should be required to
proffer a brain scan in some contexts. This section reviews this
emerging area of caselaw. While most of the time the use of a
brain scan is not warranted, the illustrative cases raise the pos-
sibilities that in some circumstances, an attorney’s failure to
gather brain data would be ineffective assistance of counsel.
The U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test for inef-
fective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington
(1984).57 A case may be remanded if a criminal defendant can
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness and that counsel’s performance gave
rise to a reasonable probability that, if counsel had performed
adequately, the result of the trial or sentencing would have
been different.58
If an attorney fails to present mitigating evidence, including
evidence of mental illness or extreme emotional distress, the
case can be remanded for ineffective assistance of counsel. For
example, California defendant Fernando Caro’s death sentence
was vacated and remanded for re-trial because his attorney
failed to investigate and present evidence of the impact that
exposure to neurotoxicants and child abuse had on his brain.59
The court stated that attorneys must cast a wide net for all rel-
evant mitigating evidence at capital-sentencing hearings
because “the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death
penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might
evoke mercy.”60 The court did not state that neuroimaging was
required in Caro’s case. Rather, it gave an extensive list of cir-
cumstances that were likely to lead to brain damage. Caro
spent his childhood working and playing in pesticide-soaked
fields, and he bathed in and was fed food cooked in water con-
taminated with pesticides. The court noted that Caro worked
as a “flagger” for a crop-dusting company and at a company
that made toxic pesticides. He was regularly exposed to
organophosphates, solvents, organochlorines, and carbamates,
and he was poisoned by a number of toxic chemicals at the
plant. In addition, Caro suffered serious physical abuse and
head injuries as a result of horrific child abuse. Caro also sus-
tained several head injuries as a child: he was born with a
three-inch lump on his head due to the use of forceps during
his difficult delivery, a water cooler fell on his head at the age
of three, and he was hit by a car later that year.61
It is possible that testimony regarding these unfortunate cir-
cumstances would be adequate to allow a jury to sentence
Caro to life rather than death. However, if a psychiatrist were
to claim that these multiple neurologic insults caused brain
damage, evidence of damage would need to be submitted to
the court. The Caro court suggested that it is adequate for
counsel to obtain a corroborated injury history listing factors
that led to demonstrated cognitive impairment. But evidence
could also be presented through neuropsychological testing,
structural brain scans (MRI), and/or functional brain scans
(SPECT or PET).  
A California court also vacated a death sentence when an
attorney failed to consult a neurologist, neuropsychologist, or
psychiatrist regarding the defendant. In Francis Hernandez’s
case, the defense attorney failed to arrange a neurological exam
of Hernandez despite the fact that he wrote notes in his legal
file suggesting that he planned to do so. On appeal, the attor-
ney stated that “evidence of neurological impairment is the
type of evidence I wanted because it would have helped to
explain and mitigate Francis’s state of mind at the time of the
killings.”62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
also determined that counsel’s failure to present this evidence
of brain-based abnormalities fell below the constitutional min-
imum standard for effective representation. Roderick Smith
murdered his wife and four step-children. His defense counsel
failed to present evidence of brain-based abnormalities includ-
ing “borderline mental retardation, mental illness, and organic
brain impairment” as mitigating evidence at trial. 63 The Tenth
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Circuit vacated his sentence, stating: “The sentencing stage is
the most critical phase of a death penalty case. Any competent
counsel knows the importance of thoroughly investigating and
presenting mitigating evidence.”64 We are cognizant of “the
overwhelming importance of the role mitigation evidence
plays in the just imposition of the death penalty.”65
A brain scan does not replace a thorough mitigation analy-
sis of a capital defendant, which should include the develop-
mental, genetic, social, family, home environment, educa-
tional, and vocational history of the defendant. But evidence of
brain deficit may arise from the mitigation analysis. If brain
injury or intellectual deficit is suspected, defense counsel must
have a qualified medical professional evaluate the defendant,
and the professional may request neuropsychological testing. If
physical examination or neuropsychological testing reveals
brain-based deficits, these deficits may be confirmed or further
characterized with brain imaging. The magnitude of the abnor-
mality detected by neuropsychological testing can assist an
expert in determining whether neuroimaging is likely to reveal
brain-based abnormalities. In some cases, experts may recom-
mend against obtaining costly brain images if they feel the
abnormalities that could be pictorially displayed by the images
will be minimal. In such cases, the prosecution is likely to
draw attention to the lack of abnormality.  
CONCLUSION 
The inner workings of a defendant’s mind are often a central
issue in each phase of criminal jurisprudence. However, differ-
ent standards apply for admission of scientific evidence during
the guilt phase and the penalty phase in criminal trials. In the
pretrial phase, attorneys may request the evaluation of a crim-
inal defendant for competence to stand trial. If a defendant is
found incompetent to stand trial, the examiner is asked to give
a diagnosis as to what caused the mental incapacity as well as
a prognosis for when and how competence can be restored. In
cases where a physician believes it will not be possible to
restore a defendant’s mental wherewithal due to brain damage,
a PET scan can help illustrate the brain-based abnormality that
the examiner detected. 
In the guilt phase of a criminal trial, PET may elucidate
damage to areas of the brain that are involved in cognitive
functions such as judgment and impulse control. Physicians
may use PET to corroborate their clinical impression of a
defendant. In some cases, prosecutors’ motions to exclude PET
evidence that challenge defense experts’ plans to present a
causal link between violence and brain damage have been suc-
cessful.66 But even in the face of evidentiary challenges, PET’s
colorful imagery of brain damage can be useful during trial or
in plea bargaining discussions, as in Weinstein.
At sentencing, brain-based deficits are a mitigating factor
for both capital and non-capital defendants. While there is not
yet an absolute mandate that brain-based deficits be consid-
ered in all criminal cases, the defendant’s cognitive and neu-
ropsychological limitations must be considered in capital
cases, even if the impairment bears no direct link with the
homicidal behavior.67 Accordingly, when PET is offered as mit-
igating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital mur-
der trial, an admissibility challenge is unlikely. Failure to pre-
sent evidence of brain damage has been a factor in overturning
death sentences in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases. In
addition, evidence of brain damage could assist a jury in
understanding the defendant’s limitations, resulting in a lesser
sentence. 
When a judge has to decide whether to admit brain imag-
ing, the rules of evidence provide clear guidelines regarding
when and for what purposes such evidence can be introduced.
The judge will consider whether the defense is offering the
original scan or a comparison between the defendant’s scan
and other scans. In cases where an extrapolation has occurred,
the judge is the gatekeeper who must consider the reliability of
the methodology used in the interpretation of the brain image.
If scan methodology is determined to meet admissibility stan-
dards, then the judge will consider the reason why the scan is
being offered. Before trial, does the information demonstrated
by the scan assist the jury in determining the cognitive capac-
ity of the criminal defendant? At the guilt phase, will the brain
image assist the jury in deciding a fact at issue in the guilt-
innocence phase of trial? Is there sufficient evidence to allow
an expert to testify that a brain abnormality was related to vio-
lent or otherwise criminal behavior? During the sentencing
phase, does the scan assist the judge or jury in understanding
a particular deficit or disadvantage experienced by the defen-
dant? In this final phase, brain images are almost always per-
mitted to supplement the mitigation plea. In fact, in some
cases not providing PET scans or other evidence of any brain
abnormalities may be ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The science of adolescent brain development is making itsway into the national conversation. As an early researcherin the field, I regularly receive calls from journalists ask-
ing how the science of adolescent brain development should
affect the way society treats teenagers. I have been asked
whether this science justifies raising the driving age, outlawing
the solitary confinement of incarcerated juveniles, excluding
18-year-olds from the military, or prohibiting 16-year-olds
from serving as lifeguards on the Jersey Shore. Explicit refer-
ence to the neuroscience of adolescence is slowly creeping into
legal and policy discussions as well as popular culture. The
U.S. Supreme Court discussed adolescent brain science during
oral arguments in Roper v. Simmons,1 which abolished the
juvenile death penalty, and cited the field in its 2010 decision
in Graham v. Florida,2 which prohibited the sentencing of
juveniles convicted of crimes other than homicide to life with-
out parole.
There is now incontrovertible evidence that adolescence is
a period of significant changes in brain structure and function.
Although most of this work has appeared just in the past 15
years, there is already strong consensus among developmental
neuroscientists about the nature of these changes. And the
most important conclusion to emerge from recent research is
that important changes in brain anatomy and activity take
place far longer into development than had been previously
thought. Reasonable people may disagree about what these
findings may mean as society decides how to treat young peo-
ple, but there is little room for disagreement about the fact that
adolescence is a period of substantial brain maturation with
respect to both structure and function.
BRAIN CHANGES
There are four noteworthy, structural changes in the brain
during adolescence. First, there is a decrease in gray matter in
prefrontal regions of the brain, reflective of synaptic pruning,
the process through which unused connections between neu-
rons are eliminated. The elimination of these unused synapses
occurs mainly during pre-adolescence and early adolescence,
when major improvements in basic cognitive abilities and log-
ical reasoning are seen, in part due to these very anatomical
changes.
Second, important changes in activity involving the neuro-
transmitter dopamine occur during early adolescence, espe-
cially around puberty. There are substantial changes in the
density and distribution of dopamine receptors in pathways
that connect the limbic system and prefrontal cortex. The lim-
bic system is associated with emotions, rewards, and punish-
ments, and the prefrontal cortex is the brain’s chief executive
officer. There is more dopaminergic activity in the pathways
that connect the two during the first part of adolescence than
at any other time in development. Because dopamine plays a
critical role in how humans experience pleasure, these changes
have important implications for sensation-seeking.
Third, there is an increase in the strength of connections
between the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system. If you
were to compare a young teenager’s brain with that of a young
adult, you would see a much more extensive network of myeli-
nated cables connecting brain regions. This anatomical change
is especially important for emotion regulation, which is facili-
tated by increased connectivity between regions important in
the processing of emotional information and those important
in self-control. These connections permit different brain sys-
tems to communicate with each other more effectively, and
these gains are also ongoing well into late adolescence.
Fourth, there is an increase in white matter in the prefrontal
cortex during adolescence. This is largely the result of myeli-
nation, the process through which nerve fibers become
sheathed in myelin, a white, fatty substance that improves the
efficiency of brain circuits. Unlike the synaptic pruning of the
prefrontal areas, which is mainly finished by mid-adolescence,
myelination continues well into late adolescence and early
adulthood. This increased efficiency in neural connections
within the prefrontal cortex is important for higher-order cog-
nitive functions—planning ahead, weighing risks and rewards,
and making complicated decisions, among others—that are
regulated by multiple prefrontal areas working in concert.
Adolescence is not just a time of tremendous change in the
brain’s structure. It is also a time of important changes in how
the brain works, as revealed in studies using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging, or fMRI. What do these imaging
studies reveal about the adolescent brain? First, over the
course of adolescence and into early adulthood, there is a
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strengthening of activity in brain systems involving self-regu-
lation. During tasks that require self-control, adults employ a
wider network of brain regions than do adolescents, and this
trait may make self-control easier, by distributing the work
across multiple areas of the brain rather than overtaxing a
smaller number of regions.
Second, there are important changes in the way the brain
responds to rewards. When one examines brain scans of indi-
viduals who are shown rewarding stimuli, such as piles of
coins or pictures of happy faces, adolescents’ reward centers
are usually activated more than children’s or adults’ brains.
(Interestingly, these age differences are more consistently
observed when individuals are anticipating rewards than
when they are receiving them.) Heightened sensitivity to
anticipated rewards motivates adolescents to engage in risky
acts when the potential for pleasure is high, such as with
unprotected sex, fast driving, or experimentation with drugs.
In our laboratory, Jason Chein and I have shown that this
hypersensitivity to reward is particularly pronounced when
adolescents are with their friends, and we think this helps
explain why adolescent risk-taking so often occurs in
groups.3
A third change in brain function over the course of adoles-
cence involves increases in the simultaneous involvement of
multiple brain regions in response to arousing stimuli, such as
pictures of angry or terrified faces. Before adulthood, there is
less cross-talk between the brain systems that regulate rational
decision-making and those that regulate emotional arousal.
During adolescence, very strong feelings are less likely to be
modulated by the involvement of brain regions involved in
controlling impulses, planning ahead, and comparing the costs
and benefits of alternative courses of action. This is one reason
why susceptibility to peer pressure declines as adolescents
grow into adulthood; as they mature, individuals become bet-
ter able to put the brakes on an impulse that is aroused by their
friends.
IMPORTANCE OF TIMING
These structural and functional changes do not all take
place along one uniform timetable, and the differences in their
timing raise two important points relevant to the use of neuro-
science in public policy. First, there is no simple answer to the
question of when an adolescent brain becomes an adult brain.
Brain systems implicated in basic cognitive processes reach
adult levels of maturity by mid-adolescence, whereas those
that are active in self-regulation do not fully mature until late
adolescence or even early adulthood. In other words, adoles-
cents mature intellectually before they mature socially or emo-
tionally, a fact that helps explain why teenagers who are so
smart in some respects sometimes do surprisingly dumb
things.
To the extent that society wishes to use developmental neu-
roscience to inform public policy decisions on where to draw
age boundaries between adolescence and adulthood, it is
important to match the policy
question with the right science.
In his dissenting opinion in
Roper, the juvenile-death-penalty
case, Justice Antonin Scalia criti-
cized the American Psychological
Association, which submitted an
amicus brief arguing that adoles-
cents are not as mature as adults
and therefore should not be eligi-
ble for the death penalty. As Scalia
pointed out, the association had previously taken the stance
that adolescents should be permitted to make decisions about
abortion without involving their parents, because young peo-
ple’s decision-making is just as competent as that of adults.
The association’s two positions may seem inconsistent at
first glance, but it is entirely possible that an adolescent might
be mature enough for some decisions but not others. After all,
the circumstances under which individuals make medical deci-
sions and commit crimes are very different and make different
sorts of demands on their brains and abilities. State laws gov-
erning adolescent abortion require a waiting period before the
procedure can be performed, as well as consultation with an
adult—a parent, health care provider, or judge. These policies
discourage impetuous and shortsighted acts and create cir-
cumstances under which adolescents have been shown to be
just as competent at making decisions as adults. In contrast,
violent crimes are usually committed by adolescents when they
are emotionally aroused and with their friends—two condi-
tions that increase the likelihood of impulsivity and sensation-
seeking and that exacerbate adolescent immaturity. From a
neuroscientific standpoint, it therefore makes perfect sense to
have a lower age for autonomous medical decision-making
than for eligibility for capital punishment, because certain
brain systems mature earlier than others.
There is another kind of asynchrony in brain development
during adolescence that is important for public policy. Middle
adolescence is a period during which brain systems implicated
in how a person responds to rewards are at their height of
arousability but systems important for self-regulation are still
immature. The different timetables followed by these different
brain systems create a vulnerability to risky and reckless
behavior that is greater in middle adolescence than before or
after. It’s as if the brain’s accelerator is pressed to the floor
before a good braking system is in place. Given this, it is no
surprise that criminal activity peaks around age 17—as does
first experimentation with alcohol and marijuana, automobile
crashes, accidental drownings, and attempted suicide.
In sum, the consensus emerging from recent research on the
adolescent brain is that teenagers are not as mature as adults in
either brain structure or function. This does not mean that
adolescents’ brains are “defective,” just as newborns’ muscular
systems, which do not allow them to walk, or language sys-
tems, which do not allow them to carry on conversations, are
3. Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhanc-
ing Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14(2) DEVELOPMENTAL
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not defective. The fact that the
adolescent brain is still develop-
ing, and in this regard is less
mature than the adult brain, is
normative, not pathological. Ado-
lescence is a developmental stage,
not a disease, mental illness, or
defect. But it is a time when peo-
ple are, on average, not as mature
as they will be in adulthood.
I am frequently asked how to
reconcile this view of adolescence with historical evidence that
adolescents successfully performed adult roles in previous
eras. This may be true, but all societies in recorded history
have recognized a period of development between childhood
and adulthood, and writers as far back as Aristotle have char-
acterized adolescents as less able to control themselves and
more prone to risk-taking than adults. In 1623 (without the
benefit of brain scans), Shakespeare wrote in The Winter’s Tale:
“I would there were no age between ten and three-and-twenty,
or that youth would sleep out the rest; for there is nothing in
the between but getting wenches with child, wronging the
ancientry, stealing, fighting.”
SCIENCE IN THE POLICY ARENA
Although there is a good degree of consensus among neu-
roscientists about many of the ways in which brain structure
and function change during adolescence, it is less clear just
how informative this work is about adolescent behavior for
public policy. Because all behavior must have neurobiological
underpinnings, it is hardly revelatory to say that adolescents
behave the way they do because of “something in their brain.”
Moreover, society hardly needs neuroscience to tell it that, rel-
ative to adults, adolescents are more likely to engage in sensa-
tion seeking, less likely to control their impulses, or less likely
to plan ahead. So how does neuroscience add to society’s
understanding of adolescent behavior? What is the value,
other than advances in basic neuroscience, of studies that pro-
vide neurobiological evidence that is consistent with what is
already known about human behavior?
I will consider five such possibilities, two that I think are
valid, two that I think are mistaken, and one where my assess-
ment is equivocal. Let me begin with two rationales that are
widely believed but that are specious.
The first mistake is to interpret age differences in brain
structure or function as conclusive evidence that certain
behaviors must be hard-wired. A correlation between brain
development and behavioral development is just that: a corre-
lation. It says nothing about the causes of the behavior or
about the relative contributions of nature and nurture. In some
cases, the behavior may indeed follow directly from biologi-
cally driven changes in brain structure or function. But in oth-
ers, the reverse is true—that is, the observed brain change is
the consequence of experience. Yes, adolescents may develop
better impulse control as a result of changes within the pre-
frontal cortex, and it may be true that these anatomical
changes are programmed to unfold along a predetermined
timetable. But it is also plausible that the structural changes
observed in the prefrontal cortex result from experiences that
demand that adolescents exercise self-control, in much the
same way that changes in muscle structure and function often
follow from exercise.
A second mistake is assuming that the existence of a bio-
logical correlate of some behavior demonstrates that the
behavior cannot be changed. It is surely the case that some of
the changes in brain structure and function that take place
during adolescence are relatively impervious to environmental
influence. But the brain is malleable, and there is a good deal
of evidence that adolescence is, in fact, a period of especially
heightened neuroplasticity. That’s one reason it is a period of
such vulnerability to many forms of mental illness.
I suspect that the changes in reward sensitivity that I
described earlier are largely determined by biology and, in par-
ticular, by puberty. I say this because the changes in reward
seeking observed in young adolescents are also seen in other
mammals when they go through puberty. This makes perfect
sense from an evolutionary perspective because adolescence is
the period during which mammals become sexually active, a
behavior that is motivated by the expectation of pleasure. An
increase in reward sensitivity soon after puberty is added
insurance that mammals will do what it takes to reproduce
while they are at the peak of fertility, including engaging in a
certain amount of risky behavior, such as leaving the nest or
troop to venture out into the wild. In fact, the age at peak
human fecundity (that is, the age at which an individual
should begin having sex if he or she wants to have the most
children possible) is about the same as the age at the peak of
risk-taking—between 16 and 17 years of age.
Other brain changes that take place during adolescence are
probably driven to a great extent by nurture and may therefore
be modifiable by experience. There is growing evidence that
the actual structure of prefrontal regions active in self-control
can be influenced by training and practice. So in addition to
assuming that biology causes behavior, and not the reverse, it
is also a mistake to think that the biology of the brain cannot
be changed.
HOW SCIENCE CAN HELP
How, then, does neuroscience contribute to a better under-
standing of adolescent behavior? As I said, I think the neuro-
science serves at least two important functions.
First, neuroscientific evidence can provide added support
for behavioral evidence when the neuroscience and the behav-
ioral science are conceptually and theoretically aligned. Notice
that I used the word “support” here. When neuroscientific
findings about adolescent brain development are consistent
with findings from behavioral research, the neuroscience pro-
vides added confidence in the behavioral findings; scientific
evidence of any sort is always more compelling when it has
been shown to be valid. But it is incorrect to privilege the neu-
roscientific evidence over the behavioral evidence, which is
frequently done because the neuroscientific evidence is often
incorrectly assumed to be more reliable, precise, or valid. Many
nonscientists are more persuaded by neuroscience than by
behavioral science, because they often lack the training or
expertise that would enable them to view the neuroscience
through a critical lens. In science, familiarity breeds skepti-
cism, and the lack of knowledge that most laypersons have
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about the workings of the brain, much less the nuances of neu-
roscientific methods, often leads them to be overly impressed
by brain science and underwhelmed by behavioral research,
even when the latter may be more relevant to policy decisions.
A second way in which neuroscience can be useful is that it
may help generate new hypotheses about adolescent develop-
ment that can then be tested in behavioral studies. This is espe-
cially important when behavioral methods cannot be used to
test alternative accounts of a phenomenon. Let me illustrate
this point with an example from our ongoing research.
As I noted earlier, it has been hypothesized that heightened
risk-taking in adolescence is thought to be the product of an
easily aroused reward system and an immature self-regulatory
system. The arousal of the reward system takes place early in
adolescence and is closely tied to puberty, whereas the matura-
tion of the self-regulatory system is independent of puberty
and unfolds gradually, from preadolescence through young
adulthood.
In our studies, we have shown that reward sensitivity, pref-
erence for immediate rewards, sensation-seeking, and a greater
focus on the rewards of a risky choice all increase between pre-
adolescence and mid-adolescence, peak between ages 15 and
17, and then decline.4 In contrast, controlling impulses, plan-
ning ahead, and resisting peer influence all increase gradually
from pre-adolescence through late adolescence, and in some
instances, into early adulthood.
Although one can show without the benefit of neuro-
science that the inclination to take risks is generally higher in
adolescence than before or after, having knowledge about the
course of brain development provides insight into the under-
lying processes that might account for this pattern. We’ve
shown in several experiments that adolescents take more risks
when they are with their friends than when they are alone. But
is this because the presence of peers interferes with self-con-
trol or because it affects the way in which adolescents experi-
ence the rewards of the risky decision? It isn’t possible to
answer this question by asking teenagers why they take more
risks when their friends are around.  They admit that they do,
but they say they do not know why. But through neuroimag-
ing, we discovered that the peer effect was specifically due to
the impact that peers have on adolescents’ reward sensitivity.
Why does this matter? Because if the chief reason that adoles-
cents experiment with tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs is
that they are at a point in life where everything rewarding feels
especially so, trying to teach them to “Just Say No” is proba-
bly futile. I have argued elsewhere that raising the price of cig-
arettes and alcohol, thereby making these rewarding sub-
stances harder to obtain, is probably a more effective public
policy than health education.5
I have now described two valid reasons to use neuroscience
to better understand adolescent behavior and two questionable
ones. I want to add a fifth, which
concerns the attributions we
make about individuals’ behavior.
This particular use of neuro-
science is having a tremendous
impact on criminal law.
A few years ago I was asked to
provide an expert opinion in a
Michigan case involving a prison
inmate named Anthony, who as a
17-year-old was part of a group of
teenagers who robbed a small
store. During the robbery, one of
the teenagers shot and killed the
storekeeper. Although the
teenagers had planned the robbery, they did not engage in the
act with the intention of shooting, much less murdering, some-
one. But under the state’s criminal law, the crime qualified as
felony murder, which in Michigan carries a mandatory sen-
tence of life without the possibility of parole for all members of
the group involved in the robbery—including Anthony, who
had fled the store before the shooting took place.
Anthony—who has been in prison for 33 years—requested
that his sentence be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in Graham v. Florida that life without parole is cruel and
unusual punishment for juveniles because they are less mature
than adults.6 The ruling in that case was limited to crimes
other than homicide, so Anthony’s challenge was based on the
argument that the logic behind the Graham decision applies
to felony murder as well.
I was asked specifically whether a 17-year-old could have
anticipated that someone might be killed during the robbery.
It is quite clear from the trial transcript that Anthony didn’t
anticipate this consequence, but “didn’t” is not the same as
“couldn’t.” It is known from behavioral research that the aver-
age 17-year-old is less likely than the average adult to think
ahead, control his impulses, and foresee the consequences of
his actions, and clinical evaluations of Anthony revealed that
he was a normal 17-year-old. But “less likely” means just that;
it doesn’t mean “unable,” but neither does it mean “unwill-
ing.” As I will explain, the distinction between “didn’t” and
“couldn’t” is important under the law. And studies of adoles-
cent brain development might be helpful in distinguishing
between the two.
The issue was not whether Anthony is guilty. He freely
admitted having participated in the robbery, and there was
clear evidence that the victim was shot and killed by one of the
robbers. But even when someone is guilty, many factors can
influence the sentence he receives. Individuals who are
deemed less than fully responsible are punished less severely
than those who are judged to be fully responsible, even if the
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consequences of the act are iden-
tical. For example, manslaughter
is not punished as harshly as
premeditated murder, even
though both result in the death
of another individual. So the
question in Anthony’s case, as it
was in the Roper and Graham
Supreme Court cases, was
whether 17-year-olds are fully
responsible for their behavior. If
they are not, they should not be
punished as severely as individu-
als whose responsibility is not
diminished.
In order for something to
diminish criminal responsibility,
it has to be something that was
not the person’s fault—that was
outside his control. If someone
has an untreatable tumor on his frontal lobe that is thought to
make him unable to control aggressive outbursts, he is less
than fully responsible for his aggressive behavior, and the pres-
ence of the tumor would be viewed as a mitigating factor if he
were being sentenced for a violent crime. On the other hand, if
someone with no neurobiological deficit goes into a bar, drinks
himself into a state of rage, and commits a violent crime as a
result, the fact that he was drunk does not diminish his respon-
sibility for his act. It doesn’t matter whether the mitigating fac-
tor is biological, psychological, or environmental. The issue is
whether the diminished responsibility is the person’s fault and
whether the individual could have been able to compensate for
whatever it is that was uncontrollable.
Judgments about mitigation are often difficult to make
because most of the time, factors that diminish responsibility
fall somewhere between the extremes of things that are obvi-
ously beyond an individual’s control, such as brain tumors,
and those that an individual could have controlled, such as
self-inflicted inebriation. In many cases, things are not clear-
cut. One must make a judgment call, and one looks for evi-
dence that tips the balance in one direction or the other. Pro-
found mental retardation that compromises foresight is a miti-
gating condition. A lack of foresight as a result of stupidity that
is within the normal range of intelligence is not. Being forced
to commit a crime because a gun is pointed at one’s head mit-
igates criminal responsibility. Committing a crime in order to
save face in front of friends who have made a dare does not.
Many things can lead a person to act impulsively or without
foresight but are not necessarily mitigating. A genetic inclina-
tion toward aggression is probably in this category, as is having
been raised in a rotten neighborhood. Both are external forces,
but society does not see them as so determinative that they
automatically diminish personal responsibility.
As I have argued elsewhere,7 studies of adolescent brain
anatomy clearly indicate that regions of the brain that regulate
such things as foresight, impulse control, and resistance to
peer pressure are still developing at age 17. Imaging studies
show that immaturity in these regions is linked to adolescents’
poorer performance on tasks that require these capabilities.
There is evidence that the adolescent brain is less mature than
the adult brain in ways that affect some of the behaviors that
mitigate criminal responsibility. This suggests that at least
some of adolescents’ irresponsible behavior is not entirely
their fault.
The brain science, in and of itself, does not carry the day,
but when the results of behavioral science are added to the
mix, I think it tips the balance toward viewing adolescent
impulsivity, short-sightedness, and susceptibility to peer pres-
sure as developmentally normative phenomena that teenagers
cannot fully control. This is why I have argued that adolescents
should be viewed as inherently less responsible than adults and
should be punished less harshly than adults, even when their
crimes are identical.8 I do not find persuasive the counterargu-
ment that some adolescents can exercise self-control or that
some adults are just as impulsive and shortsighted as
teenagers. Of course there is variability in brain function and
behavior among adolescents, and of course there is variability
among adults. But the average differences between the age
groups are significant, and that is what counts as society draws
age boundaries under the law on the basis of science.
AGE RANGES FOR RESPONSIBILITY
Beyond criminal law, how should social policy involving
young people take this into account? Society needs to distin-
guish between people who are ready for the rights and respon-
sibilities of adulthood and those who are not. Science can help
in deciding where best to draw the lines. Based on what is now
known about brain development—and I say “now known”
because new studies are appearing every month—it is reason-
able to posit that there is an age range during which adult neu-
robiological maturity is reached. Framing this as an age range,
rather than pinpointing a discrete chronological age, is useful
because doing so accommodates the fact that different brain
systems mature along different timetables, and different indi-
viduals mature at different ages and  rates. The lower bound of
this age range is probably somewhere around 15, and the
upper bound is probably somewhere around 22. By this I mean
that if society had an agreed-upon measure of adult neurobio-
logical maturity (which it doesn’t yet have but may at some
point in the future), it would be unlikely that many normally
developing individuals would have attained this mark before
turning 15 and would have failed to reach it by age 22.
If society were to choose either of these endpoints as the age
of majority, it would be forced to accept many errors of classi-
fication because granting adult status at age 15 would result in
treating many immature individuals as adults, which is dan-
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gerous, whereas waiting until age 22 would result in treating
many mature individuals as children, which is unjust. So what
is society to do? I think there are four possible options.
The first option is to pick the mid-point of this range. Yes,
this would result in classifying some immature individuals as
adults and some mature ones as children. But this would be
true no matter what chronological age is picked, and assuming
that the age of neurobiological maturity is normally distrib-
uted, fewer errors would be made by picking an age near the
middle of the range than at either of the extremes. Doing so
would place the dividing line somewhere around 18, which, it
turns out, is the presumptive age of majority pretty much
everywhere around the world. In the vast majority of coun-
tries, 18 is the age at which individuals are permitted to vote,
drink, drive, and enjoy other adult rights. And just think—the
international community arrived at this without the benefit of
brain scans.
A second possibility would be to decide, on an issue-by-
issue basis, what it takes to be “mature enough.” Society does
this regularly. Although the presumptive age of majority in the
United States is 18, the nation deviates from this age more
often than not. Consider, for a moment, the different ages man-
dated for determining when individuals can make independent
medical decisions, drive, hold various types of employment,
marry, view R-rated movies without an adult chaperone, vote,
serve in the military, enter into contracts, buy cigarettes, and
purchase alcohol. The age of majority with respect to these
matters ranges from 15 to 21, which is surprisingly reasonable,
given what science says about brain development. The only
deviation I can think of that falls out of this range is the
nation’s inexplicable willingness to try people younger than 15
as adults, but this policy, in part because of the influence of
brain science, is now being questioned in many jurisdictions.
Although the aforementioned age range may be reasonable,
society doesn’t rely on science to link specific ages to specific
rights or responsibilities, and some of the nation’s laws are baf-
fling, to say the least, when viewed through the lens of science
or public health. How is it possible to rationalize permitting
teenagers to drive before they are permitted to see R-rated
movies on their own, sentencing juveniles to life without parole
before they are old enough to serve on a jury, or sending young
people into combat before they can buy beer? The answer is
that policies that distinguish between adolescents and adults
are made for all sorts of reasons, and science, including neuro-
science, is only one of many proper considerations.
A third possibility would be to shift from a binary classifi-
cation system, in which everyone is legally either a child or an
adult, to a regime that uses three legal categories: one for chil-
dren, one for adolescents, and one for adults. The nation does
this for some purposes under the law now, although the age
boundaries around the middle category aren’t necessarily sci-
entifically derived. For example, many states have graduated
drivers’ licensing, a system in which adolescents are permitted
to drive but are not granted full
driving privileges until they reach
a certain age. This model also is
used in the construction of child
labor laws, where adolescents are
allowed to work once they’ve
reached a certain age, but there
are limits on the types of jobs
they can hold and the numbers of
hours they can work.
In our book, Rethinking Juve-
nile Justice,9 Elizabeth Scott and I
have argued that this is how the
nation should structure the jus-
tice system, treating adolescent
offenders as an intermediate cate-
gory, neither as children, whose crimes society excuses, nor as
adults, whom society holds fully responsible for their acts.
While there are some areas of the law where a three-way sys-
tem would be difficult to imagine, such as voting, it has been
suggested that society should apply this model to other areas
of the law. For example, we could permit individuals between
18 and 20 to purchase beer and wine, but not hard liquor, and
implement especially stiff punishment for adolescents who
become intoxicated or engage in wrongdoing under the influ-
ence of alcohol. 
A final possibility is acknowledging that there is variability
in brain and behavioral development among people of the
same chronological age and making individualized decisions,
rather than drawing categorical age boundaries at all. Many of
the Supreme Court justices who dissented in the juvenile-
death-penalty and life-without-parole cases took this stance.
They argued that instead of treating adolescents as a class of
individuals who are too immature to be held fully responsible
for their behavior, the policy should be to assess each offender’s
maturity to determine his criminal culpability. The justices did
not specify what tools would be needed to do this, however,
and reliably assessing psychological maturity is easier said than
done. There is a big difference between using neuroscience to
guide the formulation of policy and using it to determine how
individual cases are adjudicated. Although it may be possible
to say that, on average, people who are Johnny’s age are typi-
cally less mature than adults, we cannot say whether Johnny
himself is.
Science may someday have the tools to image an adoles-
cent’s brain and draw conclusions about that individual’s neu-
robiological maturity relative to established age norms for var-
ious aspects of brain structure and function, but such norms
do not yet exist, and the cost of doing individualized assess-
ments of neurobiological maturity would be prohibitively
expensive. Moreover, it is not clear that society would end up
making better decisions using neurobiological assessments
than those it makes on the basis of chronological age or than
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those it might make using behavioral or psychological mea-
sures. It makes far more sense to rely on a driving test than a
brain scan to determine whether someone is ready to drive. So
don’t expect to see brain scanners any time soon at your local
taverns or movie theaters.
ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGES
The study of adolescent brain development has made
tremendous progress in the very short period that scientists
have been studying the adolescent brain systematically. As the
science moves ahead, the big challenge facing those of us who
want to apply this research to policy will be in understanding
the complicated interplay of biological maturation and envi-
ronmental influence as they jointly shape adolescent behavior.
And this can be achieved only through collaboration between
neuroscientists and scholars from other disciplines. Brain sci-
ence should inform the nation’s policy discussions when it is
relevant, but society should not make policy decisions on the
basis of brain science alone.
Whether the revelation that the adolescent brain may be
less mature than scientists had previously thought is ultimately
a good thing, a bad thing, or a mixed blessing for young peo-
ple remains to be seen. Some policymakers will use this evi-
dence to argue in favor of restricting adolescents’ rights, and
others will use it to advocate for policies that protect adoles-
cents from harm. In either case, scientists should welcome the
opportunity to inform policy discussions with the best avail-
able empirical evidence.
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Footnotes
1. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004).
2. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47-48 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(summarizing caselaw stating that execution methods imposing
more pain than is required to cause death would violate the
Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishments).
3. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601
(1986) (footnote omitted).
4. See id. at 3.
5. See id. at 3–4.
6. See id. at 7.
7. Cf. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE WORLD 3–4 (1985) (describing a person’s reaction to pain
as retaining inherently personal aspects).
Important legal distinctions turn on the presence and degreeof physical pain. Statutes refer to degrees of physical pain todefine criminal offenses like torture-murder,1 while pain
that rises to the level of cruelty draws the boundary between
constitutionally permissible and impermissible punishment.2
Claims about pain motivate legislative action to protect previ-
ously unrecognized classes, such as in several states’ recent
passage of statutes concerning fetal pain and fetal anesthesia
during abortion.3 In legal domains ranging from tort to torture,
pain and its degree do important definitional work by estab-
lishing boundaries of lawfulness and of entitlements. 
For all of the work done by pain as a term in statutes, trea-
tises, constitutions, and administrative- and common-law
jurisprudence, it has had a troubling lack of externally verifi-
able reality.4 Like other subjective, affective states, pain has
been invisible and, frequently, unspeakable.5 Though we have
been able to impute pain based on experience or knowledge or
by observing expressions of it in behavior, we have not been
able to observe or measure it directly.6 For this reason, claims
of great pain come with great doubt.
But now, pain rests on the cusp of visibility. That is, neu-
roimaging technology is in the process of making pain, anxiety,
certain forms of deception, and potentially myriad other sub-
jective states at least partly knowable and quantifiable.  This
article, which is part of a broader project exploring the role of
pain imaging in law, argues that statutory definitions of chronic
pain and judicial interpretations both of such statutes and of
evidence presented by chronic-pain claimants must be updated
to reflect recent discoveries that various chronic-pain syn-
dromes constitute verifiable and distinct neurological disorders.
Assessing the impact that the neuroimaging of pain may
have on diverse areas of law illuminates the point that legal
issues concerning the body rarely assume the form of straight-
forward questions about physical facts or measurement.
Though they may involve measurement, they also fundamen-
tally implicate the normative dimension of how suffering relates
to empathy and of who deserves (or does not deserve) empathy
in the law. Indeed, pain discourse in law frequently is a proxy
or heuristic for values and for moral or normative judgments.
Attempting to solve certain normatively freighted legal prob-
lems, like what constitutes torture, or cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, through quantification would be profoundly mis-
guided. There are serious empirical and epistemic questions as
to whether even perfect pain quantification could modify or
improve ostensibly pain-related areas of legal doctrine. This is
not because the technology is not “there yet” (although it is
not) but more fundamentally because certain doctrinal legal
issues presented as pain-measurement problems are predomi-
nantly values problems—problems about whose suffering
counts and how much suffering we will tolerate to be inflicted
upon or experienced by different categories of persons.
It is not accidental that pain functions as a moral status
indicator; rather, this stems from the unique relationship
between pain and empathy. Our conceptions of rights and
duties are necessarily informed by human physicality and con-
strained by the limits of empathic identification. A person’s
moral proscription against excess pain ends when that person
encounters the boundaries of empathic identification—the
ability to say that a category of subjects is in some way “like
us.”7 This helps explain why different groups can hold incom-
patible intuitions about whether the infliction of excess pain
constitutes a wrong, separate even from the infliction of death,
in such disparate and morally contentious areas as the death
penalty, pre-viability abortion, and animal welfare. Pain mea-
surement thus represents the archetypal example of how to
properly understand if, when, and how to adapt the findings of
brain imaging to bodies of legal doctrine. Attempts to resolve
values-laden issues with neuroimaging or other forms of hedo-
nic quantification would suffer from a measurement fallacy;
this would in turn produce policy prescriptions as morally
unconvincing as they would be practically infeasible.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the biology
of pain and the science of pain detection, focusing on functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) for the detection of acute
pain. It incorporates current medical and scientific research and
interviews with leading pain researchers in the United States and
United Kingdom who offer their views on the potential and lim-
its of pain detection. This part contends that, while stunning
advances have occurred in neuroimaging, current and in-princi-
ple barriers to accurate pain measurement remain.
Part II presents the first of two case studies. It analyzes
criminal torture-murder statutes (with related caselaw) and
then analyzes state torture statutes and treaties, both of which
facially speak in terms of quanta of pain. As part II will show,
torture-murder and state torture function as an expressive des-
ignation for the categories of offenses that are most norma-
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8. See Pain Management Basics, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/
pain-management/guide/pain-basics; see also FAQs: What Is Pain?
THE BRITISH PAIN SOC’Y, http://www.britishpainsociety.org/
patient_faq.htm#q1.
9. See FAQS: What Is Pain? supra note 8; The Autonomic Nervous Sys-
tem, NAT’L DYSAUTONOMIA RES. FOUND., http://www.ndrf.org/
ans.html.
10. See Phantom Pain: Definition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayo
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/phantom-pain/basics/definition/
con-20023268; see also OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS
WIFE FOR A HAT 66–70 (1985) (recounting a patient who had dam-
aged proprioception that caused him to lose his sense of balance).
11. This is the mechanism through which local anesthetics like
bupivacaine work: by flooding the sodium channels in the nerve
fibers around where it is injected, the anesthetic blocks the
nerves from transmitting signals up to the brain. See STEPHEN E.
ABRAM, PAIN MEDICINE: THE REQUISITES IN ANESTHESIOLOGY 91–93
(2006) (describing bupivacaine and other sensory-blocking
local anesthetics).
12. Id. at 12–13 (describing descending control in nociception and
pain).
13. Id. at 28.
14. A conscious person may experience no pain if nerve signaling from
the site of injury to the spinal cord or brain has been blocked. This
is the mechanism by which local anesthetic and epidurals work.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., C. Richard
Chapman, Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious
Experience, in PAIN: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 59–60
(Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig eds., 2004).
15. Contrast this with the description of a nerve block injection, see
supra note 11, which prevents signal transmission from the nerve
to the brain. General anaesthesia does not block afferent signal
transmission; rather, “[t]he anesthetized brain doesn’t respond to
pain signals or surgical manipulations.” General Anesthesia: Defin-
ition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/
anesthesia/basics/definition/prc-20014786.
tively transgressive. Consistent with liberal political theory, the
harm, although tied to the body, primarily lies in the expres-
sion of corrupt values relative to the autonomy and person-
hood of the victim.
Part III presents a second set of case studies that examine
the role of pain in Eighth Amendment challenges to execution
by lethal injection and in recent legislation restricting late-term
abortion. In these areas, advocates who oppose state execution
or abortion frame their challenges to the contested practices as
challenges to excess physical suffering—that the state should
neither inflict nor countenance the infliction of suffering on
the condemned or the unborn. However, despite their anti-
pain rhetoric, important normative commitments independent
of objections to physical pain animate activists who work in
these areas.
Part IV draws on the insights from the case studies to
develop the concept of embodied morality: the idea that facts
about the body do not translate directly into legal conclusions
or concepts but do inform a community’s norms about what
constitutes morally permissible treatment of the body. Pain’s
role across different areas of law thus provides a fascinating
lens through which to understand legal notions of the embod-
ied person and its normative dimensions.
I. PAIN AND PAIN IMAGING: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
A. ACUTE PAIN: DEFINITION AND MECHANISMS
1. Definition and Basic Mechanisms of Acute Pain
Acute pain is the pain that a person experiences immediately
when something goes wrong. Such pain results from the brain’s
translation of signals it receives from the body’s contact with a
noxious external stimulus, like a hot stove, or from a sudden
change in the body’s internal condition, like intestinal cramps.
Acute pain is characterized not by its severity but by its sud-
denness and short duration. Although there exists a common
vernacular misuse of “acute pain” to mean “very severe pain,”
acute pain may indeed be only minor or moderate. For exam-
ple, the pain of getting a paper cut and of breaking a leg are
both acute, but the former is minor while the latter is severe.
Acute pain is the basic pain model and is also a highly impor-
tant survival mechanism that
motivates the sufferer to get away
from the harmful thing.8
Regardless of where pain orig-
inates in the body, the brain acts
as the central processing unit for
pain. The pain-detecting nerves
present in the part of the body
that encounters the noxious stim-
ulus send the message to the
brain through ascending or
“afferent” neurons. The brain
interprets the signal and then
sends signals back via descending
or “efferent” neurons to where the afferent signal originated. The
signal from the brain back to the peripheral site can be amped
up or tamped down by descending modulation. That is, the
body’s physiological state (including mental state) can both
magnify and moderate the pain signal.9
Although we often think of pain as being instantaneous and
“in” a particular body part, it is possible to demonstrate in a
few ways that pain is actually not “in” the place that feels hurt.
One classic example is the experience of pain in body parts
that no longer exist: so-called phantom limb pain. That phe-
nomenon may cause pain in a missing hand that feels exactly
like pain in a physically present hand.10 Conversely, if signal-
ing to the brain has been blocked, a noxious stimulus applied
to the physically present hand will produce no pain at all.11
Thus, there is no simple one-to-one relationship between
harm to the peripheral site, signal strength up to the brain,
efferent signal strength back down to the site, and pain per-
ception.12 The brain’s reception and interpretation of the affer-
ent signal is essential for the brain’s detection of and response
to aversive stimuli, but pain perception requires something
more.13 The brain must receive and interpret the afferent sig-
nal and operationalize conscious awareness of the signal.14
2. The Role of Consciousness in Pain
Without consciousness, there is no pain. Consider the case of
a person who is anaesthetized with general anesthesia for a sur-
gical procedure. Anesthesia renders the person unconscious;15
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16. See Robert J. Gatchel et al., The Biopsychosocial Approach to
Chronic Pain: Scientific Advances and Future Directions, 133 PSY-
CHOL. BULL. 581, 582 (2007).
17. The thalamus is “the main relay site for nociceptive inputs before
cortical and subcortical structures.” Petra Schweinhardt et al.,
Imaging Pain in Patients: Is It Meaningful? 19 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROLOGY 392, 397 (2006).
18. See M.N. Baliki et al., Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive
Representation and Magnitude Estimation, 101 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
875, 885 (2009) (describing how the insula activates sensory
modalities during pain perception).
19. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, Somatosensory Cortex, in MEDICAL
SUBJECT HEADINGS, available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/cgi/mesh/
2014/MB_cgi?mode=&index=12446&field=all&HM=&II=&PA=
&form=&input= (defining the somatosensory cortex as the “[a]rea
of the parietal lobe concerned with receiving general sensations”).
20. Gatchel et al., supra note 16, at 582.
21. See id.
22. Similarly, though many of us have had the experience of being
woken from sleep by pain, we did not feel it as pain until we
awoke.
23. See id.; cf. Donald D. Price et al., Integrating Experiential-Phenom-
enological Methods and Neuroscience to Study Neural Mechanisms of
Pain and Consciousness, 11 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 593, 597
(2002) (arguing that a subjective, “first person experiential”
approach is an essential component to the study of pain).
24. See, e.g., Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere, Some Foundational
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(2002); Price et al., supra note 23, at 595; Jennifer Radden, A Con-
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standardized heat stimulus delivered by laser is also commonly
used. Use of uniform stimuli allows researchers working in differ-
ent laboratories to compare their results. See, e.g., Susanna J.
Bantick et al., Imaging How Attention Modulates Pain in Humans
Using Functional MRI, 125 BRAIN 310, 312 (2002) (applying
“[t]hermal noxious stimuli . . . using a thermal resistor” in mea-
suring “experimentally induced pain”).
26. PET stands for “positron emission tomography.”  For an overview
of different brain imaging techniques, see generally MATT CARTER
& JENNIFER SHIEH, GUIDE TO RESEARCH TECHNIQUES IN NEURO-
SCIENCE 1–23 (2010).
27. See Kenneth L. Casey et al., Positron Emission Tomographic Analy-
sis of Cerebral Structures Activated Specifically by Repetitive Noxious
Heat Stimuli, 71 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 802, 805–06 (1994); A. May,
Neuroimaging: Visualising the Brain in Pain, 28 NEUROLOGICAL SCI.
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activation is seen in the contralateral thalamus.  U. Bingel et al.,
Single Trial fMRI Reveals Significant Contralateral Bias in Responses
to Laser Pain Within Thalamus and Somatosensory Cortices, 18
NEUROIMAGE 740, 740–41 (2003).
however, it does not prevent the
operation’s target tissues from reg-
istering noxious stimuli.16 When
the surgeon cuts into the patient’s
abdomen, the tissues still send
messages to the brain (unless
nerves also have been locally
blocked)—principally to the thal-
amus,17 insula,18 and somatosen-
sory cortex19—relaying informa-
tion. This signal transmission,
called “nociception,” meaning the
detection and transmission of sig-
nals about noxious stimuli, hap-
pens even though the patient does
not feel the incision.20 Nociception does not translate into pain,
though, because the brain is not at that moment conscious, and
thus the person remains unaware.21
At first, this distinction between pain and nociception might
seem peculiar. The distinction becomes intuitive and familiar,
however, if we shift from thinking about pain to other phe-
nomenological states like cold, thirst, or hunger. If a patient is
anaesthetized for long enough, blood-sugar levels may drop or
the patient may become dehydrated; however, the patient will
not feel hungry or thirsty. Operating theaters are kept cool,
causing the patient’s body temperature to drop; even so, the
patient will not feel cold (at least until the patient wakes up).
We would not expect the unconscious patient to feel these
things; all phenomenological (or experiential) states require
consciousness.22 Pain perception is continuous with all other
subjectively perceived body states, which can only be said to
exist when they intrude upon consciousness.23
Accordingly, the nociception/pain distinction does not differ
much from the relationships between lack of sleep and fatigue,
dehydration and thirst, and so forth. This fundamentally sub-
jective, phenomenological quality of pain has generated exten-
sive literature (and controversy) within the field of philosophy
of mind.24 Certainly, different people may have different experi-
ences of pain, even in response to the same external or internal
stimuli. Yet, understanding pain—or hunger or cold or thirst—
for most practical purposes ought not be particularly mysteri-
ous or require unraveling the nature of consciousness. 
B. ACUTE PAIN IN THE SCANNER
The brain’s processing of different noxious stimuli correlates
with activation in several specific regions. Further, the degree of
activation in certain parts of the brain correlates well with the
intensity of pain or discomfort reported by a subject. In other
words, the physiology and the phenomenology seem closely
related. The main challenge is that the degree of activation and
its relationship to the intensity of pain or discomfort does not
correlate very well across subjects. This section describes the
brain regions involved in pain processes and the fMRI research
correlating brain activation with subjective experience.
1. Specific Areas of Brain Activity Correlate with
Painful Stimulus
Many regions of the brain become active in research sub-
jects who experience a painful heat stimulus.25 Identified in
the 1990s with PET scanning,26 the major areas that display
activity in response to acute pain include the anterior insula,
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), primary and secondary
somatosensory cortex, and thalamus.27 More recent acute-pain
studies also find activation in the prefrontal cortex, supple-
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28. See Gatchel et al., supra note 16, at 592–93 (citing and reviewing
extensive literature).
29. See id. at 582.
30. See Jeanne D. Talbot et al., Multiple Representations of Pain in
Human Cerebral Cortex, 251 SCIENCE 1355, 1355–56 (1991). But
see Andrew K. Jones et al., Localization of Responses to Pain in
Human Cerebral Cortex, 255 SCIENCE 215, 215 (1992) (presenting
Jones’s comment on Talbot’s article and Talbot’s response).
31. See Bantick et al., supra note 25, at 316–18.
32. See id. at 317 (noting how the anterior cingulate cortex provides
an emotion-processing function).
mental motor cortex, basal ganglia, cerebellum, amygdala, hip-
pocampus, hypothalamus, and periaqueductal gray (PAG).28
This section will briefly describe the role of these various brain
regions and why pain response is distributed so widely across
the brain.
So many parts of the brain respond to painful stimuli
because pain is a multidimensional experience: it involves sen-
sory, motor, and affective components as well as memory and
executive functions (like planning and self-control).29 When a
conscious person perceives pain, activity likely arises in the
prefrontal cortex, thalamus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex,
and brain areas correlated with sensory perception
(somatosensory cortex and somatosensory association areas).
The individual may reflexively or deliberately move away from
the stimulus, activating brain areas involved in motor function
(like the motor cortex and cerebellum).30 The individual may
turn to distractions in order to minimize the experience of the
pain, an exercise in self-control that also would engage the pre-
frontal cortex.31 The individual will have an instantaneous,
negative affective reaction to the pain, engaging the amygdala
and anterior cingulate cortex, key areas of the brain involved
with emotional processing.32 The individual may utilize
implicit and explicit memory to identify what the pain experi-
ence is; this would involve several areas of the brain, including
the hippocampus and likely also (again) the somatosensory
association cortex. If the memory involves visual recollection,
there will also be activity in, among other areas, the occipital
lobe. Thus, the sum of processes and reactions that we call
“pain” involves nearly a whole-brain experience.
2. Degree of Brain Activation Correlates with
Degree of Reported Pain
Studies involving fMRI acute-pain imaging show that a per-
son’s degree of brain activation correlates—not perfectly, but
well—with self-reported degree of pain. That is, people who
report more sensitivity to a painful stimulus show greater brain
activity in areas of the brain associated with pain perception
(and people who report less sensitivity to the stimulus show
less). Therefore, brain activation at least crudely matches sub-
jective experience.
This is a truly striking result because it suggests an answer
to the centuries-long debate about whether people who
respond more or less “stoically” to pain actually experience the
pain differently or whether the more stoic one is simply men-
tally tougher in the face of the same degree of experienced pain.
In laboratory subjects who report their degree of pain honestly
(i.e., they have incentives neither to exaggerate nor act tough),
a direct relationship exists between biological response and psy-
chological experience. This means that people who report pain
differently actually experience pain differently. 
3. Experimental Error
The kinds of fMRI-based
pain assessments described
above could produce both
type-one and type-two errors—
that is, false positives and false
negatives. False-positive and
false-negative results from
fMRI pain detection could
result in several ways.
First, consider the case in
which activation above a signif-
icant threshold is present in
areas of the brain associated
with pain perception (both
nociception and affective expe-
rience). This should indicate that a person is experiencing pain.
However, a person may not subjectively feel pain. Predicting
pain based on this scan pattern could produce type-one errors.
The second case is where activation above a significant
threshold is not present in areas of the brain associated with
pain perception (nociception and affective experience). This
should indicate that a person is not experiencing pain. How-
ever, the subject still could subjectively be experiencing pain
because of a low pain threshold (whether as a result of tran-
sient affective state or physiology or some combination of
both). Predicting the absence of pain based on this scan pat-
tern could produce both type-one and type-two errors.
The third case is where areas of the brain associated with
nociception experience activation above a significant threshold
but areas related to affective experience do not. This could pro-
duce either a type-one or type-two error. It could suggest any
of the following: that the subject is registering nociception but
not experiencing pain; the subject is registering nociception
and is experiencing pain but is not highly affectively aroused;
the subject is sedated, experiencing interference with affective
processing of the painful stimulus; or that the areas of the
brain related to affective experience are otherwise suppressed
(whether through chemical means, unconsciousness, organic
brain damage, or difference). On the phenomenological level,
it would not be possible to determine from the scan whether
the subject definitely does or does not experience pain.
The fourth case is the flipside: where activation above a sig-
nificant threshold is present in areas of the brain associated with
affective experience but not in the areas related to nociception.
This also could produce either a type-one or type-two error. It
could suggest any of the following: that the subject is not in
pain; the subject is not registering significant nociception but is
experiencing pain because of unusual sensitivity to pain; the
subject is not registering significant nociception but is experi-
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33. See ARTHUR W. TOGA & JOHN C. MAZZIOTTA, BRAIN MAPPING: THE
METHODS 341 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing signal-to-noise ratios in
fMRI scanners).
34. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
35. Researchers refer to this as the effect of “set and setting.” “Set” is
the subject’s ingoing mindset (fearful, eager, relaxed) while “set-
ting” is the context in which the experience takes place, including
the subject’s perceived degree of control. The same subject may
receive the same amount of the same compound and have an
intensely different reaction based on changes in set and setting
across the two experiences. See Louis A. Faillace & Stephen Szara,
Hallucinogenic Drugs: Influence of Mental Set and Setting, 29 DIS-
EASES NERVOUS SYS. 124, 125–26 (1968).
encing pain because the subject
is highly affectively aroused
(e.g., by fear). Thus, it would
not be possible to determine
with confidence from the scan
whether the subject definitely is
or is not experiencing pain.
In each of the above exam-
ples, the “threshold” for activa-
tion is itself absolutely critical
in determining whether the
subject is likely experiencing
pain or not. A true resting state
for the brain does not exist, as
the only time when the brain
performs no activity at all is at death. Thus, researchers have to
determine what degree of activity in a particular brain region
counts as “significant,” a trickier and more subjective task than
determining statistical significance for, say, population size in
an epidemiological study or political poll. Researchers deter-
mine significance in fMRI studies by balancing signal and
noise. If the software that crunches the data from the scans is
programmed to be very sensitive to differences in scan signal
between task one and task two, it will pick up even very faint,
relative activations.33 This may help researchers focus in on a
needle in a haystack, but it will also make it look like there are
needles everywhere. However, if the software is programmed
to be less sensitive to differences in signal between task one
and task two, then it will only pick up differences that are com-
paratively large; in a sense, it will find the broomstick in the
haystack but might miss some needles.
C. DIRECT LEGAL UTILITY?
As summarized above, the brain does not have any single
“pain spot” or pain-perceiving organ. And we know that pain
varies across and within subjects and depends on internal and
external context. Yet, a few affirmative generalizations can be
made. First, nociception of various kinds generally will involve
activation in the insula and thalamus,34 although many other
phenomena also involve activation of these brain regions. Sec-
ond, fMRI may be useful for inferring the absence of nocicep-
tion and pain. Third, fMRI may have some limited utility in
supporting inferences about the presence and degree of acute
pain. These proposed techniques or methods may generate
type-one and type-two errors; researchers would need to do
more work to establish the confidence levels in the results.
Additionally, such tools may be subject to countermeasures.
1. Inferring Absence of Nociception and Pain
At this point in its development, fMRI could be used to indi-
cate the absence of nociception and acute pain. In the presence
of nociception, observers can expect, at a minimum, engage-
ment of the contralateral thalamus, insula, and somatosensory
cortex. This should be true across individuals and types of
noxious stimuli. Additionally, in the presence of subjectively
perceived acute pain, activation would typically occur in areas
related to affective processing, including the anterior cingulate
cortex and amygdala. There would also be heightened activa-
tion in the prefrontal cortex as a marker of executive function.
Note that the inference of no pain follows only in the com-
plete absence of such activation, not if merely very low coor-
dinated activation is present. Because pain is phenomenologi-
cal, the only sure way to know if a person is in pain is to ask.
A person showing very low levels of activation in these target
regions may still genuinely be in pain.
2. Partially Inferring Presence and Degree of
Acute Pain
Inferring the presence and degree of acute pain with fMRI
poses a greater challenge than demonstrating its absence. As
noted above, the degree of activation correlates fairly well with
degree of experienced pain. Thus, a research subject must hon-
estly self-report experienced pain for a researcher to accurately
correlate the pain to a contemporaneous scan. If a person
either cannot respond (maybe he or she is in a coma or has
locked-in syndrome) or has an incentive not to respond hon-
estly, the researcher has no reliable way to infer the true pain
level from the scan in the absence of a reliable self-report.
Again, this result stems from the fact that people experience
stimuli as “painful” at quite different thresholds and reflect the
experience in different levels of brain activation.
In the best-case scenario, a researcher would take readings
of an individual subject’s self-reported pain levels and brain
activation over time in response to stimuli graduated from
non-noxious to highly noxious. This would establish this sub-
ject’s average sensitivity to noxious stimuli. Then, the
researcher could expose the subject to a stimulus, take a brain
image, and estimate the subject’s phenomenological experi-
ence of pain based on a comparison with prior correlations of
self-reporting and scan data. The researcher could then assign
a confidence level to the phenomenological guess.
Even in this purely hypothetical best-case scenario, predic-
tion of pain phenomenology remains dicey because individual
subjects simply are not very consistent in their pain perception
over time and across different internal contexts.35 In testing
across subjects, it might be possible to say that a particular
response would fall a certain number of standard deviations
away from the average subject response. The researcher could
then give a probabilistic or statistical estimate of how likely the
subject will experience the degree of pain reported. These
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36. In presenting this work in informal talks, the suggestion has
arisen several times that researchers could use fMRI to compile
tables of the “average painfulness” of particular types of torture.
This, proponents argue, would at least lead to transparency and
enforceability in torture practices.
Three fundamental problems arise from this argument: it is
unnecessary, it misses the point, and it invites more subterfuge than
it eliminates. First, a sophisticated laboratory inquiry with 7-tesla
magnets on a statistically significant set of subjects is not necessary
to tell any mentally and morally competent person what kinds of
things hurt and about how much. Second, much conduct that is
physically painful but not excruciating is understood to constitute
torture because of the conjunction of its painfulness and its norma-
tive meaning—for example, rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. Third,
as soon as certain conduct becomes de jure insufficiently painful to
constitute torture, the race to exacerbate the painfulness of the per-
mitted conduct will ignite. This would create a back door into tor-
ture—victims could be treated with every appearance of lawfulness,
indeed with a presumption of lawfulness, yet suffer torture.
This is not conjecture or speculation. In 2005, the United States
Department of Justice issued two interrogation memoranda that used
pain-perception research in precisely this way. These recently declas-
sified memoranda used the research of, among others, Bernd Kun-
dermann et al., The Effect of Sleep Deprivation on Pain, 9 PAIN RES. &
MGMT. 25, 31 (2004), available at http://www.pulsus.com/
journals/toc.jsp?sCurrPg=journal&jnlKy=7&isuKY=550 (conclud-
ing that sleep deprivation leads to heightened pain sensitivity and
reduced response to analgesic drugs), to recommend extended sleep
deprivation—specifically for the purpose of enhancing the painful-
ness of otherwise-authorized interrogation techniques, including
beatings and waterboarding. See Justice Department Interrogation
Memos Abuse Sleep Deprivation Research, UNION OF CONCERNED SCI-
ENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/ abuses_of_sci-
ence/justice-department.html (citing Justice Department memo-
randa to the Central Intelligence Agency, available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/justice-department-memos-on-inter-
rogation-techniques#p=39); Noah Schactman, Sleep Scientists:
Research Twisted to Justify Torture, WIRED.CO.UK, Apr. 22, 2009,
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2009-04/23/sleep-research-
twisted-to-justify-torture; Michael Scherer, Scientists Claim CIA Mis-
used Work on Sleep Deprivation, TIME, Apr. 21, 2009, available at
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1892897,00.html.
37. The second set of case studies appears infra Part III.
38. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2008) (including murder
“by means of . . . torture” in the definition of first-degree murder);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (defining murder to include “the
intentional application of torture to a human being, which results
in the death of a human being”).
39. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001. In states like Idaho, the intent require-
ment is relaxed; an offense constitutes torture-murder not only
where “intent to cause suffering” is present but also “irrespective of
proof of intent to cause suffering.” Id. (emphasis added).
40. People v. Cook, 139 P.3d 492, 519 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This California standard does not include “pun-
ishment,” but many other statutes do. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-4003(a) (including “intent . . . to execute vengeance” in first-
degree torture-murder). Legal dictionaries define “torture” as fol-
lows: “[t]he infliction of intense pain to the body or mind to pun-
ish, to extract a confession or information, or to obtain sadistic
pleasure.” See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009).
41. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001. This definition of private torture has
long been established in American law. See, e.g., Territory v. Vial-
pando, 42 P. 64, 65 (N.M. 1895) (defining torture as the infliction
of “pain, anguish, pang[, or] . . . extreme pain”).
43. 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 41 (2008) (citing State v. Pierce, 488
S.E.2d 576, 588 (N.C. 1997)).
44. In State v. Crawford, 406 S.E.2d 579, 589 (N.C. 1991), the defen-
dant challenged his conviction under the state’s torture-murder
statute on the ground that the statute’s use of the term “torture”
was vague. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied the chal-
lenge, holding that the meaning of torture as extreme or prolonged
pain is more or less self-evident and “puts a reasonable person on
notice of what is forbidden.” Id. at 590.
numerous extrapolative steps, though, reduce the power and
credibility of such tests.36
II. CASE STUDY: PAIN AS HEURISTIC IN TORTURE AND
TORTURE-MURDER
Part I explored the question of whether neuroimaging tech-
nologies can measure acute pain with precision and reliability
on an individual level and concluded that fMRI acute-pain
measurement has significant technical and in-principle limita-
tions, as well as some power under carefully controlled exper-
imental conditions. This part turns to the doctrinal and epis-
temic questions of whether, if perfect pain quantification were
to exist, it would improve doctrine and practice in certain
putatively pain-defined areas of law. It explores these questions
through the first of two sets of case studies:37 the cases of crim-
inal torture-murder and state torture.
A. TORTURE-MURDER
The importance of pain as a signal in the law seems
nowhere clearer than in the historically, deeply rooted crime of
torture-murder. Torture-murder consists of a simple act
requirement and a single intent requirement. For the act
requirement, torture-murder must include the commission of
acts of torture resulting in
death;38 for the intent require-
ment, there must be something
like the “intentional infliction of
extreme and prolonged pain with
the intent to cause suffering.”39
Though torture-murder statutes
appear to limit the offense to the
infliction of pain for particular
corrupt purposes only, that limi-
tation turns out to be hollow
because the statutorily proscribed
purposes are often “revenge, extortion, persuasion, [punish-
ment], or . . . any sadistic purpose.”40
While defining “torture” relative to state actors remains
highly contested,41 state legislatures and courts appear to have
little difficulty defining exactly what torture is among private
parties. It is the “intentional infliction of extreme and pro-
longed pain”42 or “grievous pain and suffering”43 upon another.
Further, courts have held that because society generally has
enough common understanding of this definition of torture,
torture-murder statutes provide sufficient notice of prohibited
conduct and thus are not unconstitutionally vague.44
“The importance
of pain as a 
signal in the law
seems nowhere
clearer than in
the deeply
rooted crime of
torture-murder.”
Court Review - Volume 50 83
45. See, e.g., People v. Steger, 546 P.2d 665, 669 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
46. Murder by torture does not require premeditation or intent to kill.
Cf. People v. Davis, 234 Cal. Rptr. 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1987) (infer-
ring that the jury found “willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing” in the absence of a finding of torture-murder). Specific
intent to kill is irrelevant when first-degree murder is perpetrated
by torture. See Crawford, 406 S.E.2d at 587. Neither premeditation
nor intent to kill is an element of first-degree murder perpetrated
by torture. See State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293, 303 (N.C. 1991).
47. Less frequently, states use the formulation “heinous, cruel, and
depraved” (HCD). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Note,
Depravity Thrice Removed: Using the “Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved”
Factor to Aggravate Convictions of Nontriggermen Accomplices in
Capital Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 2471, 2497–99 (1994) (describing
HCD factors and detailing the relationship between statutory cru-
elty and physical pain).
48. State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 799 (S.D. 2006) (quoting State v.
Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415, 448 (S.D. 1996) (defining torture under
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(6) (2004), as the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of severe pain, agony, or anguish” and “the
intent to inflict such pain, agony or anguish”); see also State v.
Kiles, 857 P.2d 1212, 1221 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (“[C]ruelty may
be found when a defendant intends to inflict mental anguish or
physical pain.”). Some courts require a finding of specific intent
to inflict pain and suffering. See, e.g., Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d
1310, 1313 (Fla. 1993) (defining HCD factors and stating that
they are applicable only where a defendant intends extreme pain
and torture); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 612 A.2d 395, 400 (Pa.
1992) (per curiam) (noting that the aggravating circumstance of
torture requires intent to inflict pain).
49. Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 799. Here, “‘[u]nnecessary pain’ implies suf-
fering in excess of what is required to accomplish the murder.” Id.
(quoting Rhines, 548 N.W.2d at 452) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 239 Cal. Rptr. 214, 224 (Ct. App.
1987) (noting in a torture-murder case that the defendant left the
victim “to suffer in pain”); Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 194
(Fla. 2001) (noting in a HAC case that the victim “suffered fear
and emotional strain”).
51. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
52. Cf. People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 845 (Cal. 2004) (articulating a rule
that the victim need not perceive the pain for a conviction for
murder by torture to be upheld); People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d
899, 910 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (articulating a similar rule).
53. Imagine, for example, a crime that required the victim to experi-
ence one hundred units of pain. If the victim only suffered sev-
enty-three units of provable pain before death, the defendant
would enjoy immunity from conviction for the crime.
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.06 (West 2000) (defining abuse of
a dead human body as a second-degree felony).
55. People v. Elliot, 122 P.3d 968, 978 (Cal. 2005) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
A conviction on a torture-
murder charge does not require
intent to cause death. This is
remarkable because it places
torture-murder with very par-
ticular company: except for
felony murder, torture-murder
is the only capital crime for
which the defendant need not
have had any intent to kill.45
The mere intent to inflict pain
satisfies the mens rea require-
ment.46
In states that do not have
specific torture-murder statutes
but that do have the death
penalty, pain inflicted equal to
torture—so-called “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” (HAC) con-
duct upon the victim47—can differentiate ordinary murder from
capital murder. HAC factors are effectively identical to “torture”
as defined under torture-murder statutes; HAC conduct is the
infliction of “severe pain, agony, or anguish”48 or the “unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of severe pain.”49
Torture-murder and HAC statutes show that the state metes
out additional punishment for the infliction of torture upon
the victim, defined as “extreme” or “grievous pain.”  These
would seem, therefore, to be offenses largely defined by a
quantum of pain. Published opinions in torture-murder and
HAC cases dwell on the suffering of the victim’s last moments
and the degree of pain and fear the victim likely felt.50 This
reinforces the apparent linkage between the extra punishment
that the state inflicts on the torture- or HAC-murderer and the
victim’s suffering.
One might suggest that if it were possible to quantify aver-
age pain for particular acts committed upon the body, then it
might also be possible to calibrate punishment even more pre-
cisely.51 Alternatively, one might imagine a defense to a torture-
murder or HAC charge that the defendant’s conduct upon the
victim was not sufficiently painful to meet the standards
required by these statutes.52
And yet, a definition of an offense or a defense based on
quantum of pain53 might seem intuitively wrong even if it were
empirically feasible. To illustrate this point, we might hypoth-
esize an unconscious or insensate victim. A torture-murderer,
whose sole intent is to cause pain, physically abuses the
unconscious victim. The victim perceives nothing and then
dies from the injuries. The offender will in all cases be liable
for some category of homicide. One who subscribes to the
hedonic or experiential understanding of pain-based offenses
likely would argue that, because the victim did not perceive
any torture, the offender does not merit any additional pun-
ishment; in hedonic terms, the torture component of such an
offense is a nullity. Abuse of the unconscious victim, on the
hedonic view, could equate to abuse of a dead body, a far lesser
offense that obviously has no hedonic component and does not
avenge hedonic wrongs.54
The extra punishment for torture-murder of an uncon-
scious victim (beyond the punishment for non-torture mur-
der) shows that a concern for hedonic harms to victims does
not drive the torture-murder/HAC cases.  While torture-mur-
der and HAC are indeed defined in hedonic terms, convictions
for these offenses (and their affirmances) are independent of
the victim’s perception. As clearly articulated by the California
Supreme Court: “[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder
by torture even if the victim is never aware of any pain.”55
Numerous jurisdictions have held that a conviction for tor-
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56. See, e.g., id. (establishing the “no awareness” rule in California);
Hill v. State, 724 P.2d 734, 736 & n.4 (Nev. 1986) (implying a sim-
ilar rule in Nevada by upholding the defendant’s conviction while
noting that the victim was paralyzed); Commonwealth v. Brown,
711 A.2d 444, 448, 454 (Pa. 1998) (implying a similar rule in
Pennsylvania). As discussed in Part I.A.2, an unconscious person
cannot have subjective awareness of pain, as pain has no existence
distinct from the awareness thereof.
57. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
58. An informal search of “all state and all feds (pub & unpub)” data-
bases on Westlaw, with a date parameter starting (arbitrarily) with
1985, using the search phrase “tortur! /50 (homicide murder
manslaughter) &da(aft 1/01/1985)” pulled several thousand cases
from which relevant results were counted.
59. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d 1100, 1104–05 (Nev. 2002)
(death of adult woman in rape and sexual battery with knife);
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 700 A.2d 1243, 1247 (Pa. 1997) (death
of adult woman during rape and sexual battery, involving stran-
gulation).
60. See, e.g., People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 398–99 (Cal. 1992)
(murder by prolonged beating of five-year-old boy); State v. Lee,
501 S.E.2d 334, 337–39 (N.C. 1998) (abuse of child over a one-
week period resulting in death); Hernandez, 50 P.3d at 1104–05;
Brown, 711 A.2d at 454 (death of a child by sexual torture where
victim was possibly unconscious due to blood loss); Common-
wealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1084 (Pa. 1993) (mutilation
of a two-year-old kidnapping victim by beating, carving, and sex-
ual abuse).
61. We might conceive of “mental suffering” and severe physical pain
as equally constitutive of torture. The relationship of physical and
mental pain, and whether mental “suffering” and mental “pain”
are equivalent or identical concepts and experiences, deserve
exploration in their own right but are beyond the scope of this
article. Preliminary work suggests that many forms of acute emo-
tional distress involve the same brain regions as acute-physical-
pain experience—that the neurobiology tracks the phenomenol-
ogy when we speak of “the pain of rejection” or the feeling of
“broken-heartedness.” In this domain, language is wise; it con-
tains intuitions of our embodiment.  It is not my normative claim
that mental pain cannot constitute torture. Rather, this is a
descriptive claim that, while torture definitions include a mental
suffering or anguish prong, the suffering inherent to torture
remains constructed as primarily physical.
62. 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 278 (James A.H. Murray et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1991) (defining torture as the “infliction of severe bodily
pain, as punishment or a means of persuasion; spec. judicial tor-
ture, inflicted by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, for the pur-
pose of forcing an accused or suspected person to confess, or an
unwilling witness to give evidence or information”).
63. See, e.g., Nigel S. Rodley, 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 861 (15th
ed. 1998), available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/600270/torture (defining “torture” as “the infliction of
severe physical or mental pain or suffering for a purpose, such as
extracting information, coercing a confession, or inflicting pun-
ishment . . . [that is] normally committed by a public official or
other person exercising comparable power and authority”); Seu-
mas Miller, Torture, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/torture/ (“Torture includes such
practices as searing with hot irons, burning at the stake, electric
shock treatment to the genitals  . . . and denying food, water or
sleep for days or weeks on end. All of these practices presuppose
that the torturer has control over the victim’s body, e.g. the victim
is strapped to a chair. Most of these practices, but not all of them,
involve the infliction of extreme physical pain.”).
64. See, e.g., The Ethics of Torture, PHILOSOPHY TALK (Apr. 10, 2010),
http://philosophytalk.org/shows/ethics-torture-1 (pointing out the
broader categorization of torture to include both physical and
mental anguish); cf. David Luban, The Fundamental Trick: Pre-
tending That “Torture” is a Technical Term, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 26,
2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/02/fundamental-trick-
pretending-that.html (arguing that torture is defined by severe
pain, as elaborated in David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the
Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425–28 (2005) [here-
inafter Luban, Liberalism]).
65. Elizabeth Hanson, Torture and Truth in Renaissance England, 34
REPRESENTATIONS 53, 57 (1991) (quoting Sir Thomas Smith to have
defined torture as “torment . . . which is used by the order of the
civill lawe and custome . . . to put a malefactor to excessive paine,
ture-murder may lie where the victim has no awareness of the
torture inflicted.56 This upends the notion that what we pun-
ish in this category is the actual suffering inflicted on the vic-
tim. Yet how can actual pain be irrelevant to torture-murder, an
offense statutorily defined by the infliction of “extreme” or
“grievous pain” or “agony”?57 This article posits that, in this
context, “infliction of pain” is not a description of facts about
the body but rather a proxy for certain values. Punishment
aims at the corrupt tastes and preferences of the torture-mur-
derer or HAC murderer, not the pain purportedly caused to the
victim. A review of the reported cases supports this interpreta-
tion; in the last 25 years (1985 to present), opinions have been
issued in more than 200 torture-murder cases.58 Of those,
more than half involved some kind of battery on the sexual
organs of the victim.59 Nearly half involved acts committed
against children or in the presence of children.60
Because the degree of pain experienced by the victim is
largely or totally irrelevant, torture-murder doctrine and caselaw
illustrate how a legal regime that appears to turn on pain expe-
rience and that is statutorily defined in terms of physical pain
actually rests on the notion of pain-as-proxy-for-values. The case
of torture-murder helps show that
adoption of a hedonic theory of
criminal punishment would be
inapposite because felt pain is not
the necessary (or perhaps even the
primary) object of these legal pro-
hibitions. 
B. STATE TORTURE AND
PAIN MEASUREMENT
The common understanding
of state-sanctioned or official tor-
ture finds close ties to pain. After
reflecting upon the definition of “torture,” most people would
suggest that torture equates to severe physical pain, inflicted
on the victim intentionally (and not beneficially). Indeed, this
sense that torture involves severe pain or the threat of severe
pain to the victim or the victim’s loved ones61 is tracked by
definitions drawn from dictionaries,62 encyclopedias,63 blogs,
and other repositories of cultural meaning64 and has remained
largely consistent over time.65
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to make him confesse him selfe, or of his fellowes or complices”
and noting its absence in English law in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. See, e.g., Yutaka Arai-Yokoi, Grading Scale of Degradation: Identify-
ing the Threshold of Degrading Treatment or Punishment Under Arti-
cle 3, 21 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 385, 415 (2003).
67. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and
Parker Reports, 35 MOD. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (1972) (describing
tactics classified in British colonies as permissible “interrogation
in depth,” not torture). For a more recent example, consider the
extensive public and academic debates over whether waterboard-
ing constitutes torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading conduct;
or permissible enhanced interrogation.
68. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism
and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1488 (2004).
69. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113–14 (emphasis added).
70. See European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (“No one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.”).
71. Gross, supra note 68, at 1488 (citing Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The
European Convention on Human Rights and Its Prohibition on Tor-
ture, in TORTURE 213, 213–28 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004)).
What constitutes “severe pain”?
This single question seems to have
become the battleground for cur-
rent debates about what constitutes
torture and separates it from so-
called “harsh interrogation tactics.”
Quantum of pain provides the
arena in which opponents fight out
the questions of what constitutes
torture, what constitutes the lesser
but still prohibited “cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading” (CID) treat-
ment,66 and what constitutes per-
missible conduct.67 In this way,
“the threshold test of suffering has
been used in an attempt to fly
below the radar of the absolute
prohibition on torture”68 as well as
to challenge practices not currently
classified as torture.
Could pain quantification for interrogation tactics even be
possible? In foreign prisons where torture is practiced and in
the sites of extraordinary rendition to which the United States
has sent high-value suspects for interrogation (“black sites”),
the experiment is already underway. If interrogators or jailers
already perform these functions, it should be possible to col-
lect data on the average pain associated with each technique.
There could be robust debate on what pain threshold should
separate torture from CID treatment and CID from harsh prac-
tices, as well as data integrity. But there is no reason a priori
why these theoretical and empirical problems could not also be
resolved if torture could be reduced to pain experience.
Like torture-murder, however, torture points toward the
normative dimensions of physical experience. It shows that,
while we cannot separate ourselves from our physicality, we
are not entirely reducible to it because we process our rela-
tionships with our bodies through normative constructs. Fur-
ther, discourse about pain within the context of torture may
hide the ball; for example, when the ostensible issue refers to
severity of pain, the actual issue may be the values at stake in
the treatment of detained persons. In relying on a discourse
concerned with the apparently physical, we may actually sup-
press more contentious questions about values. In this way,
pain serves as a heuristic for values and not as a description of
physical facts at all.
In any case, no measurement system for pain quantification
alone could ever definitively answer what torture is or is not
and whether in any given context particular pain-causing
actions ought to be permissible. Stances toward torture corre-
late with relative emphases on pain; that is, the harsher the
conduct the proponent seeks to permit, the more closely the
definition hews to a pain formula (and vice versa). Further,
certain of the harms that flow from torture are independent of
the harms to torture victims but rather cause harm to the state
itself and to its relations with other states, again pointing to the
irreducibility of torture as solely affecting the victims’ physical
experience. This relationship between the harms of torture and
the nature of the state is tied to the fundamental rejection of
torture in classical liberal political theory. 
1. Torture as Severe Pain
The essential relationship between torture and pain is con-
firmed by sources of political meaning such as definitions of
torture promulgated by major supranational organizations.
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN
Convention Against Torture) defines torture as
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third per-
son information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person.69
This definition hinges on the infliction of severe physical
pain or mental anguish. Severe pain does not suffice in itself,
however; the definition also requires state action and the
restriction to particular purposes. But the essential term of this
definition is physical or mental pain; without it, conduct might
be coercive but would not amount to torture.
Unlike the UN Convention Against Torture, the European
Convention on Human Rights, though it bars torture, does not
delineate what constitutes it.70 Jurisprudence under the Con-
vention, however, has relied upon a “severity of suffering”
test.71
United States law defines torture compatibly with the UN
Convention Against Torture. Section 2340 of Title 18 of the
U.S. Code provides that torture is “an act committed by a per-
son acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
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72. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
73. David Sussman, Defining Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225,
226 (2006).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
75. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE
AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 115,
155 (2004).
76. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369(d) (2006) (noting that emergency med-
ical conditions include those manifesting symptoms of severe
pain); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2006) (same); id.
§ 1395x(v)(1)(K)(ii) (same); id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (same); id. §
1396b(v)(3) (same); id. § 1396u-2(b)(2)(C) (same).
77. Indeed, there is “a near consensus that the legal analysis in the
Bybee Memo [is] bizarre.” Luban, Liberalism, supra note 64, at
1455.
78. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen.
(Dec. 30, 2004). The Memo opens by stating: “Torture is abhor-
rent both to American law and values and to international norms.”
Id. at 1.
79. Id. The Levin Memo’s examples of practices that would cause pro-
scribed degrees of severe pain included, for example, “severe beat-
ings to the genitals, head, and other parts of the body with metal
pipes . . . ; removal of teeth with pliers; . . . cutting off . . . fin-
gers[;]” and other, similar conduct. Id. at 10 (citing Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332–40, 1345–46 (N.D. Ga.
2002) and Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22–23
(D.D.C. 2001)); see also Luban, Liberalism, supra note 64, at 1456
(“Although the Levin Memo condemns torture and repudiates the
Bybee Memo’s narrow definition of ‘severe pain,’ a careful reading
shows that it does not broaden it substantially.”).
80. John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We
Are?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 249 (2003).
81. Sussman, supra note 73, at 228. See generally David Sussman,
What’s Wrong with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 3–5 (2005)
(arguing for an account of why torture is morally reprehensible
that transcends the mental and physical harms involved, focusing
specially on “interrogational torture”).
82. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 519.
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person
within his custody or physical control.”72
Definitions from other conventions and those promulgated
by nongovernmental organizations emphasize pain in varying
degrees; like those in U.S. law, these definitions emphasize the
intentionality of the infliction of physical pain and the specific
purposes that cause the infliction of pain or suffering to con-
stitute torture. Because of the intimate connection between
torture and pain, and perhaps for other important reasons that
will be discussed below, “[m]uch recent discussion of torture
focuses on the severity of suffering involved.”73
The most notorious recent example of torture defined
exclusively in terms of infliction of severe pain is the much
debated “Bybee Memo.” This August 2002 memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to then-White House
Counsel Alberto Gonzales expressly defines torture by the
quantum of pain the victim experiences. The Memo states that
to constitute torture under U.S. law,74 “severe pain” must be
inflicted on a prisoner; further, “severe pain” means pain “akin
to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as
death or organ failure.”75
Although the Bybee Memo and its progeny equate torture
and pain, they do so nonsensically: What is the degree of pain
equivalent to organ failure or death? Death can be painless;
organ failure, too, may be pain-free, as when heart failure
causes a person to slip away during sleep. Conversely, excruci-
atingly painful torments may not result in organ failure. The
Bybee Memo adopted this incoherent definition from other
U.S. statutes that do not themselves define pain.76 It has been
criticized extensively for nearly every other aspect of its logic
and legitimacy.77 Indeed, not long after it became public, the
Department of Justice replaced it with new guidance known as
the “Levin Memo” that expressly condemned torture.78
Yet the heart of the Bybee Memo has not been repudiated or
abandoned. The notion remains that torture is best defined by
the victim’s quantum of acute pain. The Levin Memo uses as
examples of torture only those
practices that inflict the most
extreme pain and which would
have qualified under the defini-
tion of torture found in the Bybee
Memo.79
2. Torture as Power
Relations
While many efforts to define torture described above turn
on degree of pain, there is nothing close to a consensus on
which acts (or omissions) constitute torture. Taking a different
approach, other scholars seek to define torture in terms of
power rather than pain. John T. Parry, for example, has
advanced the notion that torture is the infliction of even brief,
non-severe pain if it occurs “against a background of total con-
trol and potential escalation that asserts the state’s dominance
and unsettles or destroys the victim’s normative world.”80 Sim-
ilarly, David Sussman has described the true horror of torture
as that which results from the “asymmetry of power, knowl-
edge, and prerogative” between interrogator and subject,
where “the victim is in a position of complete vulnerability and
exposure, the torturer in one of perfect control and inscrutabil-
ity.”81 These definitions capture something about the horror of
torture that the purely pain-based definitions do not: that the
normative dimensions of torture—the ability to psychologi-
cally destroy the victim and cause the renunciation of whatever
had been held most sacred—comprise an essential component
of torture.
At least one important supranational organization has
adopted an approach to defining torture that is consistent
with the intuitions about torture expressed in these non-pain-
based definitions. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture (Inter-American Convention) looks to the
relational aspects of a torture situation rather than to degrees
of pain.82 The Inter-American Convention defines torture
such that any degree of pain may constitute torture provided
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83. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 43 (1984); see Luban, Liberal-
ism, supra note 64, at 1429.
84. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 9–10 (2003); see
also Heikki Pihlajamäki, The Painful Question: The Fate of Judicial
Torture in Early Modern Sweden, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 557, 582
(2007) (“[T]he idea of respectful treatment of the prisoner only
ar[ose] in Europe after the French Revolution.” (footnote omit-
ted)).
85. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 447–48 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 2d ed. 1891 prtg.).
86. Luban, Liberalism, supra note 64, at 1430.
87. Pihlajamäki, supra note 84, at 558 (citing MATHIAS SCHMOECKEL,
HUMANITÄT UND STAATSRAISON: DIE ABSCHAFFUNG DER FOLTER IN
EUROPA UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES GEMEINEN STRAFPROZEß- UND
BEWEISRECHTS SEIT DEM HOHEN MITTELALTER 359, 536, 591 (2000)).
88. See Gerald Gaus & Shane D. Courtland, Liberalism, STAN. ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 16, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/liberalism/#PreFavLib (“The a priori assumption is in
favour of freedom . . . . This might be called the Fundamental Lib-
eral Principle: freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of
justification is on those who would limit freedom, especially
through coercive means. It follows from this that political author-
ity and law must be justified, as they limit the liberty of citizens.”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 119, at 291 (1821)
(“Every man being . . . naturally free, and nothing being able to
put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own
consent. . . .”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (London,
Longman, Roberts & Green 2d ed. 1859), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/130/index.html (advocating the limita-
tion of society’s authority over individuals).
89. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interroga-
tion of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (May 10, 2005), reprinted
in THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 152,
191–96 (David Cole ed., 2009).
90. See sources cited supra notes 78–79.
it is inflicted for specified pur-
poses: for “criminal investiga-
tion, as a means of intimida-
tion, as personal punishment,
as a preventive measure, as a
penalty, or for any other pur-
pose” other than those incident
to lawful sanctions.  This Con-
vention illustrates the values
component of torture—that
physical pain may have less sig-
nificance than the purpose for
which dominance is being
exerted and the impact on the
mental state of the victim. 
While these non-pain-based definitions capture a certain
aspect of the issue, they do not grapple with what I would
argue remains the essence of torture as an embodied experi-
ence. It cannot be the case that a mere disparity in power is
sufficient to constitute torture. Asymmetries of power, knowl-
edge, and prerogative are not only common but ubiquitous. In
a world of inequalities, power dynamics between subjects are
the norm, not the exception.  
3. Harms of Torture Beyond Direct Harm to 
Victims
The liberal theoretical objection to torture offers another
approach that is neither narrowly rooted in the victim’s pain
nor focused on the victim’s emotional experience, focusing
instead on the harms of torture to the body politic. The abhor-
rence of cruelty, as Judith N. Shklar has argued, only arises
with liberal consciousness because physical subjugation of the
individual to the raison d’état was presumed in earlier peri-
ods.83 Norms of respect for the prisoner’s body began to
emerge in European society only after the French Revolu-
tion.84 The writings of statesmen and political philosophers
active in the founding of the United States and in the political
underpinnings of the American and French revolutions also
had parts to play, making evident that the primary party
harmed by torture is the state practicing it. To take one of
many examples, Patrick Henry spoke passionately against tor-
ture: “What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would
not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But
Congress may . . . tell you that there is such a necessity of
strengthening the arm of government, that they must . . .
extort confession by torture . . . . We are then lost and
undone.”85 As David Luban argues, “torture is a microcosm,
raised to the highest level of intensity, of . . . tyrannical polit-
ical relationships,”86 of the elevation of the state (Staatsraison
or raison d’état) over the autonomy and dignity of the indi-
vidual.87 This puts torture in direct opposition to liberal polit-
ical theory.  Rather, the individual’s triumph over the state
may be seen as liberalism’s core achievement.88
4. Torture, Measurement, and Embodied Morality
Definitions of torture that focus exclusively on degree of
bodily pain ultimately mislead because they suggest a mea-
surement fallacy—the fallacy that torture is no more than a lot
of pain.  Waterboarding provides the paradigmatic example of
the shortcomings of and subterfuges permitted by the notion
of torture as specific and measurable pain. Volunteers who
have experienced waterboarding describe the experience as not
intensely, physically painful but nevertheless filled with panic
and dread.89 Because of the emphasis on physical pain in
recent interpretative guidelines governing torture,90 propo-
nents of waterboarding and similar practices may argue that it
categorically does not constitute torture because it simply does
not hurt enough.
Conversely, definitions of torture that abjure a connection
to the body’s suffering are overinclusive and fail to account for
the status of the body in relation to moral theory and political
theory. Thus, both torture and torture-murder show how legal
categories defined by pain cannot be reduced to facts about the
body yet remain rooted in it through embodied morality. 
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91. See generally Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment
Challenges to Lethal Injections, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1301,
1304–06 (2007) (noting that “[a]n explosion of Eighth Amend-
ment challenges to lethal injection protocols has struck the fed-
eral courts” and describing such litigation).
92. Id. at 1304 (citing Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043
(N.D. Cal.), aff’d per curiam, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006)) (col-
lecting cases).
93. 547 U.S. 573 (2006); see also Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel
Gold in a Hill of Beans, 2005–2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 311, 318
(“[T]he Court’s work in Hill had a profound nationwide ripple
effect on lethal injection litigation and on state efforts to carry out
scheduled executions.”). Section 1983 permits a petitioner to
challenge the circumstances of a lawfully imposed sentence; thus
it is more limited than a habeas claim, which challenges the law-
fulness of the sentence itself. See Hill, 547 U.S. at 579.
94. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SO LONG AS THEY DIE: LETHAL INJECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2006), available at http://
hrw.org/reports/2006/us0406/us0406web.pdf.
95. Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06CT3018 H, 2006 WL 3914717, at *7
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006).
96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 94, at 22.
97. See Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 300, 309, 312–13
(Tenn. 2005) (declining to apply a state animal euthanasia statute
to humans but noting the potential painfulness of the challenged
substance).
98. 553 U.S. 35, 41, 49-50 (2008).
99. See id. at 41.
100. See id. at 59.
101. See id.
III. CASE STUDY: ACUTE PAIN IN DEATH PENALTY AND
ABORTION LAWMAKING
Two highly contentious, current legal controversies appear
to be framed exclusively in terms of quanta of pain: Eighth
Amendment challenges to the death penalty and limitations on
abortion based upon fetal pain. In Eighth Amendment chal-
lenges to the death penalty, the battlefront has moved from the
constitutionality of execution to the question of whether lethal
injection is unconstitutionally painful. In abortion legislation
and jurisprudence, the pressing contemporary question has
transformed from the constitutionality of access to the proce-
dure to whether the procedure may be limited on the ground
that fetuses experience pain. In these areas, the major public
claims have shifted from arguments for outright abolition to
arguments for pain-limiting restrictions. That is, opponents of
these practices argue for their severe curtailment based on the
unwarranted degree of pain they cause while supporters either
assert that current practices are sufficiently humane or not
painful.
These two controversies, at first glance, appear to represent
classic instances where empirical information about degree of
pain would be dispositive. Yet the terms of the debates them-
selves show that the appeal to pain is substantially strategic.
Guaranteeing complete painlessness in administering abor-
tions and the death penalty would not resolve the abovemen-
tioned problems; the abolition debate would simply shift to yet
another area. This is not to say that real pain does not count,
or that limiting suffering is not in itself a worthy goal; rather,
these discourses do not view the limiting of suffering as the
primary issue. 
A. PAIN-BASED CHALLENGES TO THE DEATH
PENALTY
Since 2006, all major anti-death-penalty litigation has
focused on Eighth Amendment challenges to the painfulness
of lethal injection.91 Prior to 2006, the Supreme Court had
rejected method-of-execution challenges to lethal injection.92
Then, in Hill v. McDonough, the Court held that petitioners
could employ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the method of
their scheduled lethal injections as a violation of their civil
rights.93
The usual claim raised under § 1983 is the following: The
most common lethal injection protocol, which involves three
drugs being injected in
sequence, sometimes fails. If the
drug that induces unconscious-
ness is not administered success-
fully, the condemned remains
conscious during injection of
the final drugs.94 Without ade-
quate anesthesia, one such drug,
potassium chloride, causes
“excruciating pain”95 as it
“inflames . . . the sensory nerve
fibers, literally burning up the
veins as it travels to the heart.”96
The third drug, pancuronium
bromide, is believed to be no less
painful.97
Post-Hill Eighth Amendment
challenges to the painfulness of
lethal injection have necessarily
styled themselves as method-of-
execution cases. Yet, they effec-
tively use the claim of pain to
challenge the practice of execu-
tion itself. This is clearest in Baze v. Rees, in which the Supreme
Court both clarified and confounded the state of pain-based
challenges to lethal injection.98 In Baze, two Kentucky death-
row inmates challenged the state’s lethal injection protocol as
unconstitutional because it had the potential to cause a cruel
or unusual level of pain.99
This surely looked like a purely pain-based challenge in
which success on the merits would have done nothing for the
petitioners but tweak the execution protocol to which they
were entitled. But the petitioners (or their attorneys) had a
clever play: they asserted that only physician monitoring
would assure an execution sufficiently pain-free to satisfy con-
stitutional standards.100 However, physicians in Kentucky may
not legally assist in any capacity with executions. Since doctors
cannot participate in executions, a decision requiring physi-
cian monitoring of pain would have the underlying effect of
halting executions.101
The Court did not bite. The Court very narrowly held that
Kentucky’s execution protocol did not require medical moni-
toring while reserving judgment as to the constitutionality of
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102. Baze, 553 U.S at 61-63.
103. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion) (noting that a criminal sanction may not impose “gratuitous
infliction of suffering” unrelated to “penological justification”);
see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . . It
implies there [sic] something inhuman and barbarous, some-
thing more than the mere extinguishment of life.”).
104. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding
that the death penalty is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (same with respect
to mentally retarded defendants).
105. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464
(1947) (permitting a second attempt to execute by electrocu-
tion).
106. Katherine E. Engelman, Note, Fetal Pain Legislation: Protection
Against Pain Is Not an Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J.
279, 279 (2007) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Dover Publ’ns 2007)
(1789)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (analogizing
between Bentham’s animal-welfare argument and positions
adopted by those who understand abortion at least partially in
terms of a fetus as a rights-bearing entity with a right to be free
of pain).
107. The relevant part of this legislation is known as the Pain-Capa-
ble Unborn Child Protection Act, 2010 Neb. Laws 874.
108. The statute makes an exception where the abortion is necessary
to avert the death or “serious risk of substantial and irreversible
physical impairment of a major bodily function” of the mother
or to save the life of the unborn child. See id. at 875.
109. See id.
110. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1101 to -1111 (2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-9A-3(2)(D) (West 2009) (“The physician . . . shall
orally inform the female that materials have been provided by the
State of Georgia . . . [that] contain information on fetal pain.”);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(6) (2005) (requiring physician to
inform pregnant woman of the availability of an anesthetic to
“alleviate organic pain to the fetus”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.4242(a)(1)(iv) (West 2011) (requiring that the female be
told “whether or not an anesthetic or analgesic would eliminate
or alleviate organic pain to the unborn child”); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 1-738.6 to -.17 (West 2011) (requiring physician to
inform female of state-provided materials containing “informa-
tion on pain and the unborn child”).
111. H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006); see also H.R. 6099: Unborn
Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-6099.
the risk and amount of pain inci-
dent to the execution protocol of
any other state.102
Baze shows how pain stands
in as a proxy for the larger values
and commitments at stake. In
bringing a challenge to the
degree of painfulness of Ken-
tucky’s execution protocol, the
litigants meant to do no less than
halt the practice of execution in
Kentucky. In deciding Baze so
narrowly, the Court effectively
left the door open not only for
future method-of-execution cases
but for challenges to the practice
of execution itself (regardless of
whether intent can be imputed to
a fractured court).
At the same time, there is no
doubt that the facts of bodily pain also played a non-incidental
role in Baze. At one extreme, if Kentucky’s execution method
were demonstrably painless, the litigants could not have styled
the case as a pain-based Eighth Amendment challenge. At the
other extreme, if the Kentucky execution protocol involved
gratuitous pain, no justice could have affirmed it because set-
tled precedent would deem it unconstitutional.103
Pain thus played a real role in this question, if only at the
extremes. But everything in between these extremes involves
clearly normative judgments as to the level of pain a state or a
society finds tolerable in the specific context of the death
penalty. And it is in this unquantifiable, normative ground that
ideological differences between members of the Court emerge.
On the one hand, if the punishment of execution equates to the
taking of life, execution should be actually painless—anything
else is gratuitous, additional punishment. Justices espousing
this view, unsurprisingly, have espoused anti-death-penalty
views and have proven instrumental in limiting the application
of the death penalty to special populations like juveniles and
the intellectually disabled.104 On the other hand, justices who
view pain incident to death as an acceptable part of execution
do not find themselves ideologically opposed to the death
penalty.105 The “pain tolerance,” as it were, of justices on both
sides of the issue is a reflection of and a proxy for their values.
B. FETAL PAIN AS ABORTION CHALLENGE
As death-penalty litigation has evolved toward challenges to
the practice’s painfulness, so too has the controversy around
another great lightning rod in American politics—abortion.
The strategy of focusing on fetal pain allows the debate to shift
away from the endless and irresoluble controversy over per-
sonhood. Instead, it permits anti-abortion advocates to pro-
pose, along with Bentham, that “[t]he question is not Can they
reason?, nor, Can they talk?, but Can they suffer?”106 In addi-
tion to Bentham’s moral question, the disgust factor related to
thinking about fetal pain also plays a role, a factor that may be
more viscerally effective than the philosophical and rhetorical
strategies related to personhood.
The tactic of focusing on pain has had considerable success.
In 2010, Nebraska passed the Abortion Pain Prevention Act,
which bans abortions of any fetus deemed “pain capable.”107
The statute establishes a bright-line rule (subject to the typical
exceptions)108 that no abortion may be performed at or after
the 20th week of gestation on the ground that such fetuses can
experience pain.109 Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, and
Oklahoma passed inform-and-consent, fetal pain abortion leg-
islation.110 A proposed federal inform-and-consent statute, the
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, also known as the “Abor-
tion Pain Bill,” nearly passed the House of Representatives in
2006.111
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and 2011 as the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, where it has
remained in committee. S. 314, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 356,
110th Cong. (2007).
113. The inform-and-consent statutes and Nebraska’s ban (entitled
the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Act) apply only to abortions per-
formed at or after the 20th week of gestation. Such late-term pro-
cedures account for just over 1% of all abortions in the United
States. See Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html. About 90% of abortions in the
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114. See Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary
Review of the Evidence, 294 JAMA 947, 947 (2005). Behavioral
studies have shown that neonatal facial movements in response to
invasive procedures at 28 to 30 weeks mimic those of adults expe-
riencing pain. See id. at 950. Premature infants born at 28 weeks
or earlier may also feel pain. See ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNAECOLOGISTS, FETAL AWARENESS: REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 9, 23 (2010), available at
http://www.rcog.org.uk/files/rcog-corp/RCOGFetalAwareness-
WPR0610.pdf [hereinafter RCOG Report]. Hormonal, environ-
mental, and neurological changes brought about by birth account
for these differences between pain perception in an in-utero fetus
and one born at the same gestational age. See id. at 10.
115. RCOG Report, supra note 114, at viii.
116. See Lee et al., supra note 114; RCOG Report, supra note 114. See
generally sources cited supra notes 113-114.
The Abortion Pain Bill had a similar rationale to those of the
state inform-and-consent statutes currently in force, made evi-
dent from its requirement that abortion providers make acces-
sible to pregnant women a brochure stating the following:
There is substantial evidence that the process of being
killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child pain,
even though you receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs.
Under [this Act], you have a right to know that there is
evidence that the process of being killed in an abortion
will cause your unborn child pain.112
As the language above indicates, repugnance to abortion—
not fetal pain itself—is the driving force behind these statutes.
These statutes can be understood as symbolic in several ways.
First, they do not curtail any significant abortion practice,
applying to 1% or less of abortions.113 Second, they do not con-
form to the best objective, current science on fetal pain. 
The American Medical Association suggests that fetuses
cannot experience pain until at least 29 weeks,114 while the
British Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
concludes that fetuses cannot feel pain up until birth because
“the fetus never experiences a state of true wakefulness in
utero and is kept . . .  in a continuous, sleep-like uncon-
sciousness or sedation.”115 Other researchers conclude that
fetuses prior to 24 weeks may, like a person in a coma, expe-
rience nociception without experiencing pain.116 The 24-week
threshold holds significance for another reason: by 24 weeks,
the fetus is viable.
In this arena, judgments about the presence and degree of
pain align well with moral precommitments. The moral sub-
strate of this discourse makes it highly improbable that any
degree of scientific knowledge about fetal pain would materi-
ally change basic positions on abortion. For those to whom
abortion equals the unjustified taking of human life, knowl-
edge of the presence or absence of fetal pain would not alter
their view of its wrongfulness. For those to whom abortion
does not constitute the taking of a human life, knowledge of
the presence or absence of fetal pain might at the margin
change views about abortion timing or protocols but would
not alter their central belief that the rights of the individual
trump those of the merely incipi-
ent individual. Again, the role of
pain in the abortion debate seems
best explained by ideologies and
moral commitments.
CONCLUSION
The development of neu-
rotechnologies prompts us to
reexamine the role that the body,
including the brain and brain
state, plays within the law. With-
out opportunities to measure
and ascertain brain states like
pain, legal discourse about pain
can function as both a heuristic
and as a set of facts about the
body, shifting back and forth
between both. When neurotech-
nology promises the ability to
measure pain, it requires us to ask the question of what, pre-
cisely, measurement will solve. This forces us to untangle the
heuristic nature of pain discourse from its physical, factual
bases. Thus, pain neuroimaging not only provides a possible
tool for measuring pain but also for separating which types of
legal discourse about pain are principally heuristic or princi-
pally factual.
This set of technologies will or should lead to a more
explicit realization of how culture, as mediated through legal
culture, engages in and produces embodied normativity. How
we experience the body is shaped by norms; reciprocally, our
norms about the body are shaped by physical experience itself.
In turn, physical experience provides grounding for defining
what constitutes moral or immoral treatment of the bodies of
others and what conduct toward the bodies of others valorizes
or corrupts our values.
A sense of the normative relationship to the body leads to
moral judgments about what is or is not morally permissible
conduct. Pain occupies a unique position in this regard onto-
logically and epistemologically. There is an ontological pri-
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macy to pain because it is through the suffering of the self that
we understand the wrongfulness of causing gratuitous suffer-
ing to others; some of this is direct, empathic, and likely phys-
iological. In a sense, such reasoning is grounded in the body’s
physicality. And yet, it is also grounded in the body’s status
within the nomos, which is informed by—but not coextensive
with—physiological experience. The experience of the body,
both of self and “other,” is also contingent. Sociohistorical con-
text defines which “others” are seen as sufficiently like the self
such that their pain experience is credited as real; once cate-
gorized, they are deemed deserving of protection from pain.
Since such questions as “who can suffer?” and “whose suffer-
ing counts?” define the membership of the community of
empathic inclusion, they also define what degree of treatment
toward particular legal subjects (whether humans, human
fetuses, animals, conscious machines, and others yet to be
named) is permissible.
Though primarily normative determinations about status,
these questions also involve factual determinations of bodily
capacities and of the subject’s relationship (if any) to its
embodiment. In these ways, the question of pain neuroimaging
shows that there must always be significant translational work
in moving from neuroimaging technologies to their legal uses
and implications. Questions in law about or involving the body
(perhaps particularly questions about the brain) are rarely pure
questions of fact or value. Rather, we must understand the
heuristic and normative role of the law’s body-language—of
the embodied morality implicit within the law—to properly
understand if, when, and how to adapt the findings of brain
imaging to bodies of legal doctrine. Knowledge of what causes
the body to suffer informs what a society views as moral or
immoral treatment of the person; nevertheless, simple mea-
surement can never resolve fundamental questions about just
treatment.
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In a 2002 editorial published in The Economist, the followingwarning was given: “Genetics may yet threaten privacy, killautonomy, make society homogeneous and gut the concept
of human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these things
first.”1 The genome was fully sequenced in 2001, and there has
not been one resulting major advance in therapeutic medicine
since. Thus, even in its most natural applied domain—medi-
cine—genetics has not had the far-reaching consequences that
were envisioned.2 The same has been true of various other sci-
ences that were predicted to revolutionize the law, including
behavioral psychology, sociology, and psychodynamic psychol-
ogy, to name but a few. This will also be true of neuroscience,
which is simply the newest science on the block. Neuroscience
is not going to do the terrible things The Economist fears, at
least not in the foreseeable future. Neuroscience has many
things to say, but not nearly as much as people would hope,
especially in relation to law. At most, in the near to intermedi-
ate term, neuroscience may make modest contributions to
legal policy and case adjudication. Nonetheless, there has been
irrational exuberance about the potential contribution of neu-
roscience, an issue I have addressed previously and referred to
as “brain overclaim syndrome.”3
I first address the law’s motivation and the motivation of
some advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard nor-
mative problems that law addresses. The next part discusses the
law’s psychology and its concepts of the person and responsi-
bility. Then I consider the general relation of neuroscience to
law, which I characterize as the issue of “translation.” The fol-
lowing part canvasses various distractions that have bedeviled
clear thinking about the relation of scientific, causal accounts of
behavior to responsibility. Next, I examine the limits of neuro-
law and consider why neurolaw does not pose a genuinely rad-
ical challenge to the law’s concepts of the person and responsi-
bility. The penultimate part makes a case for cautious optimism
about the contribution that neuroscience may make to law in
the near and intermediate term. A brief conclusion follows.
THE SOURCE OF NEUROEXUBERANCE
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative,
addressing how we should regulate our lives in a complex soci-
ety. How do we live together? What are the duties we owe each
other? For violations of those duties, when is the state justified
in imposing the most afflictive—but sometimes warranted—
exercises of state power, criminal blame, and punishment?4
When should we do this, to whom, and how much?
Virtually every legal issue is contested—consider criminal
responsibility, for example—and there is always room for
debate about policy, doctrine, and adjudication. In a recent
book, Professor Robin Feldman has argued that law lacks the
courage forthrightly to address the difficult normative issues
that it faces.5 The law therefore adopts what Feldman terms an
“internalizing” and an “externalizing” strategy for using science
to try to avoid the difficulties. In the internalizing strategy, the
law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria. A futuristic exam-
ple might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility. In
the externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientific or clinical
experts to make the decision. An example would be using
forensic clinicians to decide whether a criminal defendant is
competent to stand trial and then simply rubberstamping the
clinician’s opinion.6 Neither strategy is successful, because each
avoids facing the hard questions and impedes legal evolution
and progress. Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree, that
the law does not err by using science too little, as is commonly
claimed. Rather, it errs by using it too much because the law is
too insecure about its resources and capacities to do justice.
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to
have extravagant expectations about the contribution of neuro-
science to law, especially criminal law. Here is my speculation
about the source. Many people intensely dislike the concept
and practice of retributive justice, thinking that they are presci-
entific and harsh. Their hope is that the new neuroscience will
convince the law at last that determinism is true, no offender is
genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that
the law should adopt a consequentially based prediction/pre-
vention system of social control guided by the knowledge of the
neuroscientist-kings who will finally have supplanted the pla-
tonic philosopher-kings.7 On a more modest level, many advo-
cates think that neuroscience may not revolutionize criminal
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justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that many more
offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh pun-
ishments imposed by the United States criminal justice system.
Four decades ago, our criminal justice system would have been
using psychodynamic psychology for the same purpose. More
recently, genetics has been employed in a similar manner. The
impulse, however, is clear: jettison desert, or at least mitigate
judgments of desert. As will be shown below, however, these
advocates often adopt an untenable theory of mitigation or an
excuse that quickly collapses into the nihilistic conclusion that
no one is really criminally responsible.
THE LAW’S PSYCHOLOGY, CONCEPT OF THE PERSON,
AND RESPONSIBILITY
Criminal law presupposes a “folk-psychological” view of
the person and behavior. This psychological theory explains
behavior in part by mental states such as desires, beliefs, inten-
tions, willingness, and plans. Biological and other psychologi-
cal and sociological variables also play a causal role, but folk
psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full
causal explanation and understanding of human action.
Lawyers, philosophers, and scientists argue about the defini-
tions of mental states and theories of action, but that does not
undermine the general claim that mental states are fundamen-
tal. Indeed, the arguments and evidence that disputants use to
convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the
person. Brains do not convince each other, people do. Folk
psychology presupposes only that human action can be ratio-
nalized by mental state explanations or will be in response to
reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions.
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why
you are reading this article is, roughly, that you desire to
understand the relation of neuroscience to criminal responsi-
bility or to law generally. You believe that reading the article
will help fulfill that desire, so you formed the intention to read
it. This is a practical, rather than a deductive, syllogism. Brief
reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a
folk-psychological theory, a view of the person as a con-
scious—and potentially self-conscious—creature who forms
and acts on intentions that are the product of the person’s other
mental states. We are the sort of creatures who can act for and
respond to reasons. The law treats persons generally as inten-
tional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of nature.
Law is primarily action-guiding and is not able to guide
people directly and indirectly unless people are capable of
using rules as premises in their reasoning about how they
should behave. Unless people could be guided by law, it would
be useless (and perhaps incoherent) as an action-guiding sys-
tem of rules. Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because
these rules provide an agent with good moral or prudential rea-
sons for forbearance or action. Human behavior can be modi-
fied by means other than influencing deliberation, and human
beings do not always deliberate before they act. Nonetheless,
the law presupposes folk psychology even when we most
habitually follow the legal rules. Unless people are capable of
understanding and then using legal rules to guide their con-
duct, the law is powerless to affect human behavior.
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must
always reason or consistently behave rationally according to
some preordained, normative
notion of rationality. Rather, the
law’s view is that people are both
capable of acting for reasons and
capable of minimal rationality
according to predominantly con-
ventional, socially constructed
standards. The type of rationality
the law requires is the ordinary
person’s common-sense view of
rationality, not the technical
notion that might be acceptable within the disciplines of eco-
nomics, philosophy, psychology, computer science, and the
like.
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised,
blamed, rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causa-
tion and, in principle, is responsive to reasons, including
incentives. Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do
wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how people
ought to live together. Machines do not deserve praise, blame,
reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or
because of the results they cause. Only people, intentional
agents with the potential to act, can do wrong and violate
expectations of what they owe each other.
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action
might consider folk psychology to be a primitive or prescien-
tific view of human behavior. For the foreseeable future, how-
ever, the law will be based on the folk-psychological model of
the person and behavior described. Until and unless scientific
discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves is radically
wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology will
remain central. It is vital that we not lose sight of this model
lest we fall into confusion when various claims based on neu-
roscience are made. If any science is to have appropriate influ-
ence on current law and legal decision-making, the science
must be relevant to and translated into the law’s folk-psycho-
logical framework (as shall be discussed in more detail below).
All of the law’s doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility
are folk psychological. Begin with the definitional criteria, the
elements of crime. The “voluntary” act requirement is defined,
roughly, as an intentional bodily movement—or omission in
cases in which the person has a duty to act—done in a reason-
ably integrated state of consciousness. Other than crimes of
strict liability, all crimes also require a culpable mental state,
such as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. All affirmative
defenses of justification and excuse involve an inquiry into the
person’s mental state, such as the belief that self-defensive force
was necessary, or the lack of knowledge of right from wrong.
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility
follow logically from the action-guiding nature of law itself,
from its folk-psychological concept of the person and action,
and from the aim of achieving retributive justice, which holds
that no one should be punished unless they deserve it and pun-
ished no more than they deserve. The general capacity for ratio-
nality is the primary condition for responsibility, and the lack of
that capacity is the primary condition for excusing a person. If
human beings were not rational creatures who could under-
stand the good reasons for action and were not capable of con-
forming to legal requirements through intentional action or for-
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bearance, the law could not ade-
quately guide action and would
not be just. Legally responsible
agents are therefore people who
have the general capacity to
grasp and be guided by good rea-
son in particular legal contexts.8
In cases of excuse, the agent
who has done something wrong acts for a reason, but is either
incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the specific
occasion in question. This explains, for example, why young
children and some people with mental disorders are not held
responsible. The lack of capacity for rationality that is neces-
sary to find the agent not responsible is a moral, social, politi-
cal and, ultimately, legal issue. It is not a scientific, medical,
psychological, or psychiatric issue.
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition. Lit-
eral compulsion exists when the person’s bodily movement is
a pure mechanism that is not rationalizable by reference to the
agent’s mental states. These cases defeat the requirement of a
“voluntary act.” For example, a tremor or spasm produced by
a neurological disorder is not an action because it is not inten-
tional and, therefore, defeats the ascription of a voluntary act.
Metaphorical compulsion exists when an agent acts inten-
tionally, but in response to some hard choice imposed on the
agent through no fault of his or her own. For example, if a
miscreant holds a gun to an agent’s head and threatens to kill
her unless she kills another innocent person, it would be
wrong for her to kill under these circumstances. Nevertheless,
the law may decide as a normative matter to excuse the act of
intentional killing because the agent was motivated by a threat
so great that it would be supremely difficult for most citizens
to resist. Cases involving internal compulsive states are more
difficult to conceptualize because it is difficult to define and
assess loss of control.9 The cases that most fit this category are
“disorders of desire,” such as addictions and sexual disorders.
The question is why these acting agents lack control, but
other people with strong desires do not. If people frequently
yield to their apparently very strong desires at great social,
medical, occupational, financial, and legal cost to themselves,
agents will often say they could not help themselves, they
were not in control, and an excuse or mitigation is therefore
warranted. But why mitigation or excuse should obtain is dif-
ficult to understand.
LOST IN TRANSLATION? LEGAL RELEVANCE AND THE
NEED FOR TRANSLATION
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to
law? We must begin with a distinction between internal rele-
vance and external relevance. An internal contribution or cri-
tique accepts the general coherence and legitimacy of a set of
legal doctrines, practices, or institutions, and attempts to
explain or alter them. For example, an internal contribution to
criminal responsibility may suggest the need for doctrinal
reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest
that the notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or
illegitimate. By contrast, an externally relevant critique sug-
gests that the doctrines, practices, or institutions are incoher-
ent, illegitimate, or unjustified. Because a radical, external cri-
tique has little possibility of success at present (as is explained
below), I make the simplifying assumption that the contribu-
tions of neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be
translated into the law’s folk-psychological concepts.
The law’s criteria for responsibility and competence are
essentially behavioral—acts and mental states. The criteria of
neuroscience are mechanistic—neural structure and function.
Is the apparent chasm between those two types of discourse
bridgeable? This is a familiar question in the field of mental
health law,10 but there is even greater dissonance in neurolaw.
Psychiatry and psychology sometimes treat behavior mecha-
nistically, sometimes treat it folk psychologically, and some-
times blend the two. In many cases, the psychological sciences
are quite close to folk psychology in approach. Neuroscience,
in contrast, is purely mechanistic and eschews folk-psycholog-
ical concepts and discourse. Neurons and neural networks do
not act intentionally for reasons. They have no sense of past,
present, and future, and no aspirations. Thus, the gap will be
harder to bridge.
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know
how this occurs). Therefore, facts we learn about brains in gen-
eral or about a specific brain could in principle provide useful
information about mental states and about human capacities in
general and in specific cases. Some believe that this conclusion
is a category error.11 This is a plausible view, and perhaps it is
correct. If it is, then the whole subject of neurolaw is empty,
and there was no point in writing this article in the first place.
Let us therefore bracket this pessimistic view and determine
what follows from the more optimistic position that what we
learn about the brain and nervous system can be potentially
helpful to resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the
findings are properly translated into the law’s psychological
framework.
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally rel-
evant because it makes a proposition about responsibility or
competence more or less likely to be true. Any legal criterion
must be established independently, and biological evidence
must be translated into the criminal law’s folk-psychological
criteria. That is, the expert must be able to explain precisely
how the neuroevidence bears on whether the agent acted,
formed the required mens rea, or met the criteria for an excus-
ing condition. In the context of competence evaluations, the
expert must explain precisely how the neuroevidence bears on
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whether the subject was capable of meeting the law’s func-
tional criteria. If the evidence is not directly relevant, the
expert should be able to explain the chain of inference from
the indirect evidence to the law’s criteria. At present, as I
explain below, few such data exist, but neuroscience is advanc-
ing so rapidly that such data may exist in the near or medium
term. Moreover, the argument is conceptual and does not
depend on any particular neuroscience findings.
DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING NEURO-
SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPE-
TENCE
This part considers a number of related issues that are often
thought to be relevant to criminal responsibility and compe-
tence but that are in fact irrelevant, confusing, and distracting:
free will, causation as an excuse, causation as compulsion, pre-
diction as an excuse, dualism, and the non-efficacy of mental
states. It is important to correct these errors because much of
the unjustified legal exuberance about the contributions of
neurolaw flows from them. The legal exuberance also flows,
however, from unrealistic expectations about the scientific
accomplishments of neuroscience. A later part of this article
addresses the scientific exuberance.
Contrary to what many people believe and what judges and
others sometimes say, free will is not a legal criterion that is
part of any doctrine, and it is not even foundational for crimi-
nal responsibility.12 Criminal law doctrines are fully consistent
with the truth of determinism or universal causation that
allegedly undermine the foundations of responsibility. Even if
determinism is true, some people act and some people do not.
Some people form prohibited mental states and some do not.
Some people are legally insane or act under duress when they
commit crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or
acting under duress. Moreover, these distinctions matter to
moral and legal theories of responsibility and fairness that we
have reason to endorse. Thus, law addresses problems gen-
uinely related to responsibility, including consciousness, the
formation of mental states such as intention and knowledge,
the capacity for rationality, and compulsion. The law, however,
never addresses the presence or absence of free will.
When most people use the term “free will” in the context of
legal responsibility, they are typically using it loosely as a syn-
onym for the conclusion that the defendant was or was not
criminally responsible. They typically have reached this con-
clusion for reasons that do not involve free will—for example,
that the defendant was legally insane or acted under duress—
but such use of the term only perpetuates misunderstanding
and confusion. Once the legal criteria for an excuse have been
met—and no excuse includes lack of free will as a criterion—
the defendant will be excused without any reference whatso-
ever to free will as an independent ground for the excuse.
There is a genuine metaphysical problem regarding free
will, which is whether human beings have the capacity to act
uncaused by anything other than themselves and whether this
capacity is a necessary founda-
tion for holding anyone legally or
morally accountable for criminal
conduct. Philosophers and others
have debated these issues in vari-
ous forms for millennia and there
is no resolution in sight. Indeed,
some people might think that the
problem is insoluble. This is a
philosophical issue, but it is not a
problem for the law, and neuro-
science raises no new challenge
to this conclusion. Solving the
metaphysical free-will problem
might have profound implications for responsibility doctrines
and practices, such as blame and punishment, but having or
lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any civil or
criminal law doctrine.
Neuroscience is simply the most recent, mechanistic causal
science that appears deterministically to explain behavior.
Neuroscience thus joins social structural variables, behavior-
ism, genetics, and other scientific explanations that have also
been deterministic explanations for behavior. In principle,
however, neuroscience adds nothing new, even if neuroscience
is a better, more persuasive science than some of its predeces-
sors. No science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that
libertarian free will does or does not exist. As long as free will
in the strong sense is not foundational for just blame and pun-
ishment and is not a criterion at the doctrinal level—which it
is not—the truth of determinism or universal causation poses
no threat to legal responsibility. Neuroscience may help shed
light on folk-psychological excusing conditions, such as
automatism or legal insanity, but the truth of determinism is
not an excusing condition. The law will be fundamentally
challenged only if neuroscience or any other science can con-
clusively demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and
that we are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are
causally effective. This is a different question from whether
determinism undermines responsibility, however, and this arti-
cle returns to it below.
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is
caused, but causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating
or excusing condition. I termed this confusion the “funda-
mental psycholegal error.”13 At most, causal explanations can
only provide evidence concerning whether a genuine excusing
condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present. For
example, suppose a life marked by poverty and abuse played a
predisposing causal role in a defendant’s criminal behavior or
that an alleged new mental syndrome played a causal role in
explaining criminal conduct. The claim is often made that
such causes—for which the agent is not responsible—should
be an excusing or mitigating position per se, but this claim is
false.
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient
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causal conditions without which
the behavior would not have
occurred, including brain causa-
tion, which is always part of the
causal explanation for any behav-
ior. If causation were an excusing
condition per se, then no one
would be responsible for any
behavior. Some people might
welcome such a conclusion and
believe that responsibility is
impossible, but this is not the
legal and moral world we inhabit.
The law holds most adults responsible for most of their con-
duct, and genuine excusing conditions are limited. Thus,
unless the person’s history or mental condition, for example,
provides evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condi-
tion, such as lack of rational capacity, there is no reason for
excuse or mitigation.
Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not per se an excusing
condition. For example, imagine an armed robber who suffers
from intermittent hypomania and who only robs when he is
clinically hypomanic because only then does he feel suffi-
ciently energetic and confident. In other words, the hypomania
is a “but for” cause of his robberies. Nevertheless, he would
not be excused for an armed robbery because hypomania sel-
dom compromises rational capacity sufficiently to warrant an
excuse. If he committed an armed robbery under the influence
of a delusional belief his mania produced, then he might be
excused by reason of legal insanity. In that case, the excusing
condition would be compromised rationality and not the
mania per se. In short, a neuroscientific causal explanation for
criminal conduct, like any other type of causal explanation,
does not per se mitigate or excuse. It only provides evidence
that might help the law resolve whether a genuine excuse
existed, or it may in the future provide data that might be a
guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures.
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition,
but causation—including brain causation—is not the equiva-
lent of compulsion. As we have seen, compulsion may be
either literal or metaphorical and normative. It is crucial to rec-
ognize that most human action is not plausibly the result of
either type of compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by
its necessary and sufficient causes—including brain causation.
Even abnormal causes are not necessarily compelling. To illus-
trate, suppose that a person has weak pedophilic urges and
weak sexual urges in general. If this person molested a child,
there would be no ground for a compulsion excuse. If causa-
tion was the equivalent of compulsion, all behavior would be
compelled and no one would be responsible. Once again, this
is not a plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions.
Causal information from neuroscience might help us resolve
questions concerning whether legal compulsion existed, or it
might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures
when dealing with plausible legal compulsion. Causation,
however, is not per se compulsion.
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other
science, can enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions,
but predictability is also not a per-se excusing or mitigating
condition—even if the predictability of the behavior is perfect.
To understand this, consider how many things we do that are
perfectly predictable but for which there is no plausible excus-
ing or mitigating condition. If the variables that enhance pre-
diction also produce a genuine excusing or mitigating condi-
tion, then excuse or mitigation is justified for the latter reason
and independent of the prediction.
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of
childhood abuse coupled with a specific, genetically produced
enzyme abnormality that produces a neurotransmitter deficit
vastly increases the risk that a person will behave antisocially
as an adolescent or young adult.14 Does this mean that an
offender with this gene-by-environment interaction is not
responsible or less responsible? No. The offender may not be
fully responsible or responsible at all, but not because there is
a causal explanation. What is the intermediary excusing or
mitigating principle? Are these people, for instance, more
impulsive? Are they lacking rationality? What is the actual
excusing or mitigating condition?
Again, causation is not compulsion, and predictability is not
an excuse. Just because an offender is caused to do something
or is predictable does not mean that the offender was com-
pelled to do the crime charged or is otherwise not responsible.
Brain causation—or any other kind of causation—does not
mean that we are automatons, not really acting agents at all, or
otherwise excused.
Most informed people are not dualists concerning the rela-
tion between the mind and the brain. That is, they no longer
think that our minds—or souls—are independent of our brains
and bodies more generally and can somehow exert a causal
influence over our bodies. It may seem as if law’s emphasis on
the importance of mental states as causing behavior is based on
a prescientific, outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the
case. Although the brain enables the mind, we have no idea
how this occurs and have no idea how action is possible.15
It is clear that, at the least, mental states are dependent
upon or supervene on brain states, but neither neuroscience
nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states do
not play an independent and partially causal role.
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action
relation, some scientists and philosophers question whether
mental states have any causal effect, thus treating mental states
as psychic appendixes that evolution has created but that have
no genuine function. These claims are not strawpersons. They
are made by serious, thoughtful people.16 As discussed below,
if accepted, they would create a complete and revolutionary
paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility and com-
petence (and more widely). Thus, this claim is an external cri-
tique and must be understood as such. Moreover, given our
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current state of knowledge, there is little scientific or concep-
tual reason to accept it.17
In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law pol-
icy, doctrine, and adjudication must always keep the folk-psy-
chological view present in their minds when considering
claims or evidence from neuroscience, and must always ques-
tion how the science is legally relevant to the law’s action and
mental states criteria. The truth of determinism, causation, and
predictability do not in themselves answer any doctrinal or
policy issue.
THE LIMITS OF NEUROLAW: THE PRESENT LIMITS OF
NEUROSCIENCE
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one
of the hardest problems in all of science. Again, we have no
idea how the brain enables the mind or how action is possi-
ble.18 The brain-mind-action relation is a mystery. For exam-
ple, we would like to know the difference between a neuro-
muscular spasm and intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly
the same way. The former is a purely mechanical motion,
whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot explain the dif-
ference between the two. We know that a functioning brain is
a necessary condition for having mental states and for acting.
After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states, are
not acting, and indeed are not doing much of anything at all.
Still, we do not know how mental states and action are caused.
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and
other neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisti-
cated causal knowledge of how the brain works generally, and
we have little information that is legally relevant. This is
unsurprising. The scientific problems are fearsomely difficult.
Only in the last decade have researchers begun to accumulate
much data from functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), which is the technology that has generated most of the
legal interest. Moreover, virtually no studies have been per-
formed to address specifically legal questions.
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a
few preliminary points of general applicability must be
addressed. The first and most important is contained in the
message of the prior part. Causation by biological variables,
including abnormal biological variables, does not per se create
an excusing or mitigating condition. Any excusing condition
must be established independently. The goal is always to trans-
late the biological evidence into the criminal law’s folk-psy-
chological criteria.
Assessing criminal responsibility involves a retrospective
evaluation of the defendant’s mental states at the time of the
crime. No criminal wears a portable scanner or other neurode-
tection device that provides a
measurement at the time of the
crime, at least not yet. Further,
neuroscience is insufficiently
developed to detect specific,
legally relevant mental content
or to provide a sufficiently accu-
rate diagnostic marker for even a
severe mental disorder.19 Never-
theless, certain aspects of neural
structure and function that bear on legally relevant capacities,
such as the capacity for rationality and control, may be tempo-
rally stable in general or in individual cases. If they are, neu-
roevidence may permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference
about the defendant’s rational and control capacities and their
impact on criminal behavior. This will of course depend on the
existence of adequate science to do this. We currently lack such
science, but future research may provide the necessary data.
Questions concerning competence or predictions of future
behavior are based on a subject’s present condition. Thus, the
problems besetting the retrospective responsibility analysis do
not apply to such issues. The criteria for competence are func-
tional. They ask whether the subject can perform some task—
such as understanding the nature of a criminal proceeding or
understanding a treatment option that is offered—at a level the
law considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the
subject’s choice and autonomy.
Now, let us consider the specific grounds for neuromodesty
in cognitive and social neuroscience, the subdisciplines most
relevant to law. At present, most neuroscience studies on
human beings involve very small numbers of subjects,
although this phenomenon is starting to change. Most of the
studies have been done on college and university students,
who are hardly a random sample of the population generally
and of criminal offenders specifically. There is also a serious
question of whether findings based on subjects’ behavior and
brain activity in a scanner would apply to real world situations.
Further, most studies average the neurodata over the subjects,
and the average finding may not accurately describe the brain
structure or function of any actual subject in the study. Repli-
cations are few, which is especially important for law. Policy
and adjudication should not be influenced by findings that are
insufficiently established, and replications of findings are cru-
cial to our confidence in a result. Finally, the neuroscience of
cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in its infancy
and what is known is quite coarse-grained and correlational,
rather than fine-grained and causal.20 What is being investi-
gated is an association between a task in the scanner and brain
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activity. These studies do not
demonstrate that the brain
activity is either a necessary,
sufficient or predisposing
causal condition for the
behavioral task that is being
done in the scanner. Any lan-
guage that suggests other-
wise—such as claiming that
some brain region is the
neural substrate for the
behavior—is simply not justi-
fiable based on the methodol-
ogy of most studies. Moreover, activity in the same region may
be associated with diametrically opposite behavioral phenom-
ena—for example, love and hate.
There are also technical and research design difficulties. It
takes many mathematical transformations to get from the raw
fMRI data to the images of the brain that are increasingly famil-
iar. Explaining these transformations is beyond me, but I do
understand that the likelihood that an investigator will find a
statistically significant result depends on how the researcher
sets the threshold for significance. There is dispute about this,
and the threshold levels are conventional. If the threshold
changes, so does the outcome. I have been convinced by neu-
roscience colleagues that many such technical difficulties have
largely been solved, but research design and potentially unjus-
tified inferences from the studies are still an acute problem. It
is extraordinarily difficult to control for all conceivable arti-
facts. Consequently, there are often problems of over-inference.
Finally, it is also an open question whether accurate inferences
or predictions about individuals are possible using group data
when that group includes the individual. This is a very contro-
versial topic, but even if it is difficult or impossible now, it may
become easier in the future. Over time, however, all these
problems may ease as imaging and other techniques become
less expensive and more accurate, research designs become
more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science
increases generally.
Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the
law involve some behavior that has already been identified as
of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that behav-
ior’s neural correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general
fishing expeditions.21 There is usually some bit of behavior—
such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity—that investi-
gators would like to understand better by investigating its
neural correlates. To do this properly presupposes that the
researchers have already identified and validated the behavior
under neuroscientific investigation. Thus, neurodata can be no
more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated.
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the
behavior is not well characterized, or is neurally indistinguish-
able from other, seemingly different behavior. In general, how-
ever, the existence of legally relevant behavior will already be
apparent before the neuroscientific investigation is begun. For
example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality. If,
as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we
excuse them because they lack such knowledge. We might
learn a great deal about the neural correlates of such psycho-
logical abnormalities, but we already knew without neurosci-
entific data that these abnormalities existed, and we had a firm
view of their normative significance. In the future, however,
we may learn more about the causal link between the brain and
behavior, and studies may be devised that are more directly
legally relevant. I suspect that we are unlikely to make sub-
stantial progress with neural assessment of legally relevant
mental content, but we are likely to learn more about capaci-
ties that will bear on excuse or mitigation.
The criteria for both responsibility and competence are
behavioral; therefore, actions speak louder than images. This is
a truism for all criminal responsibility and competence assess-
ments. If the finding of any test or measurement of behavior is
contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must
believe the behavioral evidence because it is more direct and
probative of the law’s behavioral criteria. For example, if the
person behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances,
the agent is rational even if the brain appears structurally or
functionally abnormal. We confidently knew that some people
were behaviorally abnormal—such as being psychotic—long
before there were any psychological or neurological tests for
such abnormalities.
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive. Sup-
pose someone complains about back pain, a subjective symp-
tom, and the question is whether the subject actually does
have back pain. We know that many people with abnormal
spines do not experience back pain, and many people who
complain of back pain have normal spines. If the person is
claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence
that the person regularly exercises on a trampoline without dif-
ficulty indicates that there is no disability caused by back pain.
If there is reason to suspect malingering, however, and there is
not clear behavioral evidence of lack of pain, then a completely
normal spine might be of use in deciding whether the claimant
is malingering. Unless the correlation between the image and
the legally relevant behavior is very powerful, however, such
evidence will be of limited help.
If actions speak louder than images, however, what room is
there for introducing neuroevidence in legal cases? Let us
begin with cases in which the behavioral evidence is clear and
permits an equally clear inference about the defendant’s men-
tal state. For example, lay people may not know the technical
term to apply to people who are manifestly out of touch with
reality, but they will readily recognize this unfortunate condi-
tion. No further tests of any sort will be necessary to prove that
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the subject suffers from seriously impaired rationality. In such
cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase
our confidence in what we already had confidently concluded.
Determining if it is worth collecting the neuroevidence will
depend on whether the cost-benefit analysis justifies obtaining
convergent evidence.
Roper v. Simmons is the most striking example of a case in
which the behavioral evidence was clear.22 In Roper the United
States Supreme Court categorically excluded the death penalty
for capital murderers who killed when they were 16 or 17 years
old on the grounds that adolescents do not deserve the death
penalty.23 The amicus briefs were replete with neuroscience
data showing that the brains of late adolescents are not fully
biologically mature, and advocates used this data to suggest
that adolescent killers could not be fairly put to death.24 Now,
we already knew from common sense observation and from
rigorous behavioral studies that juveniles are on average less
rational than adults. What did the neuroscientific evidence
about the juvenile brain add? It was consistent with the unde-
niable behavioral data and perhaps provided a partial causal
explanation of the behavioral differences. The neuroscience
data was therefore merely additive and only indirectly relevant,
and the Supreme Court did not cite it, except perhaps by impli-
cation when it referred vaguely to “other” scientific evidence.25
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average
than adults to exclude them categorically from the death
penalty is of course a normative legal question and not a sci-
entific or psychological question. Advocates claimed, however,
that the neuroscience confirmed that adolescents are insuffi-
ciently responsible to be executed,26 thus confusing the posi-
tive and the normative. The neuroscience evidence in no way
independently confirms that adolescents are less responsible. If
the behavioral differences between adolescents and adults were
slight, it would not matter if their brains were quite different.
Similarly, if the behavioral differences were sufficient for moral
and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not
matter if the brains were essentially indistinguishable.
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential con-
tribution of neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in just
such cases that neuroscience, at present, is not likely to be of
much help. I term the reason for this the “clear-cut” problem.27
Recall that neuroscientific studies usually start with clear cases
of well-characterized behavior. In such cases, the neural mark-
ers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified
behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear. Less clear
behavior is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less
clear behavior is greater between
experimental and control sub-
jects. Thus, the neural markers of
clear cases will provide little guid-
ance to resolve behaviorally
ambiguous cases of legally rele-
vant behavior, and they are
unnecessary if the behavior is suf-
ficiently clear.
For example, suppose that in
an insanity defense case the ques-
tion is whether the defendant suf-
fers from a major mental disorder,
such as schizophrenia. In extreme
cases, the behavior will be clear, and no neurodata will be nec-
essary. Investigators have discovered various small but statisti-
cally significant differences in neural structure or function
between people who are clearly suffering from schizophrenia
and those who are not.28 Nonetheless, in a behaviorally unclear
case, the overlap between data on the brains of people with
schizophrenia and people without the disorder is so great that
a scan is insufficiently sensitive to be used for diagnostic pur-
poses. In short, at present, in those cases in which the neuro-
science would be most helpful, it has little to contribute.
Again, this situation may change if neural markers become
more diagnostically sensitive for legally relevant criteria.
Some people think that executive capacity—the congeries
of cognitive and emotional capacities that help to plan and reg-
ulate human behavior—is going to be the Holy Grail that helps
the law determine an offender’s true culpability. After all, there
is an attractive moral case that people with a substantial lack
of these capacities are less culpable, even if their conduct sat-
isfied the prima facie case for the crime charged. Perhaps neu-
roscience can provide specific data previously unavailable to
identify executive capacity differences more precisely.
There are two problems, however. First, significant prob-
lems with executive capacity are readily apparent without test-
ing, and criminal law simply will not adopt fine-grained cul-
pability criteria. Second, the correlation between neuropsycho-
logical tests of executive capacity and actual real world behav-
ior is not terribly strong.29 Only a small fraction of the variance
is accounted for, and the scanning studies will use the types of
tasks the tests use. Consequently, we are far from able to use
neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious executive
capacity differences that are valid in real world contexts.
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THE RADICAL NEURO-
CHALLENGE: ARE WE 
VICTIMS OF NEURONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES?
This part addresses the
claim and hope alluded to ear-
lier that neuroscience will
cause a paradigm shift in
criminal responsibility by
demonstrating that we are
merely victims of neuronal
circumstances (or some simi-
lar claim that denies human
agency). This claim holds that
we are not the kinds of inten-
tional creatures we think we
are. If our mental states play
no role in our behavior and are simply epiphenomenal, then
traditional notions of responsibility based on mental states and
on actions guided by mental states would be imperiled. But is
the rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post
hoc rationalization that the brains of hapless homo sapiens
construct to explain what their brains have already done? Will
the criminal justice system as we know it wither away as an
outmoded relic of a prescientific and cruel age? If so, criminal
law is not the only area of law in peril. What will be the fate of
contracts, for example, when a biological machine that was
formerly called a person claims that it should not be bound
because it did not make a contract? The contract is also simply
the outcome of various “neuronal circumstances.”
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-
action connections, to claim that we should radically change
our conceptions of ourselves and our legal doctrines and prac-
tices based on neuroscience is a form of neuroarrogance.
Although I predict that we will see far more numerous
attempts to introduce neuroevidence in the future, I have else-
where argued that for conceptual and scientific reasons, there
is no reason at present to believe that we are not agents.30 It is
possible that we are not agents, but the current science does
not remotely demonstrate that this is true. The burden of per-
suasion is firmly on the proponents of the radical view.
What is more, the radical view entails no positive agenda.
Suppose we are convinced by the mechanistic view that we are
not intentional, rational agents after all.31 What should we do
now? We know that it is an illusion to think that our deliber-
ations and intentions have any causal efficacy in the world. We
also know, however, that we experience sensations—such as
pleasure and pain—and care about what happens to us and to
the world. We cannot just sit quietly and wait for our brains to
activate, for determinism to happen. We must and will delib-
erate and act.
Even if we thought that the radical view was correct and
standard notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert
were therefore impossible, we might still believe that the law
would not necessarily have to give up the concept of incen-
tives. Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that we would have
to keep punishing people for practical purposes.32 Such an
account would be consistent with “black box” accounts of eco-
nomic incentives that simply depend on the relation between
inputs and outputs without considering the mind as a media-
tor between the two. For those who believe that a thoroughly
naturalized account of human behavior entails complete con-
sequentialism, this conclusion might be welcomed.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same inter-
nal contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the agent
that is discovering the laws governing how incentives shape
behavior? Could understanding and providing incentives via
social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal inter-
pretations of what the brain has already done? How do we
decide which behaviors to reward or punish? What role does
reason—a property of thoughts and agents, not a property of
brains—play in this decision?
If the truth of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding
what to do, no particular moral, legal, or political conclusions
follow from it.33 The radical view provides no guide as to how
one should live or how one should respond to the truth of
reductive mechanism. Normativity depends on reason and,
thus, the radical view is normatively inert. If reasons do not
matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular morals,
politics or legal rules, or to do anything at all.
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly
disappearing person remains fully visible and necessarily con-
tinues to act for good reasons, including the reasons currently
to reject the radical view. We are not Pinocchios, and our
brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.
THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS NEUROLAW OPTIMISM
Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally
cautious about the current contributions that neuroscience can
make to criminal law policy, doctrine, and adjudication, I am
modestly optimistic about the near and intermediate term con-
tributions neuroscience can potentially make to our ordinary,
traditional, folk-psychological legal system. In other words,
neuroscience may make a positive contribution even though
there has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature
of the person and the criteria for criminal responsibility. The
legal regime to which neuroscience will contribute will con-
tinue to take people seriously as people—as autonomous
agents who may fairly be blamed and punished based on their
mental states and actions.
In general, the hope is that over time there will be feedback
between the folk-psychological criteria and the neuroscientific
“[N]euroscience
may make 
a positive 
contribution [to the
law] even though
there has been 
no [change] in
thinking about the
nature of the 
person and the 
criteria for criminal
responsibility.”
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data. Each might inform the other. Conceptual work on men-
tal states might suggest new neuroscientific studies, for exam-
ple, and the neuroscientific studies might help refine the folk-
psychological categories. The ultimate goal would be a reflec-
tive, conceptual-empirical equilibrium.
More specifically, there are four types of situations in which
neuroscience may be of assistance: (a) data indicating that the
folk-psychological assumption underlying a legal rule is incor-
rect; (b) data suggesting the need for new or reformed legal
doctrine; (c) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case;
and (d) data that help efficient adjudication or administration
of criminal justice.
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk-psychologi-
cal assumptions about behavior that may prove to be incorrect.
If so, the doctrine should change. For example, it is commonly
assumed that agents intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of their actions. In many or most cases it seems that
they do, but neuroscience may help in the future to demon-
strate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we
think. In that case, the rebuttable presumption used to help the
prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more
caution.
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new
or reformed legal doctrine. For example, control tests for legal
insanity have been disfavored for some decades because they
are ill understood and hard to assess. It is at present impossi-
ble to distinguish “cannot” from “will not.” Perhaps neurosci-
entific information will help to demonstrate and to prove the
existence of control difficulties that are independent of cogni-
tive incapacities. If so, then perhaps control tests are justified
and can be rationally assessed after all. More generally, perhaps
a larger percentage of offenders than we currently believe have
such grave control difficulties that they deserve a generic mit-
igation claim that is not available in criminal law today. Neu-
roscience might help us discover that fact. If that were true,
justice would be served by adopting a generic mitigating doc-
trine. On the other hand, if it turns out that such difficulties
are not so common, we could be more confident of the justice
of current doctrine.
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate
individual cases. Consider the insanity defense again. As in
United States v. Hinckley,34 there is often dispute about
whether a defendant claiming legal insanity suffered from a
mental disorder, which disorder the defendant suffered from,
and how severe the disorder was.35 At present, these questions
must be resolved entirely behaviorally, and there is often room
for considerable disagreement about inferences drawn from
the defendant’s actions, including utterances. In the future,
neuroscience might help resolve such questions if the clear-
cut-problem difficulty can be solved. As mentioned previously,
however, in the foreseeable future, I doubt that neuroscience
will be able to help identify the presence or absence of specific
mentes reae.
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current
policy more efficiently. For example, the criminal justice sys-
tem makes predictions about future dangerous behavior for
purposes of bail, sentencing (including capital sentencing),
and parole. If we have already decided that it is justified to use
dangerousness predictions to make such decisions, it is hard to
imagine a rational argument for doing it less accurately if we
are in fact able to do it more accurately. Behavioral prediction
techniques already exist. The question is whether neuroscien-
tific variables can add value by increasing the accuracy of such
predictions considering the cost of gathering such data. It is
perfectly plausible that in the future they may do so, and thus,
decisions will be more accurate and just.36
CONCLUSION
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just
and accurate criminal law decision making concerning policy,
doctrine and individual case adjudication. This was the con-
clusion reached when I tentatively identified “brain overclaim
syndrome” five years ago, and it remains true today. In the
future, however, as neuroscience and the philosophies of mind
and action mutually mature and inform one another, neuro-
science will help us understand criminal behavior. Although
no radical transformation of criminal justice is likely to occur,
neuroscience can inform criminal justice as long as it is rele-
vant to law and translated into the law’s folk-psychological
framework and criteria.
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It is hard to know exactly what the future holds for law andneuroscience. But it is a fair bet that the future will look dif-ferent, perhaps markedly so, than the neurolaw of today.
How can one keep up with this change? In this brief essay, I
provide a series of resources for those interested in expanding
their knowledge of fundamental law and neuroscience issues,
as well as keeping up to date on cutting-edge innovations.
A useful starting point for orienting to neurolaw is Bill
Gates’s observation on technological change, “People often
overestimate what will happen in the next two years and
underestimate what will happen in ten.”1 Gates suggests the
importance of both a short-term and long-term view. In the
short-term, it seems unlikely that legislators, advocates, or
judges will produce a paradigm shift in law, or that any single
neuroscience discovery will be game changing. In the long-
term, however, the possibilities (as discussed by the many
commentaries in this issue) are numerous and potent. The
informed consumer and producer of neurolaw should be sen-
sitive to both of these time horizons.
The practical reality of legal and judicial practice is that
knowledge is typically and rightly driven by case-specific
needs. The resources that follow provide general orientation,
allowing navigation toward more specific information of great-
est relevance for a specific case or query.
PUBLISHED RESOURCES FOR THE REFERENCE SHELF.
With a Law and Neuroscience Bibliography that now includes
more than 1,000 entries, there is no lack of reading material in
neurolaw. The bibliography is online, sortable, and searchable
at www.lawneuro.org/bibliography.php. There are many spe-
cific topics covered in the bibliography, and general references
include:
• OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW
AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014). This is the first coursebook in
law and neuroscience, and it provides over 800 pages of hard
copy in 21 chapters, with additional online materials and
over 1,000 links. It is the single largest compendium of neu-
rolaw materials. An overview, and sample chapter, are avail-
able online at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lawbrain. 
• Henry Greely & Anthony Wagner, Reference Guide on Neu-
roscience, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2012).2 This chapter by
Greely and Wagner is an excellent, concise introduction to
the field.
• A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J.
Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013). This edited volume
presents an all-star roster of scientists and legal thinkers on
core issues in criminal law and cognitive neuroscience.
• Owen D. Jones, Joshua W. Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall &
René Marois, Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2009). This is a
great introduction for the legal community to neuroimaging
generally, and fMRI specifically. 
• OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS (Judy Illes & Barbara J.
Sahakian eds., 2011). Neuroethics considers the ethical
implications of neuroscience, including a number of issues
germane to law and policy. This Handbook is a wonderful
and comprehensive collection of contemporary neuroethics
thought. You might also check out the journal Neuroethics,
which often publishes work relevant to law.
ONLINE RESOURCES. The easiest way to keep up to date on
neurolaw is to visit regularly or subscribe to updates from web-
sites dedicated to law and neuroscience. These sites include
the following:
• www.lawneuro.org, hosted by The MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, provides excel-
lent introductory materials on neurolaw, links to confer-
ences, a bibliography, and a blog with notable news from
around the neurolaw universe. On the site you can subscribe
to Neurolaw News at lawneuro.org/listserv.php. Neurolaw
News is a free service devoted to regularly circulating news
of developments in scholarship, courts, and conferences in
the field of neurolaw. 
• kolber.typepad.com is the Neuroethics & Law Blog, main-
tained by law professor Adam Kolber. It features weekly dis-
patches from the Johns Hopkins Program in Ethics and Brain
Sciences and guest bloggers on relevant neurolaw topics.
• neuroethics.upenn.edu, hosted by the University of Pennsyl-
vania’s Center for Neuroethics & Society, announces neuro-
law events, highlights news of interest, and promotes aware-
ness of neuroscience in society. 
• clbb.mgh.harvard.edu, the home of the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Hospital Center for Law, Brain & Behavior, features
news, events, and commentary on neuroscience and law.
• www.ssrn.com/link/Law-Neuroscience.html links to the Law
and Neuroscience eJournal, featuring recent neurolaw works
uploaded to the Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
• dana.org features the work of the Dana Foundation, which
supports and disseminates research on the brain and the
implications of brain research for society and law.
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3. Leading general scientific journals Science and Nature typically
publish a couple of neuroscience papers each issue as well as fre-
quent news and commentaries relevant to the law. Within the neu-
roscience community, journals of note that publish original
research findings include Journal of Neuroscience, Nature Neuro-
science, and Neuron. You can also gain more general knowledge
from highly qualified reviews published in the Annual Review of
Neuroscience, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, and Trends in Neuro-
science.
4. http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/index.php/events/neuroscience-
bootcamp
USER-FRIENDLY SCIENCE UPDATES. Every week hun-
dreds of research findings are published, posted, and circulated
in neuroscience communities.3 Most of these studies will not,
and are not designed to, have direct bearing on law. But a few
might. To keep an eye on what’s happening, the following sites
provide user-friendly summaries and critiques of notable stud-
ies:
• www.sciencedaily.com/news/mind_brain/neuroscience/  Sci-
enceDaily provides an excellent compendium of recent psy-
chology and neuroscience research, each summarized in
press-release-style posts. 
• blogs.discovermagazine.com/neuroskeptic/  Neuroskeptic is
a useful resource for providing a critical eye on recent neu-
roscience research. The conversation in blog comments is
often just as interesting as the posts themselves.
• mindhacks.com/  MindHacks describes itself as providing
“Neuroscience and psychology tricks to find out what’s
going on inside your brain.” It is consistently entertaining
and often has legal relevance.
LEARNING ABOUT THE BRAIN (IF LIFE IS BUSY). A
daunting task for wading into the neurolaw waters is the lack
of scientific training that typically accompanies legal educa-
tion. Where should the lawyer or jurist begin to catch up? The
printed materials referenced earlier are all helpful, as the Law
and Neuroscience coursebook includes a very user-friendly
module on “The Fundamentals of Cognitive Neuroscience.” It
covers brain structures, brain function, and methods for study-
ing (and imaging) the brain. In addition, the Research Network
on Law and Neuroscience provides a variety of links to recom-
mended neuroscience texts at http://www.lawneuro.org/
resources.php.
Online, I suggest two additional resources. The first comes
from the Society for Neuroscience (SfN, http://www.sfn.org/),
which is the nation’s hub for the neuroscience community. SfN
produces the site www.brainfacts.org, which is specifically
designed for a general audience. On the Brain Facts site, you
can catch up on brain basics, learn how to spot neuromyths,
and read engaging stories about new research. Another fantas-
tic resource is Neuroscientist Eric Chudler’s Neuroscience for
Kids site: http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/neurok.html.
Here’s a tip: it’s not just for kids. Dr. Chudler’s award-winning
site will answer many of those “I should really know the
answer to this, but I don’t . . .” questions. It is written in clear
prose with useful illustrations.
LEARNING ABOUT THE BRAIN (IF YOU HAVE MORE
TIME). While the above-mentioned websites may be more
than enough for the time-constrained consumer of neurolaw,
there are some additional options available if one has more
time to invest. Online, you can take advantage of the prolifer-
ation of free online courses and videos. For instance, through
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)’s Open-
CourseWare project, you can take (via online lecture and
accompanying reading materials) virtually all of the core offer-
ings in their Brain and Cognitive Sciences catalog:
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/brain-and-cognitive-sciences.
If you prefer in-person instruction, be on the lookout for
educational opportunities for the legal community. For
instance, the Education and Outreach program (which I
direct) of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Law and Neuroscience has developed a curriculum to intro-
duce neuroscience in legally relevant ways to judges and
lawyers. Videos and briefing materials from past programs are
available in the Education and Outreach section of the Net-
work’s website (www.lawneuro.org), and you can be notified of
future such programs by subscribing to the Network’s email
listserv (Neurolaw News, mentioned above). In addition to the
Research Network, other sponsoring organizations have
included the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research,
the Federal Judicial Center, the National Judicial College, and
the Advanced Science & Technology Adjudication Resource
Center (ASTAR). Most of these programs run a day or two and
provide an overview of key topics in neurolaw.
Finally, if you have ten days over the summer, you might
consider applying to the University of Pennsylvania’s Neuro-
science Boot Camp. The Boot Camp is run by UPenn’s Center
for Neuroscience and Society and “is designed to give partici-
pants a basic foundation in cognitive and affective neuro-
science and to equip them to be informed consumers of neu-
roscience research.”4 As a Boot Camp alumnus, I can report
with firsthand knowledge that the program is exceptional.
THE FUTURE OF NEUROLAW. Writing about the history of
artificial intelligence, Ray Kurzweil stated:
The technology “hype cycle” for a paradigm shift . . .
typically starts with a period of unrealistic expectations
based on a lack of understanding of all the enabling fac-
tors required. . . . While the widespread expectations for
revolutionary change are accurate, they are incorrectly
timed. When the prospects do not quickly pan out, a
period of disillusionment sets in. Nevertheless expo-
nential growth continues unabated and years later a
more mature and realistic transformation does take
place.
It may well be that law and neuroscience will enter a period,
or perhaps we’re already there, of disillusionment. For
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instance, the New York Times ran an op-ed in 2012 called
“Neuroscience: Under Attack”; a scholar recently wrote an arti-
cle called “The Problem with Neurolaw”; and 2013 saw the
publication of Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless
Neuroscience. Critiques such as these can be helpful in that
they remind us to be cautious. This is appropriate for the short
term.
But we should be cautious with our caution. Today’s best
medicine can’t tell us definitively if or when we’ll have cancer;
today’s best meteorology can’t tell us when exactly we’ll have
another hurricane; and today’s best paleontologists still can’t
tell us exactly what T. rex was doing all day. But we don’t dis-
trust the endeavors of these fields, and we are patient with
their progress.
The same can be said for neuroscience generally, and for
neuroscience and law in particular. Neuroscience can’t do a lot
of things right now (for law or for medicine) that we’d like it
to do. But there’s good reason to think that just as medical
treatments for neurological and psychological disorders are
improving, in the future neuroscience will excite, challenge,
and frustrate the legal system in new ways. 
If so, the legal system of tomorrow will rely on those vision-
ary judges, lawyers, and citizens who have been keeping up
with neurolaw.
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
The MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Law and Neuroscience
http://www.lawneuro.org
Judges will find a wealth of resources
at the website of the MacArthur Founda-
tion Research Network on Law and Neu-
roscience.  In 2007, the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation ini-
tially funded an
interdisciplinary
research effort to
integrate law and
neuroscience. Since
2010, Vanderbilt
University law pro-
fessor Owen Jones
has been the Net-
work’s director.
In its initial
phases, between 2007 and 2011, the
Network “pursued several over-arching
research questions at the intersection of
neuroscience and law that were
intended to:
• Improve legal decisions about the
responsibility of transgressors for their
actions;
• Further identify factors that can affect
blameworthiness assessments;
• Illuminate the processes by which
jurors and judges make decisions
about criminal liability and punish-
ment;
• Enable more reliable identification of
deceptive testimony;
• Increase law’s abilities to evaluate the
reliability of memories on which testi-
mony is based;
• Aid law’s abilities to predict recidivism
and future dangerousness;
• Assess distinctions between neurosci-
entific evidence that should and
should not be admitted in various
criminal law contexts; and
• Aid the proper interpretation, by
jurors and judges, of neuroscientific
evidence.”
The Network also convened seven
major conferences for judges as well as
15 smaller, judge-focused conferences
hosted by the Gruter Institute for Law
and Behavioral Research in partnership
with a variety of state judicial organiza-
tions, including the California Judges
Assocation, introducing law and neuro-
science techniques and issues to nearly
800 judges. 
Today, the Network “addresses a
focused set of closely-related problems
at the intersection of neuroscience and
criminal justice:
(1) investigating
l a w - r e l e v a n t
mental states of,
and decision-
making processes
in, defendants,
witnesses, jurors,
and judges; (2)
investigating in
adolescents the
relationship between brain development
and cognitive capacities; and  (3) assess-
ing how best to draw inferences about
individuals from group-based neurosci-
entific data.” It focuses on five legal
problems, ranging from “challenges for
law of ascertaining mental states of
defendants and witnesses[, to] empirical
. . . questions of a defendant’s mental
and behavioral capacities[, to] the diffi-
culties that neuroscientific evidence
poses for judges making evidentiary
decisions.” 
On the website, you'll find a compre-
hensive law and neuroscience bibliogra-
phy, and there's also a tab you can choose
on the website home page from which
you can request suggestions for a speaker
on a law-and-neuroscience topic for a
judicial conference or other gathering.
Also, you can subscribe to Neurolaw
News at lawneuro.org/listserv.php.
Court Review was pleased to have the
support of the Network in putting
together this special issue. Several of the
authors of articles in this issue also serve
as members of the Network.
SPEAKERS
JUDICIAL AMBASSADORS: An 
Outreach Program of the American 
Psychological Association’s Committee
on Legal Issues
http://www.goo.gl/OpAZyE 
As part of an ongoing effort to build
and maintain effective relationships
between the psychological and judicial
communities, the American Psychologi-
cal Association (APA) Committee on
Legal Issues maintains an outreach pro-
gram called Judicial Ambassadors.  The
Judicial Ambassadors program seeks to
bring psychologists and court profession-
als together in a variety of contexts to
facilitate the following goals:
• To make psychological research more
accessible to and useful for courts and
judges;
• To work with court officials to develop
collaborative research and continuing
education programs;
• To increase psychologists’ understand-
ing of court operations and legal prac-
tice; 
• To improve psychological research
about legal issues; and
• To facilitate courts’ ability to apply
psychological theories and models in
court-related research.
Judicial Ambassadors are drawn from
APA’s membership (which includes more
than 125,000 psychologists) based on
their scientific expertise in the subjects of
interest to the court.  The Judicial
Ambassadors program also has funding
to help make experts available to inter-
ested judicial organizations for a variety
of purposes, including designing and
implementing educational programs and
workshops, assisting courts with techni-
cal projects or program evaluations, and
participating in advisory committees.
For more information about the Judi-
cial Ambassadors Program, you can con-
tact Donna Beavers, Office of General
Counsel, American Psychological Associ-
ation, 750 First Street, NE, Washington,
DC 20002, email: dbeavers@apa.org. 
The Resource Page
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